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Abstract 
Much progress has been made in developing a precautionary approach to fisheries 
management, however in most cases, this has been largely confined to biological 
elements and a more balanced application needs to address social and economic risks 
as well. A current challenge for global fisheries governing bodies is to manage fishing 
capacity so that it is commensurate with the availability of the resource.  Fisheries 
science is by its nature an interdisciplinary field, and combining information has 
proven to be increasingly important in achieving sustainable fisheries management. 
One factor of increasing importance is the ability to anticipate fisher behaviour in 
response to management regulation, in order to reduce the unanticipated side effects 
of management actions aimed both at the fishery sector and at other sectors.  The 
primary aim of this work is to improve understanding of fisher behaviour to support 
fisheries management.   
 
Statistical modelling tools were applied to determine the relative importance of, and 
improve understanding of, selected drivers for both short term and long term 
behavioural responses to fishery management measures, to quantify the relationships 
between capacity, effort and fishing mortality and to investigate spatial competition 
with other marine sectors. The results demonstrate that expected revenues from target 
species, experience or habit, management measures, fuel prices, aggregate activity 
and maritime traffic are significant factors in determining fisher decision-making on 
when and where to fish. Some of the unobserved random components of the model 
causing heterogeneity in the selection of fishing grounds by fishers could be 
attributable to individual variations in decision-making, along with other factors such 
as skipper skill, age, nationality and vessel attributes.  
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Detailed individual-level vessel data that take into account the heterogeneity and 
dynamics of a beam-trawl fishing fleet were analysed to draw linkages between 
capacity, effort and fishing mortality. These relationships could be developed for use 
as indicators for spatial and temporal management. A key finding from this study was 
the detection of a switch in species targeting and fishing efficiency over time, with an 
estimated 6.2% annual decrease in plaice (Pleuronectes platessa) and an estimated 
0.6% increase in sole (Solea solea) over the 11-year study period.  
 
The research demonstrated how knowledge of drivers of fisher behaviour can lead to 
better understanding of responses of fishing fleets to management and how more 
detailed information on fleet structure and dynamics (including effort and capacity) 
improves knowledge of the relative contributions of different components of a fleet to 
fishing mortality.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
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1.1 Problem statement and rationale 
1.1.1 The state of the world’s fish stocks 
According to the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO, 2006), since the 1950s, 
there has been a consistent downward trend in the proportion of marine stocks with 
potential for expanded production and a concurrent increase in the proportion of 
stocks classified as depleted or overexploited. The State of World Fisheries and 
Aquaculture (SOFIA) (FAO, 2010; Figure 1.1) recently estimated that 20% of the 
world’s marine resources were under- or moderately and sustainably exploited, 52% 
fully exploited (i.e. harvested at their maximum biological productivity) and 27% 
overexploited and under strict management plans, depleted or recovering from 
depletion (FAO, 2010). Fish and shellfish are the primary source of protein for some 
950 million people worldwide and represent an important part of the diet of many 
more (UNEP, 2001). Given the nutritional importance of fish for so many people, 
large-scale collapse of fisheries or a significant increase in the price of fish products 
(the likely result of smaller catches and increased demand) could seriously influence 
the nutritional status and food security of many populations (World Bank, 2005), 
especially in developing countries.  
 
Figure 1.1 The exploited levels of the world’s fish stocks (SOFIA) (Source: 
FAO, 2010). 
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1.1.2 Technological change and the demand for fish 
The past two centuries have seen dramatic changes taking place, affecting commercial 
fisheries and fish stocks. The Industrial Revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries 
induced changes that spread throughout Europe, North America and eventually the 
world. Technological, scientific and medical innovations have resulted in a human 
population increase and in many cases the availability of more disposable income. 
Technological advancement has also allowed the development of larger, more-
efficient fishing vessels (Figure 1.2), better storage and preservation of commodities 
(including fishery products), and better transport networks for their distribution, 
which together facilitated the greater demand for fish (Caddy and Cochrane, 2001). 
With the ever-increasing demand for fish and more efficient ways to find, catch and 
process it, along with the expanding number of industrial-scale fishing boats being 
built, there has been a build-up of excess fishing capacity, with often too many vessels 
or excessive harvesting power in a number of fisheries harvesting depleted stocks 
(FAO, 2003a).  
 
1.1.3 Too many boats catching too few fish 
When fisheries are poorly regulated, there is a race to fish because of competition for 
a shared resource. Such a situation, often referred to as the Tragedy of the Commons, 
is a situation not only relevant to fisheries but to other natural resources (Hardin, 
1968). For fisheries to remain sustainable and profitable, the fishing effort applied 
must be in proportion with the fishing opportunities, i.e. excess fishing capacity needs 
to be reduced to an optimum level for those fishing opportunities. Excess capacity can 
be expressed as a short-term occurrence whereby fishers produce less than under 
normal operating conditions because of changes in market conditions and stock 
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abundance. Conversely, overcapacity is explicitly defined as a long-term phenomenon 
whereby fishers continually operate under normal conditions but their production falls 
short of the target optimal yield, i.e. Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) or 
Maximum Economic Yield (MEY) (FAO, 2003a).  
 
  
Figure 1.2 Modern powerful fishing vessels (left) in contrast to less powerful 
inshore vessels (right) (Source: Jim Ellis). 
 
A current challenge for global fisheries governing bodies is to manage fishing 
capacity so that it is commensurate with the availability of the resource. Excess 
capacity and overcapacity affects many fisheries throughout the world, and fishery 
managers have attempted to limit capacity by introducing a form of regulated access 
to the finite and sometimes diminishing resources (Beddington et al., 2007). Although 
fish stocks are renewable, they are not infinite and their exploitation needs to be 
managed if they are to be sustained. Capacity has not declined to the same extent as 
stocks (Cunningham and Gréboval, 2001), and as resources have become depleted, 
many fishers have redistributed their fishing effort across other fisheries, implemented 
new technology such as advanced fish-finding devices (Thurstan et al., 2010), or 
participated in Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing activities as a 
response to regulation (Agnew et al., 2009). Often, vessels and/or gears are modified 
to circumvent regulations and/or increase effective fishing power (Cunningham et al., 
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1985; OECD, 1997), in an attempt to continue harvesting depleted resources at 
profitable levels (Gréboval, 1988). Such modifications effectively increase the 
efficiency of fishing vessels. Measures are needed to guard against excessive 
exploitation, and tough regulations are now common in most fisheries throughout the 
developed nations of the world.  
 
1.1.4 Managing complex untamed systems 
The major problems facing the world’s fisheries are well-documented in the literature 
(e.g. Pauly et al., 2002; Peterman, 2004; Beddington et al., 2007; Costello et al., 
2008; Mora et al., 2009; Worm et al., 2009). In addition to those relating to capacity 
management, other problems of fisheries management relate, inter alia, to there being 
important sources of uncertainty in stock assessments and fishers’ responses to 
imposed regulations designed to manage fishing effort. Major sources of uncertainty 
include different sources of error in stock assessment models, biased input data, and 
implementation error (i.e. where the outcomes of practical implementation of 
management measures differ from those intended; Peterman, 2004). Of course, many 
processes are complex, interrelated and subject to natural variation (Figure 1.3), and is 
difficult to account for all uncertainties, but each process needs to be understood 
better (e.g. how stocks and ecosystems fluctuate in both the short and long term in 
response to management and natural variation), as do the sources of uncertainty.  
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Figure 1.3 The variability in spawning stock biomass (SSB) of five North 
Atlantic fish stocks (Source: CEFAS). 
 
Whilst natural variability is an inherent feature of fisheries that cannot be removed by 
management, minimising the effects of such variability should be possible through 
adaptable management strategies that deal with the inherent risks and uncertainty 
(Cunningham and Maguire, 2002). Further, one of the greatest challenges to fishery 
science and management currently is to identify causes of changes in abundance and 
to differentiate between those due to fishing and those due to natural factors 
(Cunningham and Maguire, 2002). 
 
1.1.5 Anticipating fisher behaviour 
Fisheries science is by its nature an interdisciplinary field, and combining information 
has proven to be increasingly important in achieving sustainable fisheries 
management (Mumford et al., 2009). One factor of increasing importance is the 
ability to anticipate fisher behaviour in response to management regulation, in order 
to reduce implementation error (Dugan and Davis, 1993; Allison et al., 1998; Fulton 
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et al., 2011). Understanding and influencing fisher behaviour in a management 
context is complex and involves many processes and interactions that may involve 
manifold actors and actions within a system, and not fishers alone. Different fishers 
do not act or behave identically, but management of fisheries in the past has treated 
them as fixed components with no consideration of individual behaviour concerning 
their fishing operations and individual aspirations (i.e. spatial, temporal, social, 
ecological and economic heterogeneities; McKelvey, 1983; Smith and McKelvey, 
1986; Salas and Gaertner, 2004). Several authors have stressed the importance of 
integrating fisher behaviour into management and stock assessments, but progress has 
been slow (Wilen, 1979; Hilborn and Walters, 1992; Charles, 1993; Fulton et al., 
2011) and despite research in this area burgeoning (e.g. Hutton et al., 2004; Poos and 
Rijnsdorp, 2007; Vermand et al., 2008; Ran et al., 2011), few have been able to 
quantify the uncertainty associated with a fleet’s response to management decisions 
(Little et al., 2004; Grafton et al., 2006).  
 
A fleet’s response cannot be predicted with absolute certainty because the drivers that 
influence strategic and tactical behaviour change over time and are not necessarily 
predictable. Tactics can be described as short-term decisions, such as where and when 
to go fishing, what gear(s) to deploy, and where to land the fish (all of which can be 
affected by fuel costs, weather, crew availability and market price), but strategies 
associated with long-term decision-making include factors such as fuel price rises, 
costs for replacing gears, modifications to vessel (including general refurbishment as 
well as changes to allow deployment of other gears), stock status, catch prices (Figure 
1.4) and incentives such as decommissioning schemes, investment or disinvestments 
for modernisation. The omission of such information in management systems, which 
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rely solely on biological assessments, can lead to overconfidence in the likely 
effectiveness of proposed management actions.  
 
 
Figure 1.4 A selection of catch at a Spanish fish market (Source: Jim Ellis). 
 
1.1.6 Ecosystem-based fisheries management  
Over the past two decades, fishery managers have attempted to address past failures 
of fishery management by acknowledging that sustainability and conservation need to 
be focused on through implementing an ecosystem approach to fisheries management 
(EAFM), also referred to as ecosystem-based fisheries management (EBFM), a term 
formally accepted at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The FAO state that 
“An ecosystem approach to fisheries strives to balance diverse societal objectives, by 
taking into account the knowledge and uncertainties about biotic, abiotic and human 
components of ecosystems and their interactions and applying an integrated approach 
to fisheries within ecologically meaningful boundaries” (FAO, 2003b). An EAFM 
therefore implies that consideration of conflicting objectives in the fisheries 
management decision-making process needs to be taken into account. Some of the 
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more high-profile issues that are incorporated in the ecosystem approach include 
increased protection for threatened species and habitats, and to address this there have 
been increased studies on the by-catch of threatened species and their survival, gear 
modifications to minimise by-catch and/or maximise discard survival and spatial 
management (i.e. manage anthropogenic activities in space and time, precluding or 
minimising conflicts between competing sectors without negatively impacting the 
ecosystem).    
1.2 Project summary and aims 
A primary aim of worldwide capacity management is to regulate fleet capacity in line 
with fishing opportunities. Capacity reduction and effort limitation tools are major 
instruments used in managing the EU’s fisheries. However, the relationships between 
capacity, effort and fishing mortality are not well understood, so it is not 
straightforward to predict the likely effect of changes in capacity and effort on fishing 
mortality. Fisher behaviour and their reactions to management measures can result in 
implementation error, rendering management measures less effective.  
 
The primary aim of this thesis is to improve understanding of fisher behaviour to 
support fisheries management. Using the fleet dynamics of the English beam trawl 
and scallop fishing fleet as case studies, I develop and apply statistical modelling tools 
i) to determine the relative importance of and improve understanding of selected 
drivers on both short term and long term behavioural responses to fishery 
management measures, ii) to quantify the relationships between capacity, effort and 
fishing mortality and iii) to investigate spatial competition with other marine sectors.  
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1.3 Case Studies 
The first case study focuses on the North Sea and the behaviour of the English and 
Welsh beam trawl fleet (Figure 1.5) during a period (1997−2007) when that fleet 
underwent notable change with its capacity changing and its ownership transferred to 
operators in the Netherlands, but continuing to operate under the UK flag and utilising 
UK quota allocations. Initially, some vessels were leased in 2001, but ownership was 
formally transferred from 2002 to 2005. A key component of the case study is 
analysing the factors and processes that affected fleet capacity, fishing mortality and 
effort, and examining specific drivers that affected choices by fishers in terms of their 
response to capacity management and effort controls. 
 
 
Figure 1.5 A beam trawl (Source: Jim Ellis). 
 
The second case study focuses on the English and Welsh scallop dredging fleet 
(Figure 1.6) operating in the eastern English Channel and looks at how capacity was 
affected by competition between maritime sectors between 2005 and 2010. The study 
area contains one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world between the Atlantic 
Ocean and the North Sea, there is a Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) in operation, 
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and there are also several active aggregate-extraction sites. Since 2008, the European 
Union has set objectives for its member states to achieve common principles, the so-
called “Roadmap for spatial planning” (EC, 2008a) under the Integrated Maritime 
Policy (IMP; EC, 2007). A common framework known as Maritime Spatial Planning 
(MSP) has been developed. The objectives of MSP are to manage anthropogenic 
activities in space and time, avoiding or minimising conflicts between competing 
sectors without negatively impacting the ecosystem within the Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive (MFSD; EC, 2008b) and human activities.  
 
 
Figure 1.6 A scallop dredge (Source: Jim Ellis). 
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis consists of seven chapters: 
Chapter 1 presents the problem statement and rationale (this chapter). 
 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the topics central to the research, (i) fisher 
strategic behaviour, (ii) fisher tactical behaviour, and (iii) the different factors that 
influence changes in fishing capacity. This chapter provides an insight into the 
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academic literature in the research area. 
 
Chapter 3 explores the factors that cause changes in capacity (strategy), focusing on 
fisher incentives for altering fishing capacity. It considers the different means of 
managing a fishery, including decommissioning schemes, an instrument used by the 
European Commission to achieve the goals of the CFP. This chapter formed the basis 
of the following paper: Tidd, A.N., Hutton, T., Kell, L.T., Padda, G. (2011). Exit and 
entry of fishing vessels: an evaluation of factors affecting investment decisions in the 
North Sea English beam trawl fleet. ICES Journal of Marine Science, 68: 961–971.1 
 
Chapter 4 determines how capacity and effort are utilised (tactics), considering bio-
economic drivers to determine where and how fishing effort is applied. The spatial 
allocation of effort links to Chapter 5, which explores the link between effort and 
fishing mortality. This chapter formed the basis of the following paper: Tidd, A. N., 
Hutton, T., Kell, L. T., and Blanchard, J. L, (2012). Dynamic prediction of effort re-
allocation in mixed fisheries. Fisheries Research, 125–126: 243–253.1 
 
Chapter 5 investigates parameters that provide the best links between capacity, effort 
and fishing mortality. The second objective is to identify subfleets within the 
demersal beam trawl fleet mixed fishery, in order to apply the spatial and temporal 
                                                 
1
 The ideas, development and writing up of this paper in the thesis were conducted by 
Alex Tidd. The inclusion of co-authors reflects the fact that the work came from 
active collaboration between researchers and acknowledges input into team-based 
research.  
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management measures required when controlling capacity, effort and fishing 
mortality. This chapter formed the basis of the following paper: Tidd, A.N., Effective 
fishing effort trip indicators and their use for efficient spatial management in mixed 
demersal fisheries. Fisheries Management and Ecology, doi: 10.1111/fme.12021. 
 
Chapter 6 analyses the key determinants of fisher behaviour of the ≥ 15 m scallop 
dredge fleet, including fisher response to the burgeoning competing sectors within 
their fishing grounds (aggregates, maritime traffic and inshore limits, as a proxy for 
the <10m fishing fleet sector) and how capacity is affected. Parameter estimation is at 
a fine spatial resolution using estimated recorded VMS positions.  
 
Chapter 7 provides an overview of the work developed in the thesis, highlights the 
importance and potential limitations of each study, and suggests future work to take 
the ideas forward. 
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Chapter 2.   Background and literature review 
 
 
 
 
 
Fishing vessels in Cork harbour (Source: Jim Ellis) 
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This section gives an overview of the literature on fisher behaviour and fleet 
dynamics and why better understanding of fisher responses to regulatory measures is 
needed for effective fisheries management. To place the literature on fleet behaviour 
in context of the case study areas, I will provide background on fisheries management 
in European waters and its associated problems. I will also introduce and define some 
of the technical terms used throughout this thesis. 
 
2.1 Why is understanding fisher behaviour and fleet dynamics 
important? 
Since the latter part of the 20th century, behavioural ecologists have been observing 
the responses by humans to changing environments (see Smith et al., 1992; Cronk et 
al., 2000; Smith, 2000). Their goal was to determine how social and ecological factors 
influence human responses within and across groups, and to predict patterns of 
behaviour, using mathematical models to quantify the relationships and processes 
observed. Although biological advice is a key element in the successful management 
of fisheries, it is increasingly evident that fisheries management is not solely a 
biological or ecological issue. The aim of fisheries management is to balance the 
needs of fishers while maintaining and sustaining healthy stocks while also reducing 
impacts to the ecosystem.  For fisheries management to be successful several authors 
have stated that understanding fisheries dynamics and the drivers that influence the 
behaviour of fishers is necessary (Wilen, 1979; Hilborn and Walters, 1992; Charles, 
1993; Fulton et al., 2011).  
 
Many factors influence a fisher’s decision where and when to fish, including fish 
distribution, fuel price, regulations, the weather, their habits and experience, previous 
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catch rates, market prices, and the proximity to landing ports. These factors can lead 
to differences in observed individual fisher behaviour and the way a group of fishers 
(a fleet) allocate their effort in time and space (See Table 2.1 for a break down of 
studies that include factors that influence fisher behaviour).   
 
Management of the resource can only be achieved by managing the resource user 
(fisher or fishers) and hence the fishing mortality of the resource. The numbers of 
vessels, size of vessels or engine power are capacity measures and can be linked to 
fishing effort; as effort is the amount of time fishing capacity is deployed in the 
fishery. Fisheries management often assumes that a reduction in capacity or effort is 
assumed to reduce fishing mortality but that may not necessarily always be the case 
and both capacity and effort can be challenging to quantify and collect accurate data 
on. Also, the data acquired can be heavily influenced by fisher behaviour.  
 
Overcapacity means that there are too many boats chasing too few fish, which means 
that as stocks decline it is difficult to implement recovery and long-term management 
plans. For example, while EU fish stocks have declined, fishing capacity has not 
(http://www.ieep.eu/assets/437/overcapacity.pdf). Instead the fishers are motivated to 
redistribute their fishing effort across fisheries, implement new technologies such as 
advanced fish-finding devices (Branch et al., 2006), or participate in illegal, 
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing (Agnew et al., 2009) or increase power to 
try and better harvest a dwindling resource (Khalilian et al., 2010).  In a number of 
fisheries, fleet capacity is said to be 2–3 times the sustainable level 
(http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/documentation/publications/cfp_brochure/fleet_en.pdf). 
However with excessive levels of capacity economic problems arise, with knock-on 
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effects to the conservation of other stocks.   
 
The definition of fleet dynamics is widely understood as changes in fishing capacity, 
the FAO (2003) define ‘capacity’ of a vessel, or a fleet as its ability, or power to 
generate fishing effort per period of time. In fisheries science, fishing effort (E) is an 
essential parameter in the assessment of fish stocks and their effective management. It 
is linked to fishing mortality (F) via the catchability (q) at age of a stock, a term that 
generally means the extent to which the stock is susceptible to fishing and that would 
be captured by one unit of effort. Catchability is therefore equally important to 
managers as effort in assessing fish stocks and ultimately in supporting effective 
management. The relationship is assumed to be linear and takes the form F=qE. 
Fishing effort, however, is difficult to quantify because the sizes and types of vessels 
and gears differ. It is usually approximated by a metric of capacity, such as gross 
tonnage or engine power, with a measure of activity (e.g. days at sea or hours fished), 
and is therefore an aggregated measure of fisher behaviour in locating the greatest 
densities of marketable fish (Rijnsdorp et al., 2006).   
 
The efficiency of fishing vessels and hence catchability tends to increase over time 
because of factors such as fishing technology improvements. Improvements in vessel 
design, marine electronics, and fish finding equipment and innovative developments 
in fishing gear potentially make catching fish more efficient, i.e. an increase in 
technical efficiency, which is commonly referred to as technical creep (Gulland, 1956). 
Technical creep can be quantified in relation to fishing mortality with constant 
nominal effort (En) and intensified effective effort (Ee). These relationships are 
important to fishery managers because they are crucial in reducing fishing mortality 
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through effort control, and ignoring them could prove meaningless in limiting fishing 
mortality (Pauly et al., 2002). Shepherd (2003) suggested that for a given amount of 
effort exerted, and because of variations in vessels and their activity, can induce 
different effects on stocks in terms of fishing mortality that can be generated. 
 
2.1.2 The Common Fisheries Policy 
The European Community has one of the world's largest fishing fleets, and is the 
world’s third largest catching power.  It is also the largest importer of fishery products 
in the world, and in 2007 imported nearly 15 billion euros worth (ACP, 2009).  The 
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), provides the framework for fisheries management 
within the EU for its Member States, and is currently under reform (EC, 2009a). The 
regulatory regime governing the community waters is complex and vast compared to 
the size of the fishing industry and yet 88% of these stocks are over-fished (House of 
Lords Paper, 2008; EC, 2009a), owing to a combination of poor compliance, 
ineffective enforcement in many regions, overcapacity in fishing fleets due in part to 
subsidies (Lindebo, 2005).   
 
The management of European mixed fisheries is primarily based on total allowable 
catches (TACs) along with effort restrictions (days at sea), technical measures (gear 
and/or mesh size regulations, size restrictions) and seasonal closures. Effort 
management differs from TACs in that controls on effort manage the input rather than 
the outputs specified by a TAC, although they both aim to limit fishing mortality. The 
difficulties in managing fish stocks through TACs are widely recognised (Shepherd, 
2003; Beddington et al., 2007).  The main issue is that a TAC set to protect one 
species within a mixed fishery can have an undesired effect on another through 
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increased discarding, or indirectly through foodweb interactions. Hence, a 
conservation policy cannot achieve its goal through this single management action 
alone. North Sea cod (Gadus morhua), for example, and many other commercially 
exploited species, have dramatically declined due to high fishing mortality in mixed 
fisheries (Hentrich and Salomon, 2006).  
 
Some fisheries/fishing gears are highly selective, but some of the main gears used by 
EC fleets (e.g. trawls) are not particularly species-specific, often leading to 
unintended catch and discarding of undesired species (Horwood et al., 2006).  This 
can result from management. For example an inappropriate quota coupled with catch 
composition rules and minimum-landing size gave rise to an unavoidably high level 
of discarding e.g. North Sea beam trawl fishery for sole where high discarding of 
plaice (Pleuronectes platessa) occurs (Feekings et al., 2012). Species that are 
discarded can survive but a high proportion die on return to the sea or the illegal 
retention of the catch leads to socially undesirable results, such as trading illegally on 
the black market (Copes 1986). 
 
Another serious issue in fisheries management is when scientific advice is 
systematically ignored by management decision makers, or not acted upon with 
enough urgency usually for political expediency (Daw and Gray, 2005). The resulting 
policy from the governing bodies rarely reflects the scientific advice, as is can be 
‘bargained’ through a political process (Ritchie and Zito, 1998; Payne, 2000; 
Lesquesne, 2001). The political process often involves member states looking after 
their (short-term) national interests, (i.e. the fishing fleet) rather than conservation of 
the resource.  The result is that quotas are often set at a level higher than the predicted 
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landings corresponding to scientific advice on what should be appropriate exploitation 
rates.  Fishers argue about the scientific advice, saying that the stock assessments are 
out of date and too reliant on modelling approaches, that scientific trawl surveys are 
not representative of the stocks, and that commercial fisher data (e.g. logbook 
information) is not often used in the stock assessments and provision of advice 
(Richie, 2003). Fishers and various stakeholders within member states involved in 
policy implementation also argue about transparency and equitability of the process. 
The fishing industry often considers that it’s too centralised, a top down regulatory 
measure dictated by Brussels with a lack of representation of national/regional 
interests.  In turn these decisions result in an imbalance between fishing capacity and 
available resource and as such can have a knock on effect in terms of strategic 
behaviour of fishers. 
 
2.1.3 Compliance and enforcement 
The past has shown that when fisheries are poorly regulated, there may be a race to 
exploit them, a situation commonly known as the “Tragedy of the Commons” 
(Hardin, 1968). In an environment where change takes place, fishers develop tactics 
and strategies to survive when faced with rising fuel costs, fluctuating stock levels, 
regulations, and market conditions. In a management context it is important to 
understand fisher behaviour in the face of a changing environment in order to manage 
the system better. For instance, if managers impose regulations, they will ultimately 
change the behaviour of the fisher. Such a change may have great implications for 
fishers economically, socially, ecologically, and geographically. If the resulting 
behaviour is not understood correctly, ineffective management outcomes and conflict 
can be expected. However without detailed knowledge of variation in behaviour 
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among fishers, managing fisheries becomes very difficult. Kuperan and Raja 
Abdullah (1994) described the social implications of small scale fishers competing 
with illegal commercial fishers who are let down by governing institutions, and as 
such make management difficult.  Poor international regulations and enforcement are 
said to be the single most important drivers for IUU fishing (Agnew and Barnes, 
2004). Nevertheless, the variability in compliance between fishers and fisheries is 
poorly understood (Branch, 2006).   
 
There are several enforcement theories in the economics literature; see, e.g., Becker 
and Stigler (1974), or more recently Polinsky and Shavell (2001) which researches 
corruption amongst law enforcers and the level of honesty for a given bribe.  Becker 
and Stigler (1974) found that law enforcers under supervision and are paid a higher 
wage would be less corrupt.  In terms of fisheries studies Sutinen and Anderson 
(1985) based their theories within the field of the economics of law, whereby non-
compliers maximise the benefits of their law-breaking compared to the expected 
probability of being caught. However, an early empirical study by Furlong (1991) 
compatible with the seminal economics of crime paper by Becker (1968) showed 
signs that expected fines for violations and monitoring have a positive effect on 
deterring offences.  Fisheries managers are beginning to look at how social and 
normative factors influence the fisher behaviour and compliance. Recent compliance 
studies in the literature investigate personal characteristics such as age and years 
within the fishery, fairness of regulation and the risk and benefits associated with 
illegal activity.  For example Hatcher et al. (2000) applied a binary model to data and 
discovered factors affecting UK fishermen’s violation and compliance towards quotas 
including risks with respect to detection, and the expected financial penalty.  The 
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social outcomes of the study showed that the fishers felt they would adhere to 
regulations if they were involved in their implementation. Nielsen and Mathiesen 
(2003) studied factors influencing rule compliance in Danish fisheries, they concluded 
that there where 6 important factors that influenced compliance and non-compliance; 
(i) economic gains to be obtained, (ii) deterrence and sanctions, (iii) compatibility 
between regulations and fishing practices and patterns, (iv) efficacy of imposed 
regulations, (v) norms (behaviour of other fishers) and morals, (vi) perception of 
being part of the decision-making process (indication).  Some of their findings 
complemented results from a UK survey conducted by Hatcher and Gordon (2005) 
who found that quota regulations were deemed unfair and treated with a lack of 
respect. Responses showed that more than one-quarter of UK fishers exceeded their 
quotas by >20%, and that just one-fifth never exceeded their quotas. The financial 
constraint of the quota was responsible for them exceeding the quota in order to stay 
in business. There was also strong evidence that, generally, the EU was the least 
respected regulatory authority and that local institutions were the most respected. For 
example two-thirds of UK fishers who were members of producer organizations 
(POs) were more likely to comply with the quota laid down by the PO because they 
had more involvement in the regulatory process. However few empirical studies exist 
in the area of compliance and enforcement for fisheries, which is surprising since it is 
an important aspect of managing fisheries.   
 
2.1.4 Implementation error  
Of increasing importance to fisheries science and management is the ability to 
anticipate fisher behaviour in response to management regulation, in order to reduce 
implementation error (Fulton et al., 2011), i.e. where the effects of management differ 
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from that intended. An example of implementation error is where fishing effort is 
redistributed following a spatial closure to protect a stock (or cohort), in a way that 
was not anticipated by management. As a general statement: all management plans 
(e.g. using TACs to reduce fishing mortality) seem like a good idea in advance and 
they mainly fail due to the response of the fisher (e.g. they may mis-report or high-
grade). Implementation error is increasingly being integrated into the discussions that 
include stakeholder involvement in the design of management plans, i.e. spatial and 
temporal closures, effort control and discard management. Implementation error 
usually arises from a combination of non-compliance with regulations by harvesters, 
changing catchability, and other dynamic processes in the fleet (Peterman, 2004), in 
addition to changing tactics and strategies in terms of location choice.  
 
2.1.5 Fisher tactics: location choice 
Many factors influence a fisher’s decision where and when to fish, including fish 
distribution, fuel price, regulations, their habits and experience, previous catch rates, 
market prices, and the proximity to landing ports. These factors can lead to 
differences in observed individual fisher behaviour and the way a group of fishers (a 
fleet) allocate their effort in time and space. Several studies have looked at 
behavioural aspects of the way fishers spatially allocate their effort (Rijnsdorp et al., 
2000; Hilborn et al., 2005; Smith et al., 2009). An important element influencing 
fisher behaviour is stock density, because fishers tend to have prior knowledge 
(Begossi, 2001) of resource distribution and habitat (Hilborn and Ledbetter, 1979; 
Gillis et al., 1993; Pet-Soede et al., 2001). Catch rates are related to stock density and 
will have a large impact on fisher behaviour (Eales and Wilen, 1986; Marchal et al., 
2006). This means that fishers will gravitate towards areas where catch rates are 
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greatest, and gravity models have been specified and applied to model fishing vessel 
spatial distribution (e.g. Walters and Bonfil, 1999). Economic factors and 
management measures in the form of technical measures (size restrictions or gear 
restrictions; Bene and Tewfik, 2001), marine protected areas (MPAs), and spatial 
closures may also force fishers to search for new fishing grounds (Hutton et al., 
2004).  
 
Over the past few years, much attention has been paid to predicting fisher location 
choice by applying models of discrete choice as the common assumption with these 
models is that of ‘random utility maximisation’ (RUM) (Anderson et al., 2010; see 
Section 2.2.1). Simply, the main assumption is that a fisher, who is faced with a finite 
set of locations to choose from, chooses the location which gives the maximum 
amount of utility. Predicting fisher behaviour using discrete choice models has 
increased in popularity with the increasing availability of appropriate data (vessel-by-
vessel trip data), because such models offer an opportunity to study individual 
behaviour at finer resolutions of time and space than other techniques (Coglan et al., 
2004; Hutton et al., 2004). These models can be applied to various theoretical policy 
scenarios (See Table 2.1 for studies), which can also be simulated.  
 
2.1.6 Fisher tactical response to management 
It is widely recognised that decision makers and managers now require an ecosystem-
based approach to address current interlinked problems for social well-being (FAO, 
2003b).  Understanding and predicting choice of fishing area can help fisheries 
managers when implementing management plans to protect marine resources, 
reducing the impact of spatial closures on the economic viability of a fishery and 
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reducing also the unintended side-effects.  There have been numerous discussions by 
fisheries managers on the benefits of MPAs or spatial closures for managing fisheries 
(e.g. larger fish, an increase in spawning stock biomass, protection of endangered 
habitat (Holland and Brazee, 1996)), because they are, apparently, relatively cost-
effective and a useful tool and “safe bet” (insurance) against management failure 
(Lauck et al., 1998; Sumaila, 1998; Murray et al., 1999) to protect resources.  
Although they are widely advocated and increasingly used around the world’s tropical 
and temperate fisheries, very few studies have explored the implications of MPAs for 
subsequent fisher behaviour, including spatial displacement, and therefore the extent 
of the biological impact (Sanchirico and Wilen, 2002; Smith and Wilen, 2003; Wilcox 
and Pomeroy, 2003).  Empirical studies have shown that if the MPA is implemented 
for long enough, marine life may recover in terms of size, fecundity and abundance 
within its boundaries (Hixon, 2002; Halpern, 2003). Halpern (2003) and Alcala et al. 
(2005) have discussed the benefits of MPAs in relation to poor or little scientific 
information, depleted stocks and situations when enforcement is insufficient.   
 
A number of models have been developed to assess the effects of reallocation of 
fishing effort on target stocks (Horwood et al., 1998; Steffansson and Rosenberg, 
2006), but knowledge of the biological effects of displacement of fishing effort 
outside the boundaries of MPAs is not well developed (Jennings, 2009).  Simulation 
models have been used widely to validate hypotheses on the design of MPAs, and to 
evaluate their biological benefits (Botsford et al., 2007). In order for MPAs to work 
successfully for a fish species, there needs to be a complete cessation of fishing 
activities (or those fishing activities that affect the species in question) within a 
sufficiently large area (Steffansson and Rosenberg, 2005), protecting the 
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encompassed species and allowing stock recovery.  
 
 
Table 2.1 Summary of fisher tactical and strategic studies in the literature 
showing the different factors influencing fisher decisions. 
 
 
Factors used in this study 
  
References 
  
Expected revenue/catch 
  
  
  
Bockstael and Opaluch, 1983; Mangel and Clark, 1983; Eales and Wilen, 
1986; Dupont, 1993; Gillis, 1993, 2003; Prince and Hilborn, 1998; Holland and 
Sutinen, 1999; Walters and Bonfil, 1999; Mistiaen and Strand, 2000; Smith, 
2000; Eggert and Tveras,  2001; Fonteneau and Richard, 2003; Swain and 
Wade, 2003; Bertrand, 2004; Hutton et al., 2004; Pradhan and Leung, 2004; 
Salas and Gaertner, 2004; Murawski et al., 2005; Anderson and Christensen, 
2006; Marchal et al., 2006; Vermand et al., 2008; Ran et al., 2011 
Operating costs 
(e.g. distance and fuel prices) 
  
Eales and Wilen, 1986; Dupont, 1993; Holland and Sutinen, 1999; Curtis and 
McConnell, 2004; Hutton et al., 2004; Little et al., 2004; Pradhan and Leung, 
2004; Smith, 2005; Hicks and Schnier, 2006; Valcic, 2009;  Venables et al., 
2009; Ran et al., 2011 
Vessel aggregation Dasgupta and Heal, 1979; Walters and Bonfil, 1999; Pradhan and Leung, 2004 
Compliance 
  
Becker, 1968; Sutinen and Anderson,  1985; Sutinen and Gauvin, 1989; 
Furlong, 1991; Charles,  1993; Kuperan and Raja Abdullah, 1994; Hatcher  et 
al., 2000; Arnason, 2003; Hatcher and Gordon, 2005 
Management 
(e.g. MPAs,quotas, capacity and 
effort) 
  
  
Frost et al., 1995; Holland and Brazee, 1996; Horwood et al., 1998; Lauck et 
al., 1998; Sumaila, 1998; Murray et al., 1999; Sanchirico, 1999; Walters and 
Bonfil, 1999; Rijnsdorp et al., 2001; Hixon, 2002; Sanchirico and Wilen, 2002; 
Botsford et al., 2003; Halpern, 2003; Halpern and Warner,  2003; Smith and 
Wilen, 2003; Wilcox and Pomeroy, 2003; Hutton et al., 2004; Salas and 
Gaertner, 2004; Alcala et al., 2005; Hatcher and Gordon, 2005; Murawski et 
al.,  2005; Steffansson and Rosenberg, 2005, 2006; Botsford et al., 2007; 
Jennings, 2009; Needle and Catarino, 2011 
Vessel characteristics 
(e.g. age and length) 
Mistiaen and Strand, 2000; Rijnsdorp et al., 2000; Pradhan and Leung, 2004; 
Mardle et al., 2005, 2006; Murawski et al.,  2005; 
Habit or experience (past effort) 
  
Hilborn and Ledbetter, 1979; Allen and McGlade, 1986; Gillis et al., 1993;  
Vignaux, 1996; Dorn, 1997; Campbell and Hand, 1999; Begossi, 2001; Pet-
Soede et al.,  2001; Hutton et al., 2004; Salas and Gaertner, 2004; Anderson 
and Christensen, 2006 
Personal characteristics 
(e.g. skipper age, years  
fishing) 
Sutinen and Gauvin, 1989; Furlong, 1991 
  
  
 
For example, with cod at a historical all-time low and as part of the North Sea cod 
recovery programme, the European Commission closed a large selection of spawning 
grounds in the North Sea for 10 weeks to protect spawning cod during 2001 (EC, 
2001). Fishing vessels confronted with this closed area redistributed their effort or 
simply relocated. Rijnsdorp et al. (2001) found that the Dutch beam trawl fleet 
concentrated fishing along the borders of the closed area, with these observations 
consistent with what would be expected from other studies (Botsford et al., 2003; 
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Halpern and Warner, 2003; Halpern et al., 2003).  Hutton et al. (2004) applied a 
discrete choice model to the fishery and considered the implications of the 2001 
closure.  Unfortunately, owing to the short period of its implementation, the closure 
unsurprisingly showed no positive results for cod. It was also suggested that it had a 
negative impact on the rate of discarding for demersal species and had created 
additional damage to benthic communities by forcing continued trawling over the 
same fishing grounds, and displacing effort to some areas that were previously little 
fished.  Fishing outside the closure, also known as ‘fishing the line’ can have its 
benefits, in terms of increases in yield and mean revenues per tow (Murawski et al., 
2005).  The overall outcome in terms of the management objectives associated with 
implementing the MPA with respect to the protected stock or the fishery are less clear 
(Walters and Bonfil, 1999).   
 
2.1.7 Fisher strategic behaviour: Entry/Exit  
Pioneering research in fisheries economics (Gordon, 1954; Scott, 1955) presented 
equilibrium models based on the rate of fishers entering and exiting common property 
fisheries. Those authors argued that fishing effort would increase, with new vessels 
entering, as long as the fishery remained profitable. In contrast, as profits declined, 
vessels were assumed to exit the fishery if they could achieve greater returns on their 
capital investment elsewhere. These classic models assume that fishing effort and 
boats can move freely in and out of fisheries as a result of open access to a stock and 
to other stocks in other fisheries, or of uses for other purposes than fishing. In many 
areas, however, fisheries are managed by a limited licensing system, thereby 
constraining the ability of individuals to move in and out of fisheries. Entry is 
restricted by the availability of licences or quota and capital, and exit is made more 
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difficult because there are limited alternative uses for the boat, which cannot be used 
in any other production process, so is not malleable (Clark et al., 1979). Additionally, 
opportunities for exploiting other fishing grounds and/or stocks will depend on 
regional biogeography. There is an extensive literature on the theoretical economics 
of entry–exit schemes within industrial organizations (e.g. Scherer and Ross, 1990), 
but very little empirical work.  
 
Most industry research that has considered the dynamic nature of a firm has 
concentrated on new entrants, and views exit predominantly as a symbol of failure 
(Jovanovic, 1982; Hopenhayn, 1992; Jovanovic and MacDonald, 1994). Various 
authors have suggested that firms exit in one of two ways (Holmes and Schmitz, 
1990; Agarwal and Gort, 1996; Dunne et al., 2005; Plehn-Dujowich, 2009). Firstly, a 
firm could terminate its operations and sell its assets at salvage value, or secondly, it 
could exit its current business and reallocate the assets and know-how towards 
another line of business.  
 
Fishing firms, be they owner–operator or larger firms, behave in a similar way, but 
with greater uncertainty, attributable to changing stock levels, management 
regulations, market prices, and fuel costs. Hence, the decisions of vessel operators to 
stay in, enter into, or exit from a fishery are influenced by a combination of economic 
and biological factors, as well as personal reasons (e.g. family tradition).  In studies 
on the North Sea flatfish fishery, Mardle et al. (2005, 2006) showed that vessel age, 
realized and expected revenues, and the status of the main target species had a bearing 
on the decision for a vessel to participate in a fishery. Dasgupta and Heal (1979) 
stated that ever-increasing numbers of competing fishers led to externalities, i.e. the 
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more one catches, the less is available to others, so that each operator believes that 
none of its competitors will adhere to a future conservation policy and in turn sees no 
benefit to pursue it personally.  
 
As fleet size expands, average landings and revenues per vessel decline along with 
catch per unit effort (cpue), the costs of fishing effort increase, and resource rents 
dissipate (Ward and Sutinen, 1994).  Pradhan and Leung (2004) showed a decision to 
enter or exit a fishery depended on the expected benefits, which included future 
revenue, the stock status of the main target species, and crowding effects (the number 
of vessels in the fleet). They also described how operators make decisions on the basis 
of age of the vessel; an older vessel is less likely to enter a fishery than a newer 
vessel; decommissioning and exit probabilities increase with age and are possibly the 
result of vessels being older and inefficient, and hence more costly to run which 
highlights the importance of fuel costs and the potential effects of fuel subsidies.  Fuel 
subsidies have a direct effect on fishing effort (Sumaila et al., 2006). They are 
controversial, because they encourage wasteful, uneconomic fishing practices in 
already overcapitalized fisheries, and they maintain fishing effort even when stock 
levels decline.   
 
2.1.8 Fisher strategic response to management 
The perceived overcapacity and the declining stocks in the North Sea require policy 
action. However the considerations above mean that a decommissioning scheme may 
not be the most cost-effective method of reducing capacity.  Frost et al. (1995) studied 
the effect that decommissioning schemes had on fishing mortality; however no 
relationship was conclusively found, presumably due to the continued excess capacity 
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in the fishery, such that the reduction in fishing mortality was negligible. 
Decommissioning tended to lead to older, less-efficient boats being removed from the 
fleet, and consequently created controversy as the more-efficient boats continued to 
fish (Nautilus Consultants, 1997). It is generally accepted that older vessels catch 
fewer fish than more modern ones (Seafish, 1989). For those efficient vessels, the 
strategy was to stay in the fishery, owing to the financial incentive to decommission 
not being high enough and the possibility that future rewards could potentially be 
higher (Nautilus Consultants, 1997). This meant that decommissioning created a fleet 
dominated by modern, efficient vessels, essentially failing to reduce capacity and 
hence reduce fishing mortality, especially because the quota for the decommissioned 
vessels’ fish made its way back into the pool of quota entitlements that were traded 
and/or leased (Shotton, 2001).  Decommissioning is said to be only a short-term 
incentive for solving the underlying overcapacity issue, although some advocate it as 
the only solution (Lindebo, 2005). However, it cannot solve the inherent incentive 
problem of over-investment and technical creep (Weninger and McConnell, 2000; 
Mahévas et al., 2004; Marchal et al., 2006, 2007; Millischer et al., 1999). Subsidies 
and technical creep have caused difficulties when applying effort limitations due to 
the ongoing modernisation of vessels funded by government grants and subsidies. 
Technical creep makes it difficult to fix a capacity constraint, particularly in the 
context of fluctuating stocks (Jensen, 1999). TACs and effort limitation measures 
which impact on revenues also affect future stock levels, because a TAC is based on 
the proportion of mature fish that can be harvested from a stock. Therefore, if the 
proportion of mature older fish, (known as the spawning stock biomass (SSB)) falls 
by a set amount, this will lead to proportional reductions in TAC, quota, revenue and 
thereby impact the proportion of vessels that enter or exit the fleet. 
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2.2 Modelling approaches for investigating fisher behaviour 
2.2.1 An empirical method for studying fisher behaviour 
Predicting fisher behaviour using Random Utility Models (RUM) has increased in 
popularity with the increasing availability of appropriate data, and  offers an 
opportunity to study individual behaviour at finer resolutions of time and space than 
other frameworks (Coglan et al., 2004; Hutton et al., 2004, Bockstael and Opaluch, 
1983; Eales and Wilen, 1986; Holland and Sutinen, 1999; Wilen et al., 2002; Branch 
et al., 2006; Vermand et al., 2008; Anderson et al., 2010, Pradhan and Leung, 2004). 
The key characteristics of RUMs are that they model discrete decisions. RUMs can be 
described as follows: A decision-maker is faced with making a choice among a 
number of alternative options, obtaining differing levels of utility from each 
alternative option, and tending to choose one that maximizes utility. As such, and like 
other economically-based choice models, utility influences individual choice with a 
deterministic and stochastic error component.  Prior to implementation in fisheries 
behaviour models, RUMs were used in the travel industry to analyse the behaviour of 
consumers of transportation services and facilities (McFadden, 1974; Ben-Akiva and 
Lerman, 1985). These models can also be applied to theoretical policy scenarios, and 
to simulate longer term strategies (e.g. the choices made year by year) in relation to 
the availability of decommissioning grants, stock status, catch quotas, investment, and 
other key factors which can play a critical role in the decision of a fisher. For 
example, Pradhan and Leung (2004) used revenue by gross tonnage within a 
multinomial logit framework to model exit and entry strategies of Hawaiian 
longliners. 
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2.2.2 Theoretical methods for studying fisher behaviour 
Prior to the application of RUMs, most models assumed the ocean to be a 
homogenous space in which fish were uniformly distributed and fishing locations 
were identical. Sanchirico and Wilen (1999) incorporated space into their renewable 
resource model and developed a theory that provided insight and tested hypotheses 
about how decision-makers behave in heterogeneous space, in terms of resource 
availability and the cost of fishing. Their model described the behavioural dynamics 
under conditions of open access, including both temporal and spatial aspects and 
incorporating the behaviour of the fleet and the fish stocks. Their analyses suggested 
that fishing effort across a system of interconnected spatial patches is driven by bio-
economic conditions in each patch, and the biological dispersal between patches. In 
patches where costs were high or the catchability and prices low, effort moves away, 
affecting in turn the distribution of stocks. Economic theories suggest that the 
distribution of fishing effort will be determined by the expected economic returns to 
individual fishers from fishing in alternative fisheries or locations (Gordon, 1954). In 
ecology, animals are thought to behave in a similar way to fishers, whereby they 
assess the patch quality, as they know how profitable each available patch is.  This 
theory is known as the Ideal Free Distribution, (IFD; Fretwell and Lucas, 1970; 
Fretwell, 1972) and is a hypothesis predicting the ways in which animals distribute 
themselves among several patches of resources. The term ‘ideal’ indicates that the 
animals have perfect knowledge in their assessment of the patch and ‘free’ implies 
freedom of moving unhindered from patch to patch. In terms of the application in 
fisheries, fishers have ideal knowledge of their ‘target’ fish distributions and are free 
to move between fishing grounds unrestricted (Gillis, 1993; Gillis, 2003), this is 
unrealistic of course but has worked quite well in some instances. 
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2.3 Conclusion and the way forward 
In Europe under the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), previous attempts have been 
made to control fishing capacity via multi annual guidance programmes (MAGP’s) 
and fishing effort targets whereby the reduction in capacity and effort will lead to a 
reduction in mortality on the stock or stocks.  The links between fishing mortality, 
effort and capacity are important for fisheries managers to understand and to quantify, 
in order for sustainability.  In 2013, expected changes to the CFP are requiring 
member states to develop cooperation among the various stakeholders and to 
rationalise and devolve management of fisheries (EC, 2009a).  Whilst it is necessary 
to build on existing capabilities to ensure implications of our advice are explained in 
socio-economic terms as well as environment, many tools are necessary to improve 
cooperation amongst various stakeholders still need to be developed.  For example to 
implement Results Based Management (RBM), an alternative management 
framework to the current over-centralised and top-down legislative process of the 
CFP needs to be developed. In the case of RBM, where strategic decisions would 
continue to be taken centrally in Brussels, but decisions relating to delivery and 
implementation could be delegated to regional bodies, subject to central auditing of 
outcomes.  Within RBM there is a need for stakeholders to be able to evaluate 
alternatives prior to implementation to show that management objectives can be met 
within a cost effective and equitable framework. This research will demonstrate a 
better understanding of the links between fishing mortality, effort and capacity and as 
such provide the basis for the development for alternative direct conservation tools in 
order for sustainability.   
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Chapter 3.  Exit and entry of fishing vessels: an evaluation of factors 
affecting investment decisions in the North Sea English beam trawl fleet
2
 
 
 
 
 
Beam trawler fishing (Source: Jim Ellis). 
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Abstract 
A profitable fishery attracts additional effort (vessels enter), eventually leading to 
overcapacity and less profit. Similarly, fishing vessels exit depending on their economic 
viability (or reduced expectations of future benefits) or encouraged by schemes such as 
decommissioning grants and/or when there is consolidation of fishing effort within a tradable 
rights-based quota system (e.g. individual transferable quotas, ITQs). The strategic decision-
making behaviour of fishers in entering or exiting the English North Sea beam trawl fishery 
is analysed using a discrete choice model by integrating data on vessel characteristics with 
available cost data, decommissioning grant information, and other factors that potentially 
influence anticipated benefits or future risks. It is then possible to predict whether operators 
choose to enter, stay, exit, or decommission. Important factors affecting investment include 
vessel age and size, future revenues, operating costs (e.g. fuel), stock status of the main target 
species, and the impact of management measures (e.g. total allowable catches, TACs) and 
total fleet size (a proxy for congestion). Based on the results, the predicted marginal effects of 
each factor are presented and the impact of each is discussed in the context of policies 
developed to align fleet capacity with fishing opportunities.  
3.1 Introduction 
 
Pioneering research in fisheries economics (Gordon, 1954; Scott, 1955) presented 
equilibrium models based on entering and exiting common property fisheries. Those authors 
argued that fishing effort would increase with the entry of new vessels as long as the fishery 
remained profitable. In contrast, as profits declined, vessels were assumed to exit the fishery 
if they could achieve greater returns on their capital investment elsewhere. These classic 
models assume that fishing effort and boats can move freely in and out of fisheries as a result 
of open access to a stock and to other stocks in other fisheries, or be used for other purposes 
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than fishing. In the UK, however, fisheries are managed by a limited licensing system, 
thereby constraining the ability of individuals to move in and out of fisheries. Entry is 
restricted by the availability of licences or quota, and exit is made more difficult because 
there is limited alternative use for the boat, which cannot be used in any other production 
process, so is not malleable (Clark et al., 1979). There is extensive literature on the 
theoretical economics of entry–exit schemes within industrial organizations (e.g. Scherer and 
Ross, 1990), but very little empirical work. Most industry research that has considered the 
dynamic nature of a firm has concentrated on new entrants, and views exit predominantly as a 
symbol of failure (Jovanovic, 1982; Hopenhayn, 1992; Jovanovic and MacDonald, 1994). 
Various authors have suggested that firms exit in two ways (Holmes and Schmitz, 1990; 
Agarwal and Gort, 1996; Dunne et al., 2005; Plehn-Dujowich, 2009). First, a firm could 
terminate its operations and sell its assets at salvage value, and second, it could exit its 
current business and reallocate the assets and know-how towards another line of business. 
Fishing firms, be they owner–operator or larger firms, behave in a similar way, but with 
greater uncertainty attributable to changing stock levels, management regulations, market 
prices, and fuel costs. Hence, the decisions of vessel operators to stay in, enter into, or exit 
from a fishery are influenced by a combination of economic and biological factors, as well as 
personal reasons. 
 
In other studies on the North Sea flatfish fishery, Mardle et al. (2005, 2006) showed that 
vessel age, realized and expected revenues, and the status of the main target species had a 
bearing on the decision for a vessel to participate in a fishery. We extend these analyses, 
providing additional data on the rates of decommissioning and the costs of fishing, by 
including fuel-price data and data on the catches of sole (Solea solea) and anglerfish (Lophius 
spp.) separately, in addition to the main target stock, plaice (Pleuronectes platessa). Apart 
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from voluntary decommissioning schemes, the option to trade quota (with an individual 
transferable quota, ITQ, system in the Netherlands and a quasi-ITQ system in the UK, 
described below) provides the opportunity for fleet rationalization in this case study. 
Therefore, within the context of non-market and market means to reduce capacity, we 
evaluate here the choices available to fishers and their responses, either to (i) stay in a fishery, 
(ii) exit, (iii) decommission, or (iv) join and enter the fishery. In both exit and decommission 
options, the vessel is assumed to leave the fishery, but in the case of decommissioning, a 
premium is paid to the owner. Here, we discriminate between the two options in order to test 
whether different factors affect each uniquely. 
 
Under the Common Fishery Policy of the EU, each Member State has a fixed proportion of a 
species quota, referred to as relative stability (based on that country’s historical access rights) 
and, apart from minor deviations from the rule, each boat in the UK has quota which is a 
proportion of the country’s share (European Commission, 1996, 1997, 1999). Also in the UK, 
a quasi-ITQ system exists where quota entitlements and their trade are administered (or at the 
very least recorded) by Producer Organizations (POs), but the government has never 
endorsed a system of fully tradable harvest rights. Prior to 1999, the English fleet was 
managed by licence and quota restrictions, where quotas could be transferred to other fishing 
vessels within the POs. Quota could be leased but not permanently traded, although 
occasionally the government allowed once-off permanent trades (within and across POs) in 
order to rid the system of all leasing arrangements that had become permanent. Post-1999, 
quotas were allocated directly to vessels, as a Fixed Quota Allocation (FQA). While being a 
fixed nominal amount of quota rather than a proportion of the total country total allowable 
catch (TAC), FQAs could be traded by individuals on a permanent basis or leased annually. 
Compared with the management arrangements in the UK, flatfish fisheries in the Netherlands 
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before the 1990s were managed on an Individual Quota (IQ) system, whereby IQs could not 
be sold permanently or leased because it was suggested that quotas would be concentrated in 
an undesirable way (Smit, 2001). In the early 1990s, a new policy was adopted, with groups 
of vessels operating within a PO framework given full quota-management responsibilities. 
The fishers within those groups pooled their ITQs and days at sea, allowing the PO board to 
control the transfer of ITQs and days at sea on a permanent basis (van Hoof, 2010).  
 
In the UK, apart from management via quotas, as just described, a system of vessel capacity 
units (VCUs), based on size and engine power, was implemented in order to administer 
fishing capacity. Attempts were made in the 1980s, 1990s, and in 2002 to reduce fishing 
capacity and effort through Multi-Annual Guidance Programmes (MAGPs), with many 
countries including the UK implementing decommissioning schemes (European Court of 
Auditors, 1994, 1997). The MAGPs were funded by various financial instruments. This 
funding significantly reduced vessel numbers in the UK, decommissioning 225 vessels 
between 1984 and 1986, under MAGP I (Pascoe et al., 2002). Then, between 1987 and 1991 
under MAGP II, another 686 vessels were decommissioned in order to cut engine power 
tonnage and effort. MAGP III, introduced in 1992, ran for five years and resulted in the 
removal of another 578 vessels. Then, from 1997 to 2002 under MAGP IV, another ~170 
boats were decommissioned based on fleet segment and the extent of overexploitation of 
targeted stocks. Capacity control since the end of MAGP IV has been replaced by effort 
ceilings, controlled by rules for entry and exit. Simply, a vessel can only enter a fishery when 
the equivalent capacity has exited. Decommissioning tended to result in older, less-efficient 
boats being removed, creating a modern, efficient fleet, essentially failing to reduce capacity 
and hence reduce fishing mortality, especially with the quota for decommissioned vessels 
making its way back into the pool of quota entitlements that were traded and/or leased.  
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Here, we assume that investment (or dis-investment) decisions are related primarily to actual 
or expected profits and the availability of decommissioning schemes. However, because the 
computation of individual profits requires detailed cost data, which is difficult to obtain and 
in many cases confidential, revenues are utilized as a proxy for economic viability. Pradhan 
and Leung (2004) used revenue by gross tonnage within a multinomial logit framework to 
model exit and entry strategies of Hawaiian longliners. Given the value of information in 
their results, and using a random utility framework provided by McFadden (1974), we 
accommodate a multinomial logit model (unordered) and evaluate the probability of vessels 
to enter, stay, exit, or decommission from the English North Sea beam trawl fleet. This 
information is used to evaluate potential alternative management strategies, and significant 
factors influencing investment are discussed in the context of policies developed to align fleet 
capacity with fishing opportunities.  
 
3.1.1 The English North Sea beam trawl fleet 
In the North Sea, English vessels that target flatfish have traditionally caught plaice in a 
directed beam trawl fishery using 120 mm mesh north of 56°N (Figure 3.1), and in a mixed 
fishery targeting sole, using 80 mm mesh in the southern North Sea. In 2006, international 
landings of plaice in the North Sea amounted to 57 943 t, well below the peak of 170 000 t in 
1989. Some 40% of the total international landings of plaice were reported by Dutch vessels. 
The UK accounted for 23% of the plaice landings, Denmark for 20% of the landings, and 
Belgium, Germany, France, and other countries for the remaining 17% of the total landings. 
Of international sole landings in 2006 (12 600 t), 71% were made by the Netherlands, 8% by 
Belgium, and the balance of 21% by France, Germany, the UK, and Denmark. Sole landings 
by beam trawlers in the early 1990s were dominated by two good year classes and yielded 
~32 000 t in total. The combined 2006 total first sale value of these two flatfish species was 
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estimated at ~€350 million, of which €140 million was from plaice sales. The English beam 
trawl fleet expanded in the early 1990s, through investment in newer trawlers and an 
expansion of the beam trawl fleet in English east coast ports. From the mid-1990s, fleet size 
dropped, either as a consequence of older vessels leaving the fishery or declines in the value 
per unit effort (vpue) of plaice at the same time, or both. Exploitation rates of plaice and sole 
in the North Sea (Figure 3.2) clearly follow the trend in the number of vessels in the fleet 
(Figure 3.3). Between 2000 and 2005, increases in the fuel price (31.1%) reduced the 
viability of many fishing operations. Beam trawling is fuel-intensive because heavy gear is 
dragged relatively fast over the seabed. Until 2003, the English North Sea beam trawl fleet 
operated mainly out of English east coast ports in ICES Division IVb and c, typically 
spending an average of 250 days at sea annually on 6-d trips (Hutton et al., 2004). Towards 
the end of 2002, an English east coast beam trawl company ceased fishing as fishing became 
unprofitable, claiming that it was not economically viable to catch fish for which they had a 
quota entitlement, that prices were poor, and that fuel costs were burgeoning as vessels had to 
operate far from port, near the Norwegian sector, in order to catch their quota (Hansard, 
2002). At this time the company operated eight vessels (down from 12 a few years earlier). 
Subsequently, the vessels were first leased then sold to Dutch operators, but they retained 
their English flag and quota entitlement. The relocation of many of the larger beam trawlers 
to Dutch ports provided an opportunity for rationalization as quota allocations for two or 
more vessels were transferred to newer fishing vessels by Dutch firms. When fishing out of 
English ports, English beam trawlers generally chose to target both plaice and sole, but in 
recent years, Dutch skippers increasingly targeted sole because of its greater commercial 
value and the proximity of the sole fishing grounds in the southern North Sea, generally ICES 
Division IVc (Figure 3.1), to ports in the southern Netherlands.  
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Figure 3.1 The study area (ICES Divisions IVb and IVc). 
 
This change in tactical behaviour is evident in Figure 3.2, where from 2002 on, there is an 
increase in the exploitation rate for sole. We postulate that Dutch skippers acquired additional 
quota to fish for sole, but we do not have data on individual vessel quota entitlements to 
provide evidence of this transfer. A summary of physical vessel characteristics (over the 
period 1989–2007) is presented in Figure 3.3. The number of vessels within the fleet in a 
given year varies considerably. In 1993, for example, there were 152 vessels, but by 2007 just 
29 remained, a considerable reduction in fleet size over just 15 years.  
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Figure 3.2 Exploitation rates (landings of the North Sea English beam trawl fleet, 
divided by SSB) for plaice (left) and sole (right). 
 
 
From the summary statistics, it is apparent that there has been a slight increase in average 
vessel age, implying that as the number of vessels decreased, few newer vessels entered the 
fishery. Also noticeable from the fleet statistics is that the average vessel power, tonnage, 
VCUs, and length all increased slightly, suggesting that less powerful, smaller vessels left the 
fleet. Over this period too, beam trawlers were purchased originally from the Dutch, operated 
out of English ports for a while, before being purchased back again by the Dutch from the 
English. Also, some fishing vessels were occasionally tied up in ports in the Netherlands for 
more than a year at a time, awaiting engine refits. Observed decisions for English North Sea 
beam trawlers to exit, enter, decommission, or stay for the period 1989–2007 are presented in 
Figure 3.4. By 2007, the fleet consisted of 29 vessels that were part of the stay group, with 
four entering, compared with a peak of 152 in 1993, of which 32 entered, 19 exited, 88 
stayed, and 13 left through a decommissioning scheme. 
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Figure 3.3 Box and whisker plots of vessel characteristics over the study period, the 
line representing the mean, the horizontal bar the 50th percentile, the top of the box 
the 75th percentile, and the base of the box the 25th percentile. Whiskers represent the 
range of data, and the solid diamonds are outliers. 
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Figure 3.4 Exit, enter, stay, and decommission decisions observed in the study fishery 
over the period 1989–2007. 
 
3.2 Material and methods 
3.2.1 Data 
The UK Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) database for 
fishing activity and the fleet register were used to select commercial landing and vessel data 
of English (and Welsh) beam trawl fleets operating in ICES Divisions IVb and IVc from 
1989 to 2007, for input into the model. The fleet register contains information on vessel 
characteristics such as gross registered tonnage, grt, vessel length, and date of registration. 
We defined the beam trawl fleet based upon the Data Collection Regulation (DCR) of the 
European Commission (EC, 2006a), and from 2009 under a new regulation, the Data 
Collection Framework (DCF; EC, 2008c). The DCR and the DCF define the beam trawl fleet 
according to its use of beam trawl gear for >50% of each trip. The study used information on 
vessels ≥10 m. 
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The specific beam-trawl fleet activity or métier is defined as the fisher’s tactic at a trip level, 
which is based on the group of targeted species. Métiers are characterized as an outcome of a 
trip based on the landing composition, assuming that what is landed in port is a reflection of 
what was originally targeted. Here, just demersal fish métiers are analysed, by analysing the 
statistics from beam trawl gear used to target brown shrimp. The landing composition is 
calculated as a fraction of the total monetary catch, removing differences in catch rates 
attributable to vessel capacity. Moreover, fractions of the catches are based on economic 
value, rather than weight, so reflecting the perception that fishers are profit-maximizers, in 
that uncommon but valuable species being targeted are given more weight in the analysis. 
Decommissioning cost data were acquired from Defra for the years where decommissioning 
grants were offered (1991–2002). Based on data on grant offers and vessel tonnage, Figure 
3.5 is the output from a linear model that predicts the premium that would have been offered 
based on vessel tonnage. The UK addressed MAGP requirements to reduce capacity and 
effort to meet with specific segment targets. It did not, however, identify overfished stocks or 
specific fleet segments where capacity needed to be reduced (Cappell et al., 2010).  
 
Figure 3.5 North Sea decommissioning grants offered plotted against vessel gross 
tonnage. Dots are the observations and the line the linear regression. 
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As an example, the 1993–1998 decommissioning scheme was aimed at vessels more than 10 
m long and 10+ years old, which had been at sea for a minimum of 100 d during each of the 
calendar years 1992 and 1993 (NIAO, 2006). Written applications from vessel owners stating 
the bid they would require for them to part with their vessels were requested, and these bids 
were ranked nationally based on the lowest cost per VCU. Over the years as the scheme 
progressed, the average bids increased as a result of collusion among vessel owners. For 
instance, the average successful bid in the UK scheme increased progressively from £349 per 
VCU in 1992 and 1993 to £758 per VCU in 1997 and 1998. The level of UK bids in 1997/8 
was significantly in excess of the average EU bid of £650 per VCU (NIAO, 2006). For 1993–
1996, the schemes attracted 331, 431, 203, and 255 eligible applications annually, 
respectively, and the numbers decommissioned were 13 (in 1993), 6 (1994), 7 (1995), 2 
(2001), and 4 (2002), a total of 32 beam trawlers. Most of the grant take-up was based on the 
decisions of the applicants, who were required to satisfy a number of qualification conditions, 
e.g. based on a minimum number of days at sea and vessel age. The target for this fleet 
segment was a 15% reduction in fishing capacity. That target was not met, however, possibly 
indicating that vessel owners had either made a decommissioning bid below market rate or 
that they valued both licences and track record as higher than the value of decommissioning. 
Using recent decommissioning data, we assume a vessel would have a grant uptake of 100% 
if successful. In terms of fuel costs, marine diesel prices excluding value-added tax (VAT) 
and duty were obtained from the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), and 
are presented in Figure 3.6. Most noticeable is the steady increase from 2002 compared with 
the relatively stable prices during the 1990s.  
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Figure 3.6 Average marine fuel prices (£ per litre, excluding VAT and duty). Source, 
DECC (UK Department of Energy and Climate Change).  
 
 
3.2.2 Model description  
 
Over the past few years, considerable attention has been applied to predicting fisher choices, 
particularly those concerning fishing location, by applying random utility methodology and 
models (Bockstael and Opaluch, 1983; Eales and Wilen, 1986; Holland and Sutinen, 1999; 
Wilen et al., 2002; Hutton et al., 2004). The key characteristics of random utility models 
(RUMs) are that they model discrete decisions and can be described as follows. A decision-
maker is faced with making a choice among a number of alternative options, obtaining 
differing levels of utility from each alternative option, and tending to choose one that 
maximizes utility. As such, and like other economics-based choice models, utility influences 
individual choice with a deterministic and stochastic error component.  
For the most general form of the conditional logit choice model (McFadden, 1974, 1981), a 
set of unordered choices is assumed, and this can be written as 
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     ijijijij zU   ,                    (3.1) 
where U is the utility, i the individual, j the choice (such as a fishing trip), zij are attributes of 
choice [xij wi], where xij are attributes of choice j of individual i, and wi are attributes of 
individual i, εij is the stochastic error component, which is random, and βij is a coefficient. It 
is assumed that values of εij are independent across the different choices. This assumption 
implies a condition known as independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), which itself 
implies that providing other choices or changing the characteristics of a third choice does not 
affect the relative odds between the two choices considered. The probability of a given choice 
being made can be estimated from the utility derived. The multinomial logit model (Equation 
3.2), used in this study differs from the conditional logit choice Equation (3.1) in that only the 
characteristics of the individual (wi), are included: 
    ijijij wU   .                   (3.2) 
 
The probability that an individual i makes choice j is then  
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where i  is an indicator variable (with the same length as vector J) referring to the choice (j) 
made by individual i. SAS 9.0 software was used in the model estimation (Logistic 
procedure, SAS institute Inc., 1999). 
 
The key independent response variables (see Table 3.1) in the model include vessel age in 
years, because it is assumed that older vessels may exit because of higher costs of 
maintenance and operation, and that newer vessels will enter. Fisher skills, knowledge, and 
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experience are expected to relate to the annual revenues of the target species of the fleet, 
specifically plaice, anglerfish, and sole. Fishers are assumed to be profit maximizers, and it is 
expected that fishers with high revenues are more likely to stay in the fishery, whereas those 
with lower incomes are more likely to exit to seek other opportunities in alternative fisheries 
or industries. It is important to note that higher revenues for a vessel might not mean greater 
profit because costs vary considerably between operators. In keeping with the thesis of 
Mardle et al. (2005), we assume that the performance based on the total revenue of the 
species caught by a vessel in its first year of entry to the fishery meets the expectations of the 
decision unit, because they expect on entry to perform as well the rest of the fleet. Pradhan 
and Leung (2004) assume that a vessel’s performance in its first year is equivalent to its 
previous year’s performance elsewhere. For the English beam trawl fleet, we cannot assume 
this, however, because of the different target species and quota limitations elsewhere. For 
those already in the fishery, we assume that the decision to exit, to stay, or to decommission 
is based on the previous year’s performance. The decision to enter a fishery may also be 
based on poor performance in another fishery, with the fisher perhaps seeking a better 
investment opportunity. 
 
The variable decommissioning grant offered is included in the model to evaluate the effects 
of a fisher’s decision to accept a grant to have their vessel removed permanently from the 
fishery. It is anticipated that a fisher will accept the grant if it is considerably more profitable 
to do so than to remain in the fishery. The model assumes that vessels have open access to the 
fishery, i.e. that they purchase a vessel and the licence with the entitlement to fish, but in 
reality the total number of UK beam trawlers is restricted. Congestion and overcrowding 
effects are investigated by the inclusion of the number of vessels operating within a given 
year in the fishery as a variable (Bockstael and Opaluch, 1983; Ward and Sutinen, 1994).  
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The price per litre of subsidized marine diesel (excluding VAT and duty) was considered a 
key variable for inclusion, because higher fuel costs could reduce profit directly and lead to a 
decision to exit the fleet, especially if the value of the catch does not increase to compensate 
for the higher fuel cost. Alternatively, if fuel costs decrease, then the expectation would be 
that more vessels would enter the fishery. The fuel cost variable was lagged (i.e. t + 1, where 
t is year), because it was assumed that fishers would not enter or exit the fishery immediately 
in response to a change in fuel price, but rather as a strategic decision based on the average 
annual costs in the previous season. 
 
Plaice was considered to be the main target species of the English fleet, so the spawning-
stock biomass (SSB) of plaice was included as a variable in the model. As stock assessments 
use the previous year’s catch to predict the next year’s quota, this variable was lagged (t + 1). 
It is assumed that a fisher would be likely to leave the fishery if past SSB was low. 
Conversely, if stock levels increase, then the assumption is that more vessels will enter the 
fishery. 
 
Overall vessel length (m) was included as a variable in order to determine whether being 
within any particular vessel-length group influenced a fishers decision to enter, stay, or exit. 
Vessel size is correlated with capital invested and may affect a fisher’s decision. Smaller 
vessels have fewer decisions on where to fish, because they are restricted primarily to inshore 
fishing grounds, but should have lower fuel costs. By comparison, medium-sized or large 
vessels can operate farther offshore for longer, so have more variable fishing opportunities. 
Other variables initially included in the models were removed because the observation was 
made that they were not significant. These included cod (Gadus morhua) revenue, the SSB of 
sole, total revenue, VCU, grt, engine power (kW), turbot (Psetta maxima) revenue, and the 
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monetary sum of other landings (excluding plaice, sole, turbot, anglerfish, and cod).  
 
Table 3.1 The explanatory variables used in the model. 
 
Variable  Description 
1 Vessel age (years) 
2 Annual individual plaice revenue (£) 
3 Individual decommissioning grant offered (£) 
4 Annual fleet size in numbers 
5 Lagged spawning-stock biomass (SSB) of plaice (t) 
6 Annual individual anglerfish revenue (£) 
7 Lagged average annual fuel price (£) 
8 Annual individual sole revenue (£) 
9 Individual vessel length (m) 
 
3.3 Results  
 
The results for the multinomial logit model (unordered) are given in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. The 
coefficients are interpretable in terms of the direction of the influence of a variable on the 
utility, and the probability of entering, exiting, staying, or decommissioning vs. staying 
(Table 3.3). Only variables with significance levels of p < 0.05 were included in the models 
with respect to the Type 3 analyses of effects (Table 3.2), which shows the overall 
significance of each variable retained in the final model, using Wald Chi-squared statistics. 
The model is highly significant, and has a likelihood ratio 2, 27 d.f., of 393.8138, p < 
0.0001, and a value of r
2
 of 0.22, where n = 1595. 
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Table 3.2. Type 3 analysis of effects, showing the overall significance of each 
variable retained in the final model, using Wald χ2 statistics and given that the other 
variables are in the model. 
 
 
Variable d.f. Wald χ2 Pr > χ2 
1 3 21.2413 <0.0001 
2 3 44.991 <0.0001 
3 3 20.1455 0.0002 
4 3 18.7338 0.0003 
5 3 10.2478 0.0166 
6 3 9.6155 0.0221 
7 3 10.2033 0.0169 
8 3 8.4166 0.0381 
9 3 15.5148 0.0014 
 
 
 
Table 3.3 Parameter estimates from the multinomial logit model. 
 
 
Variable Entry Exit Decommission 
Intercept –1.33** +0.06 –7.31*** 
Vessel age in years –1.70E–02** –5.78E–03 +6.65E–02*** 
Annual individual plaice revenue (£) –4.49E–06*** –4.79E–06*** +5.72E–06** 
Individual decommissioning grant 
offered (£) 
–9.19E–07* –2.74E–07 +6.87E–06*** 
Annual fleet size in numbers +4.04E–03** –1.82E–03 +2.97E–02*** 
Lagged SSB of plaice (t) +3.14E–06** +2.85E–07 –6.46E–06 
Annual individual anglerfish revenue (£) –1.00E–05** –1.00E–05** –3.00E–05 
Lagged average annual fuel price (£) +4.31E–02** +1.10E–02 +1.88E–01** 
Annual individual sole revenue (£) –1.21E–06 +5.64E–06 –5.00E–05** 
Individual vessel length (m) –1.88E–02 –2.57E–02** –1.24E–01*** 
    
* Statistical significance at 10% level. 
** Statistical significance at 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at 1% level. 
 
 
The results for the variable vessel age indicate, as expected, that older vessels are more likely 
to leave the fishery. Essentially, older vessels are replaced by newer ones, resulting in an 
increase in the efficiency of the fleet. Hutton et al. (2008) considered the implications of 
older vessels leaving the fleet and the resulting changes in technical efficiency of the fleet 
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remaining. Our results suggest that the bigger the fleet, the more vessels that enter, and the 
smaller the fleet, the greater the odds of vessels exiting. Historically, the trends reflect an 
expansion of the fleet as fishing opportunities increase (large catches of plaice and high 
revenues), resulting in more vessels entering the fishery. Fishers tend to follow others into a 
profitable fishery, so enter an ever-growing fleet. In recent years, the few newer and larger 
vessels remained active, acquiring newly available quota from vessels that exited the fleet. 
The coefficient for decommissioning suggests that the odds on a younger vessel in the fishery 
taking up a decommissioning scheme are low. Alternatively, older vessels were more likely 
to take up a decommissioning offer. Similarly significant was fleet size, because the bigger 
the fleet, the greater the odds of decommissioning. This result is intuitive, because the fleet 
size when it was at its largest coincided with the decommissioning schemes under MAGPIII.  
The stock status of plaice also had an important influence; the odds on entering the fishery 
increased when plaice stock levels were high. As anticipated, the results for plaice revenue 
indicated that vessels with lower revenues would have greater odds on exiting the fleet. The 
implication of vessels with low revenues (or low vpue) departing the fisheries is also likely to 
have an impact on the overall efficiency of the fleet. A highly significant negative coefficient 
on the variable plaice revenue for entry is not intuitive, but the explanation for this may be 
that cost factors such as high fuel costs dominated during this period. Decommissioning 
programmes during the period of study did show signs of enticing beam trawlers to 
decommission.  
 
The positive significant coefficient for fuel prices for vessels entering suggested that the 
vessels would enter at lower costs of subsidized fuel. However, the choice to exit was not 
significant, possibly because of the relatively stable fuel prices throughout the 1990s. The 
significant coefficient for decommissioning suggests that when fuel prices were at their 
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highest and a decommissioning scheme was available, fishers were likely to accept a grant to 
exit the fishery. 
 
All the estimated parameters for vessel length were significant. The options all possess 
negative coefficients and suggest that smaller vessels were more likely to exit, enter, and 
decommission from the fleet. With lower capital cost outlays, smaller vessels tend to be more 
mobile in their movement in and out of fisheries. The effect of vessel size is also related to 
the variable decommissioning grant, which understandably has insignificant coefficients for 
exit, and a highly significant small coefficient for the decision to decommission. Fishers on 
the large most-modern vessels would have to be offered a good financial incentive to leave 
the fishery, fitting in with the observation that smaller vessels accepted the scheme offered. 
Of interest were the significant parameter estimates for anglerfish, showing similar trends for 
exit and entry as the revenue estimates for plaice. However, sole revenue provided a different 
set of trends, notably the insignificant variables for entry and exit, which suggests that it was 
not of great importance to fisher decision-making in terms of whether to enter or exit the 
fishery.  
3.4 Discussion 
A decision to enter or exit a fishery depends on the expected benefits, which include future 
revenue, the stock status of the main target species, and crowding effects (the number of 
vessels in the fleet). Operators also make decisions on the basis of age of the vessel. Here, the 
results indicate this to be the case for English North Sea beam trawlers. Management 
measures (TACs and effort limitations) which impact on revenues also affect future stock 
levels, because a TAC is based on the proportion of mature fish that can be harvested from a 
stock. Therefore, if SSB falls by a set amount, this will be transferred to revenue and impact 
the proportion of vessels that enter or exit the fleet.  
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In order to illustrate the marginal effects of each significant explanatory variable, the mean 
model coefficients from Table 3.3 were kept constant, and the predicted probability of exit, 
entry, and decommission were computed over a range for each explanatory variable. The 
outcomes of the simulations are shown in Figure 3.7.  
a)           b) 
 
c)                       d) 
 
Figure 3.7 Simulations of the probability of exit, entry, and decommissioning 
decisions, i.e. 1 minus each probability equals the probability of staying in the fishery 
The solid lines represent the probability of entry vs. stay, the dotted lines the 
probability of exit vs. stay, and the dashed lines the probability of decommissioning 
vs. stay. (a) Vessel age, (b) vessel length, (c) plaice SSB, (d) fuel price, (e) 
decommissioning grant, (f) number of vessels, (g) plaice revenue, (h) anglerfish 
revenue. 
  
 67 
 
 
e)                        f) 
 
 
g)            h)  
 
 
Figure 3.7 (continued). 
 
 
In general the outcomes are as expected, and can be simply summarized as follows. Figure 
3.7a supports the notion that an older vessel is less likely to enter a fishery than a newer 
vessel; decommissioning and exit probabilities increase with age. These predictions are 
plausible given the decommissioning schemes under the MAGP programmes of the 1990s. 
Figure 3.7b shows that smaller vessels have a greater probability of taking up a 
decommissioning scheme, consistent with the general patterns witnessed under the MAGPs. 
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The decision by the owners of such vessels to decommission may also suggest that the 
owners of smaller vessels find it easier to part with a vessel than stakeholders investing in 
bigger boats, where a group decision is required within a firm, and where financial 
considerations are more important. Figure 3.7c shows that with an increase in stock size of 
mature fish (SSB), it is more attractive for vessels to enter; on the other hand, the probability 
of exit is reasonably constant. However, it does seem that vessels are less likely to exit at 
lower levels of SSB, suggesting that the fishery is profitable at reduced plaice SSB and that 
the fleet switches to targeting other demersal species such as sole, anglerfish, cod, or turbot, 
or mixed combinations of these species. Figure 3.7d shows that fuel prices are important; in 
2001, they accounted for 70% of running costs in the beam trawl fishery (Mardle et al., 
2005). At low and increasing costs, a vessel is more likely to enter until it appears to level off 
at £0.35 per litre of fuel.  
 
The simulation also shows that, with an increase in fuel price, fishers are more likely to 
decommission their vessels. These are possibly the result of vessels being older and 
inefficient, and hence more costly to run. This highlights the importance of fuel costs and the 
potential effects of fuel subsidies. Fuel subsidies have a direct effect on fishing effort 
(Sumaila et al., 2006). They are controversial, because they encourage wasteful, uneconomic 
fishing practices in already overcapitalized fisheries, and they maintain fishing effort even 
when stock levels decline. Figure 3.7e shows that the beam trawl flatfish fishery is of great 
value to fishers, and that a grant of £300 000 would only entice 1.3% of beam trawl fishers to 
decommission their vessel. The policy implications are that, given the overcapacity in the 
North Sea and the declining stocks, it is costly for a decommissioning scheme to become the 
most effective method of reducing capacity.  Decommissioning is said to be only a short-term 
incentive for solving the underlying overcapacity issue, although some advocate that it is the 
 69 
 
only solution; however, it cannot solve the inherent incentive problem of over-investment and 
effort creep (Weninger and McConnell, 2000). In the longer term, therefore, one would 
expect a similar capacity/effort imbalance after a decommissioning scheme. Alternatively, if 
market forces dominate under a tradable quota system, the fleet will rationalize within a 
system of ITQs, where the race for fish is removed, allowing individuals to catch a set 
quantity and allowing investment and production strategies to be internally driven by market 
forces. As quotas decrease and fuel prices rise, fishing vessels may be forced to tie up and be 
sold, or to exit the fishery to operate in areas away from the North Sea (for most of the period 
of the study, beam trawl licences permitted fishing in other areas and quotas were not gear-
specific). Redistributing overcapacity elsewhere or tying up, however, could cause social and 
economic problems to coastal communities that rely on the fishery for employment. In fact, 
the quasi-ITQ system in the UK (and the ITQ system in the Netherlands) has resulted in just 
that, a smaller English North Sea beam trawl fleet (now operated mainly by Dutch skippers) 
with traditional North Sea English fishing ports in decline.  
 
The results in Figure 3.7f demonstrate that the probability of entering the fishery increases 
with fleet size. However, Dasgupta and Heal (1979) state that ever-increasing numbers of 
competing fishers lead to externalities between them, i.e. the more one catches, the less is 
available to others, so that each operator believes that none of its competitors will adhere to a 
future conservation policy and in turn sees no benefit to pursue it personally. As fleet size 
expands, average landings and revenues per vessel decline along with catch per unit effort 
(cpue), the costs of fishing effort increase, and resource rents dissipate (Ward and Sutinen, 
1994). Anecdotal information suggests that the fishery addressed here did just that, in that it 
expanded as plaice catch rates were high, followed by success that was short-lived as catch 
rates declined and fuel costs rose, and with the demise of the fishery reflected by dissipating 
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profits.  
 
Figures 3.7g and 3.7h show similar trends for both exit and entry, in that the less the revenue 
of plaice and anglerfish, the greater the probability of entry and exit (the results for sole are 
not shown). As noted above, cost factors (e.g. fuel costs) may have dominated during this 
period. In addition, plaice catches and revenue were relatively stable compared with such 
other covariates as fuel costs, which could adversely dominate in their explanatory power. 
The implications of a smaller fleet on fish stocks are yet to be evaluated. One method to 
explore the effects of alternative fleet management policies on fish stocks is management 
strategy evaluation (MSE; De Oliveira et al., 2008). Under an MSE approach, the objective is 
to evaluate the management consequences of a strategy under alternative assumptions about 
stock dynamics, i.e. its robustness to uncertainty. A key element is to identify the relative 
impact of particular assumptions about the resource (e.g. stock–recruitment relationship, 
natural mortality) or fleet dynamics (e.g. the implementation of management regulations). 
The overall objective of fishery management is balancing the short- and long-term socio-
economic needs of stakeholders while maintaining a healthy stock and ultimately rebuilding 
fisheries. 
 
To conclude, we have discussed the implementation of a discrete choice model (specified as a 
RUM) in an attempt to explore and better understand English beam trawl fisher long-term 
investment behaviour. The results confirm the notion that vessel age, vessel length, stock 
status (plaice SSB), fuel cost, the availability of decommissioning grants, fleet size, and the 
revenues from target species are significant factors in determining fisher decision-making. 
The low model r
2
 of 0.22 suggests that other factors not incorporated in the model play a role, 
e.g. the real economic viability of each vessel (knowledge of which is limited by the limited 
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availability of cost-structure data), their ownership, and the investment portfolio of firms that 
own single and multiple vessels, as well as factors such as skipper skill and age, and/or the 
availability of a skilled crew. The model predictions were similar to the actual choices apart 
from the decision to decommission, possibly because relatively few beam trawlers took up 
the decommissioning schemes offered during the period investigated. UK decommissioning 
schemes were ad hoc in nature and spread across many sectors, not just the beam trawl fleet. 
Rather, it was a case where some owners took advantage of limited decommissioning grants 
when they were worst off financially (with low catch rates of plaice and high fuel costs), 
whereas others valued future catches, the value of the licence, and their capital investment 
higher than the value of decommissioning.  
 
Future studies should, if feasible, include an investigation of other externalities than subsidies 
on fuel and decommissioning grants. Subsidies could include tax relief in the form of income 
support and unemployment insurance, capital support such as for vessel modernization (a 
new engine refit), minimum price, and processing and marketing subsidies. Such financial 
instruments could help in attaining profitability and influence future investment decisions by 
a fisher. In addition, it would be of interest to know whether the skippers who 
decommissioned reinvested in newer vessels, encouraged by the profits of the fishery. 
Regulations, policy and alternative fishery performance, pre-enter and post-exit revenues, and 
costs, if available, would further enrich such analyses. Overall, our analysis has provided 
greater insight into the use of econometric RUMs in interpreting fisher behaviour. 
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Chapter 4. Dynamic prediction of effort reallocation in mixed fisheries
3
 
 
 
 
 
European plaice Pleuronectes platessa (Source: CEFAS). 
 
 
  
                                                 
3
 Tidd, A. N., Hutton, T., Kell, L. T., and Blanchard, J. L, (2012). Dynamic prediction of effort re-allocation in mixed fisheries. Fisheries 
Research, 125-126: 243–253. 
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Abstract 
A discrete choice model is applied to determine how fishing effort is allocated spatially and 
temporally by the English and Welsh North Sea beam trawl fleet. Individual vessels can fish 
in five distinct areas, and the utility of fishing in an area depends on expected revenue 
measured as previous success (value per unit effort) and experience (past fishing effort 
allocation), as well as perceived costs (measured as distance to landing port weighted by fuel 
price). The model predicts fisher location choice, and the predictions are evaluated using 
iterative partial cross validation by fitting the model over a series of separate time-periods 
(nine separate time-periods). Results show the relative importance of the different drivers that 
change over time. They indicate that there are three main drivers throughout the study, past 
annual effort, past monthly effort in the year of fishing, and fuel price, largely reflecting the 
fact that previous practices where success was gained are learned (i.e. experience) and 
become habitual, and that seasonal variations also dominate behaviour in terms of the strong 
monthly trends and variable costs. In order to provide an indication of the model’s predictive 
capabilities, a simulated closure of one of the study areas was undertaken (an area that 
mapped reasonably well with the North Sea cod 2001 partial closure of the North Sea for 10 
weeks of that year). The predicted reallocation of effort was compared against 
realized/observed reallocation of effort, and there was good correlation at the trip level, with 
a maximum 10% misallocation of predicted effort for that year. 
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4.1 Introduction 
It is becoming increasingly evident that fisheries management is not solely a biological issue. 
Fisheries science is an interdisciplinary field, and combining social, economic, and ecological 
information has proven to be increasingly important in achieving sustainable fisheries 
management (Mumford et al., 2009). Of increasing importance to fisheries science and 
management is the ability to anticipate fisher behaviour in response to management 
regulation, in order to reduce implementation error, i.e. where the effects of management 
differ from that intended. An example of implementation error is where fishing effort is 
redistributed following a spatial closure to protect a stock (or cohort) in a way that was not 
anticipated by management.  
 
Many factors influence a fisher’s decision where and when to fish, including fish distribution, 
fuel price, regulations, their habits and experience, previous catch rates, market prices, and 
the proximity to landing ports. These factors can lead to differences in observed individual 
fisher behaviour and the way a group of fishers (a fleet) allocate their effort in time and 
space. Several studies have looked at behavioural aspects of the way fishers spatially allocate 
their effort (Rijnsdorp et al., 2000; Hilborn et al., 2005; Smith et al., 2009). An important 
element influencing fisher behaviour is stock density, because fishers tend to have prior 
knowledge (Begossi, 2001) of resource distribution and habitat (Hilborn and Ledbetter, 1979; 
Gillis et al., 1993; Pet-Soede et al., 2001). Catch rates are related to stock density and will 
have a large impact on fisher behaviour (Eales and Wilen, 1986; Marchal et al., 2006). This 
means that fishers will gravitate towards areas where catch rate is greatest, and gravity 
models have been specified and applied to model fishing vessel spatial distribution (e.g. 
Walters and Bonfil, 1999). Economic factors and management measures in the form of 
technical measures (size restrictions or gear restrictions; Bene and Tewfik, 2001), marine 
 75 
 
protected areas (MPAs), and spatial closures may also force fishers to search for new fishing 
grounds (Hutton et al., 2004).  
 
Over the past few years, much attention has been paid to predicting fisher location choice by 
applying random utility methodology and discrete choice models (Anderson et al., 2010). 
Predicting fisher behaviour using discrete choice models has increased in popularity with the 
increasing availability of appropriate data (vessel-by-vessel trip data), because such models 
offer an opportunity to study individual behaviour at finer resolutions of time and space than 
other techniques (Coglan et al., 2004; Hutton et al., 2004). These models can be applied to 
theoretical policy scenarios, which can also be simulated. The key characteristics of discrete 
choice models or random utility models (RUMs) are that they model discrete decisions, and 
the assumption of homogeneity among individuals does not need to hold. As with other 
economics-based choice models, utility drives individual choice with a deterministic 
component and a stochastic error component (hence the name “random” utility model). Prior 
to implementation in fisheries behaviour models, discrete choice models were used in the 
travel industry to analyse the behaviour of consumers of transportation services and facilities 
(McFadden, 1974; Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985).  
 
The behaviour of fishers can be studied in the short term (their tactics), for example on a trip-
by-trip basis in terms of decisions where to fish and which species to target, or the long term 
(their strategies), i.e. choices made year by year where the availability of decommissioning 
grants, stock status, catch quotas, investment, and other key factors play a critical role in the 
decision of a fisher to invest in the fishing operation (Chapter 3). Models prior to the 
application of discrete choice models assumed the ocean to be a homogenous space in which 
fish are distributed uniformly and fishing locations are identical (e.g. Holland and Brazee, 
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1996; Smith and Wilen, 2003). Sanchirico and Wilen (1999) modelled behavioural dynamics, 
including both spatial and temporal aspects, under conditions of open access. The results of 
their analysis suggested that fishing effort across a system of interconnected spatial patches is 
driven by the bio-economic conditions in each patch, and the biological dispersal rates 
between patches. In patches where costs are high or the catchability and prices low (mix of 
low price species and/or cohorts), effort is driven away, and as it relocates, it affects the 
distribution and density of stocks (i.e. the local density and the potential for dispersal to 
nearest-neighbour patches) of other patches directly and indirectly. Incorporating economic 
variables (such as revenue and travel costs) into decision-maker behaviour is therefore 
important when analysing a resource that is distributed heterogeneously in space.  
 
In this study, we investigate whether tactical behaviour by fishers is influenced by expected 
revenues, habitual seasonal fishing patterns, effort fluctuations, and changes in fuel costs, and 
whether there are dynamic changes in the relative importance of these drivers through time. 
Focus is on the English and Welsh North Sea beam trawl fleet, where there have been 
changes in both ownership and spatial management; as such, this study provides an 
opportunity to investigate the dynamics and drivers of fisher behaviour. Also of interest to 
this study is the fact that, during 2001, the European Commission implemented a temporary 
closure or MPA in the North Sea between mid-February and the end of April, to conserve 
spawning of North Sea cod (EC, 2001). As a regulatory management measure that impacted 
fishing effort, the 2001 closure of the North Sea covered most of Roundfish area 7, which 
beam trawlers frequent, and the remainder of which included a plaice box preventing trawlers 
>300 hp from entering (Figure 4.1a). This allowed us to evaluate the predictive power of the 
model and analysis, and among other factors the response of the fleet to a management 
measure. An earlier study also applied a discrete choice model to the same fleet using 
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individual fishing trip data over the years 1999–2000. Previous knowledge or experience of 
fishing grounds (in 1999) was found to have a bearing on the decision to fish in a given area 
in 2000, and this information was then used to construct a simple effort redistribution model 
to simulate the implications of the 2001 closure (Hutton et al., 2004). Although that study 
investigated detailed spatial location choice, there are limitations to such work for 
considering temporal changes in fisher behaviour. This is because of the short time-period of 
data and the type of discrete choice model used. Hutton et al. (2004) used a conditional logit 
model, a model often criticized when used for spatial policy analysis because of the 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) it imposes, i.e. choices are assumed to be 
independent, and a change in one choice would not affect the relative choice set, which could 
have serious implications if used for a spatial policy analysis (Wilen et al., 2002). 
 
Here, focus is on the dynamic changes in tactical behaviour over a 12-year period. We 
introduce the use of a mixed model (relaxing the IIA assumption) and extend the set of 
explanatory variables investigated to a wider range of potential drivers (such as distance to 
landing port and separation of catch into their targeted components, plaice and sole). To 
understand better the drivers and dynamics of fisher location choice over space and time, we 
fit discrete choice models over different periods and investigate the effects of the various 
explanatory variables (which are proxies of expected revenue and costs perceived by fishers 
from past experience on monthly and annual time-scales). We then predict fisher location 
choice over separate periods to evaluate the model predictions, along with the versatility and 
robustness to potential changes in tactics. Finally, we develop a framework for investigating 
fisher location choice that can be used to reduce potential implementation error and scientific 
uncertainty and allow for the management system to be adjusted or adapted to what is 
learned.  
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4.2 Material and methods 
4.2.1 English North Sea beam trawl fleet 
English beam trawl vessels in the North Sea have traditionally caught mostly plaice in a 
directed beam trawl fishery using 120 mm mesh north of 56°N, and a mixture of plaice and 
sole using 80 mm beam trawls in the southern North Sea. In 2003, international landings of 
North Sea plaice amounted to 66 502 t, compared with a peak of 170 000 t in 1989. Some 
42% of the total plaice international landings were reported by vessels from the Netherlands, 
the UK accounted for 21%, Denmark for 21%, and Belgium, Germany, France, and other 
countries the balance of 16% (ICES, 2007). In the English fishery, the high value of sole 
makes it one of the most important species targeted by inshore vessels using trawls and fixed 
nets. The fishery is mainly conducted from March to October, but sole are also taken as a 
target species by offshore beam trawlers, otter trawlers, and gillnetters. The English North 
Sea beam trawl fleet operated mainly out of east coast English ports until 2003, typically 
spending an average of 250 days at sea in trips lasting about six days (Hutton et al., 2004) 
(see Figure 4.1b for effort distribution of the beam trawl fleet, 1997–2007).  
 
Towards the end of 2002, the main English east coast beam trawl company ceased fishing 
because it could not fish profitably. This was largely due to a fuel crisis from late 2000, with 
high and rising fuel prices over several years along with declining catch rates of large plaice. 
That company and other operators claimed that they could not catch the fish for which they 
had quota entitlement, that prices for fish were poor, and that the fuel costs incurred by 
vessels having to travel long distances to catch the fish were too high (Hansard, 2002). 
Subsequently, the fishing vessels were sold to operators in the Netherlands, but they still 
maintained the English flag and quota allocations. Some vessels were leased initially in 2001, 
with formal transfer of ownership depending on vessel taking place from 2002 to 2005. 
 79 
 
English beam trawl fishers generally choose to target both plaice and sole, but in recent years 
because of the shrinking fleet size and the transfer of ownership to fishers from the 
Netherlands, skippers generally targeted sole because of its high commercial value and short 
distance from port in the southern North Sea, generally in Roundfish area 6 (Figure 4.1a).  
a) 
 
Figure 4.1 The study area showing (a) Roundfish areas, including the 2001 closure 
areas and the plaice box and (b) Total hours fished by the ≥10 m English beam trawl 
fleet operating in the study area. 
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b) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 (continued) The study area showing (a) Roundfish areas, including the 
2001 closure areas and the plaice box and  (b) Total hours fished by the ≥10 m 
English beam trawl fleet operating in the study area. 
 
4.2.2 Data 
The areas in the study were chosen based on the International Bottom Trawl Survey (IBTS) 
and in particular the Netherlands beam trawl survey (BTS) which stratifies its sampling of 
sole and plaice to Roundfish areas (Figure 4.1a; ICES, 2009a). The fishery-independent 
survey results are used in the ICES North Sea demersal working group (WGNSSK) for 
assessing sole and plaice. These Roundfish areas also represent the main fishing grounds at a 
large spatial scale, and are independent, i.e. they are discrete choice decision units.  
Individual trip data for the commercial beam trawlers were collated for the years 1996–2007. 
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Roundfish areas 1 and 3 (see Figure 4.1a) were excluded from the study because English 
beam trawlers generally do not fish there. The number of trips decreased annually during the 
study period (Figure 4.2). The data collected for each vessel included species landed, hours 
fished, landed weight per ICES statistical rectangle (kg), month of fishing, year of fishing, 
and total value of the catch by species by vessel and trip. Within the EU, it is currently only a 
requirement for vessels >10 m long to submit logbooks, but the database also contains a 
subset of catch from <10 m vessels that historically reported their catches by means of 
logbooks. 
 
Figure 4.2 (top) Number of trips by registered English and Welsh beam trawlers 
during the study period. (middle) Approximate representation of the percentages of 
registered owned English and Welsh beam trawlers, black bars indicating foreign 
(excluding UK and Ireland) ownership. (bottom) Percentage of trips by English and 
Welsh beam trawlers to English or foreign (excluding UK and Ireland) landing ports, 
with black bars indicating foreign landing ports. 
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The methodology for the definition of fleets is based on the European Commission’s data 
collection regulation (DCR; EC 2000). We use a method developed independently (see EC, 
2006a), preceding the present data collection framework (DCF; EC, 2008c), which defines 
the beam trawl fleet based on its use of a beam trawl for >50% of a fishing trip. 
 
The fleet activity or métier is determined by the fisher’s tactic at a trip level, which is defined 
on the basis of the mix of target species. In other words, métiers are characterized on the 
basis of the outcome of a trip defined by the composition of the landings. That composition is 
calculated as a proportion of the total value of the catch, removing the differences in catch 
rates attributable to vessel capacity. Moreover, the proportions of the catches are based on 
economic value rather than weight, reflecting the notion that fishers are profit maximizers, so 
valuable species being targeted receive more weight in the analysis. In this study, the beam 
trawl métier that primarily targeted crustaceans (brown shrimp) was omitted, and a single 
demersal métier was defined (beam trawl demersal) and used in the analysis. This fleet 
targets the main flatfish stocks (plaice and sole) in the North Sea.  
 
We anticipate there would have been changes in tactics attributable to changes in the 
availability of fish, prices, fuel costs, and whether skippers were re-employed. Unfortunately, 
there is no information available on ownership or personal information about the owners 
(and/or skippers), but just limited information on vessels registered to the UK and whether 
they record their landings under the UK flag. However, we do have detailed information on 
port landed, where they fish, and traditional landings data such as species landed, effort, and 
price paid. Anecdotally,  a series of surveys on technological change were conducted on this 
fleet, and the results showed first-hand the switch in port (from a UK port to a port in the 
Netherlands) that occurred over the period of this study. The switch in port nationality for the 
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large beam trawl vessels was characterized by a change in vessel ownership from UK-owned 
and operated to Netherlands-owned and operated (with lease agreements at first), and a 
change in the nationality of the skipper and the crew (Hutton, pers, comm.). Spatial location 
choice is discrete instead of continuous because it can be represented as 0–1 decision in the 
context of a choice model. The choices are planned a priori and influenced by seasonality, 
tradition, habit, belief, demand, fish habitat, and the spatial distribution of the target stocks.  
 
4.2.3 Model description  
Fishers gain economic benefit, i.e. a utility  , from fishing, and have to make a choice of 
fishing location each trip based upon the potential catch rates (i.e. revenue), the cost of 
travelling to a location, and other preferences for a particular location (knowledge of fishing 
ground and weather). These will differ between locations, so the total utility       of fisher   
for site   in trip   is 
 
                       ,                  (4.1) 
 
where         are the vectors of coefficients and explanatory variables providing information 
on the known or observed component, and       is the random or unobservable component of 
each vessel’s utility and, for simplicity,    is assumed to be homogenous among individual 
fishers (such that the vector   has the same length as the number of explanatory variables  ). 
However, the conditional logit has often been criticized because it imposes an independence 
of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985), especially for spatial 
models (Wilen et al., 2002). The IIA property assumes that the random error component 
     is independent across choices for each decision-maker, and the unmeasured attributes of 
choice are assumed to be uncorrelated. This implies that a change in the choice set would not 
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affect the relative probabilities. The probability ratio of any two choices depends on the 
attribute vectors of the respective choices, despite any single probability depending on the 
attributes of all choices.  
 
The RUM used in this study is a mixed logit model (also known as a random parameters 
logit) (Hensher and Greene, 2003; Train, 2003) which relaxes the IIA property because it 
assumes heterogeneity among alternatives at the population level. It differs from the 
conditional logit (McFadden, 1974) in that    varies in a population across individuals. 
Instead of estimating    for all individuals, the mean    plus its standard deviation    are used 
to represent the preference distribution in the population of fishers (Train, 1998). The mixed 
logit choice model takes the form of Equation (4.2) below, where        represents the 
observed utility and        the unobserved utility. One part of the error distribution 
(unobserved), therefore, is correlated over alternatives, and the other part       , is 
independent and identically distributed (iid) over alternatives and individuals (McFadden, 
1981; Maddala, 1983), and is written as 
 
                               .                            (4.2)  
 
Within the mixed logit framework,    was assumed to follow a normal distribution, and for a 
given value of    (for simplicity disregarding t), the conditional probability of choice j across 
all other choices k = 1 to J is estimated by drawing random values   by simulation using 
 
       
          
           
 
   
  ,                            (4.3) 
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where   is a vector of coefficients that varies across individuals, and     is a vector of the 
attributes of each choice that was made. All covariates met the normality assumption 
following log-transformation. In keeping with economic theory, distance is a proxy for cost, 
so enters the model with a negative sign, and expected revenues enter with a positive sign 
(Train, 1998; Ran et al., 2011). The analysis was carried out in the SAS package PROC MDC 
(SAS, 1999) using quasi-Newton optimization and 100 Halton draws, and was re-run in the R 
mlogit package (R Development Core Team, 2008) to cross-validate results. The resulting 
lognormal coefficients of the mean, b, and standard deviation, s, for the log of   required 
back-transformation to provide correct interpretation (see Ran et al., 2011), e.g. for ln(  ), the 
median, mean and standard deviation can be calculated as follows: exp(b), exp[b + (s
2
/2)], 
and exp[b + (s
2 
/2)]          . 
 
4.2.4 Selection of explanatory variables 
Fishing is a risky business, and predicting catches and revenues in advance is difficult, so 
experience and knowledge of fishing locations is important. Therefore, rather than using 
revenue and costs per trip as the utility (as measures of economic gross benefit or economic 
costs), we use value per unit effort (vpue). We assume that vpue is a proxy for net benefit (i.e. 
utility) and that targeting of a stock would be based on its vpue because fishers would attempt 
to target the most valuable species, and any reduction in vpue would indicate that a species 
had been depleted or the market and effort diverted to a less valuable species. The variable 
vpue can be computed from fishing in the same location in the same month of the previous 
year (i.e. lagged average vpue). The vpue had to be used because, although obtaining cost 
data for each decision unit is possible, we had no access to individual cost data. Moreover, 
accessing individual cost data is expensive in terms of research effort, and the economic data 
are anyway generally confidential in nature. In order to take account of strong spatial and 
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temporal fluctuations and strong (or weak) year classes in the target species, a lagged average 
vpue was used on a monthly scale in the within-year of fishing as a proxy for the 
attractiveness of fishing in the same location as the previous month. This variable captures 
the within-year seasonal trends. Table 4.1 lists all the covariates estimated in the model. Not 
present in the skippers’ logbooks was fuel consumption, so distances to the port of landing 
were weighted by marine monthly average diesel price per litre over the study years as a 
proxy for cost, because true trip costs were not available. The assumption is that before a 
skipper proceeds to the fishing grounds, he already has a good idea where he will land his 
fish in order to achieve the best return (Caddy and Carocci, 1999). Distant sites are expected 
to have better quality fish stocks, however, so the choice of how far to travel is a trade-off 
between higher travel costs to distant grounds and the expected better quality catch there. 
Distance was calculated using the Haversine formula (Sinnott, 1984), using the distance from 
the centre of the ICES statistical rectangle where a declared landing was taken to the port of 
landing for each trip in a particular month. A mean distance was then calculated by year, 
month and Roundfish area. The distances in our model are the average kilometres from 
fishing in the same location in the previous month of the same year, so they take account of 
the expected travel costs and the landing behaviour of the fleet. It was assumed that fishers 
would have received prior information of where to land, so reflecting better market prices for 
the distance travelled to land their catch (Mathiesen, 2003). Table 4.2 lists the average values 
for the chosen covariates for each spatial unit for 1997, to illustrate the scale of covariate 
values and differences from one area to another.  
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Table 4.1 Definition of the variables used in the random utility model (RUM). 
 
Variable Definition 
plelagyr Average vpue of plaice from fishing in the same location in the same month in the 
previous year. 
Sollagyr Average vpue of sole from fishing in the same location in the same month in the 
previous year. 
timelagyr Percentage effort spent in the location in the same month the previous year. 
Plelagm Average vpue of plaice from fishing in the same location the previous month in the 
actual year of fishing. 
Sollagm Average vpue of sole from fishing in the same location the previous month in the 
actual year of fishing. 
timelagm Percentage effort spent in the location in the previous month in the actual year of 
fishing. 
Distcost Average distance to port of landing from the same location the previous month in the 
actual year of fishing weighted by the fuel price*. 
*Average marine fuel prices (£ per litre, excluding VAT and duty); source, DECC (UK Department of Energy 
and Climate Change). 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.2 Mean values of the input variables for 1997 (as an example year) over all 
months.  
 
Roundfish 
area 
vpue 
sole (£ per h) 
vpue 
plaice (£ per h) 
Distance 
(km) 
Trips 
(%) 
2 3.2(96)* 143.8(24) 440.3(4) 18.3(36) 
4 27.2(107) 73.2(29) 249.9(22) 6.9(41) 
5 34.4(58) 30.5(75) 156.8(37) 29.1(24) 
6 10.1(77) 123.6(13) 316.9(11) 29.7(23) 
7 3.4(105) 138.6(34) 409.2(8) 15.9(36) 
 
The coefficients of variation (CV) associated with the variables are given 
in parenthesis, showing variation for distance (as ports vary) and 
variation in the other variables attributable to individual differences for 
each decision unit and trip. 
*Note the large variation, because sole catches are minimal in this area. 
 
It is not unreasonable to assume that fishers are profit maximizers (Robinson and Pascoe, 
1997), basing their decisions to fish in a certain location on catch rate, effort and essentially 
economic return. However, previous effort allocation (an average of the entire beam trawl 
fleet) also adds to experience and knowledge gained of a location and contributes to the 
utility of a choice. Fishers tend to choose the same areas, based on previous experience, and 
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apply habitual behaviour, which in this case is referred to as a habit variable. Therefore, the 
utility of the location choice is modelled by the observed choice of location last year (% 
effort spent) in the same month (i.e. lagged location). The explanatory variables within the 
model were calculated as a mean by year, month and area (i.e. for each trip in a particular 
month and ICES rectangle, a mean was calculated by year, month and Roundfish area) for the 
fleet, the result of which made the choice set for year, month and area. This set was merged 
with individual trip data by year, month and area, such that for every trip, the decision-maker 
had a choice. If the choice was made, the values took a value of 1 if chosen, or 0 otherwise.  
The analysis was carried out in two steps. First, the RUM was fitted to the fishing trip dataset 
in nine time-windows (each three years long), each with a monthly time-step. These nine 
time-periods were 1997–1999, 1998–2000, 1999–2001, 2000–2002, 2001–2003, 2002–2004, 
2003–2005, 2004–2006, and 2005–2007. Note that because lagged variables were used as 
explanatory variables (as an example, vpue in the same month of the previous year), data 
from the previous year (starting from 1996) were used to predict choice in the current year 
(i.e Lagged vpue for a particular month in year 1 = –m; lagged annual vpue in year–1 = m). 
These nine time-windows were used to evaluate whether alternative explanatory variables 
were apparent because of differing circumstances (economic or habit), or through changes in 
management, the populations being fished, or other factors.  
 
The second step involved using the selected best models (based on each time-window) to 
predict future choice by fishers. Therefore, monthly time-series of predicted fisher location 
choice were projected over the periods corresponding to each of the above models (different 
cumulative time periods depending on the original model time-period): 1999–2007, 2000–
2007, 2000–2007, 2001–2007, 2002–2007, 2003–2007, 2004–2007, and 2005–2007. Here we 
were attempting to get an indication of each model’s predictive capability, at least partially. 
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We were also replicating a typical analysis that would have been performed by a researcher 
who would have cross-checked a model’s predictive power by fitting over a time-period, 
predicting ahead one year, then later cross-checking predicted against observed values. Here, 
it is important to acknowledge that as tactics change over time, they result in differences in 
the significance of the explanatory variables, as noted above. This provides the rationale for 
the cross-validation as carried out. A likelihood ratio test was also conducted on the 
constrained model (log-likelihood under the null hypothesis) fits against an unconstrained 
model, to determine whether any model reduction was necessary (and to check the hypothesis 
that the random parameters are uncorrelated). This statistical test provides a comparison of 
the random effects model (null model) over its simpler form, a deterministic conditional logit 
model. The test describes how many more times likely one model is over the other. The 
resulting p-value indicates the significance (usually <0.05) of whether to reject the null model 
over the simpler model. The mixed logit was also tested for the IIA property using the 
Hausman test (Hausman, 1978). The assumption behind this test is to estimate the model with 
all the choice sets, then to reduce it to a small set of alternatives, and then to re-estimate. The 
resulting estimates should not change when the alternatives are removed, and the two models 
can be compared and tested for IIA. If IIA holds, the null model is said to be efficient, 
otherwise the model is said to be inconsistent and IIA does not hold. 
 
4.3 Results 
All statistical fits to the RUM were significantly better than null models (likelihood ratio test; 
Table 4.3), so the mixed model was considered the best model in terms of likelihood. The 
likelihood ratio tests suggested that all random coefficients were important additions to the 
model fits and clearly reject the hypothesis that the random parameters are uncorrelated. 
However, a direct comparison is not correct because of the degrees of freedom in the two 
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models. Results from the Hausman test for IIA after Roundfish area 2 was removed from the 
data and re-estimated for all the fits showed that all models failed, giving a χ2 value of 
between 0.006 and 0.02 and p = 0.99. As a test, the models were reduced to the simpler 
conditional model and the results indicated that it passed the IIA assumption, giving a χ2 
value of between 23.8 and 74.0 and p < 0.05, proving that the mixed model was the correct 
model to have used. The significant variables and their estimated coefficients for each of the 
models are listed in Table 4.4. Several variables had a significant influence on the utility and 
probability of location choice, including distance to landing port from fishing grounds, 
expected revenue of plaice and sole, and past habits on the same fishing grounds. In general, 
the coefficients of the estimated variables were consistent with expectations; a positive sign 
was observed for expected revenues and a negative one for expected costs (Table 4.4). The 
signs of the standard deviations in some instances are negative, but for estimation purposes 
they are free to take any sign, because the normal distribution is symmetrical around its 
mean, and the absolute value can be taken to estimate the variance. The estimated standard 
deviation of the coefficients in Table 4.4 show highly significant estimates of some of the 
drivers for location choice, indicating that the parameters (timelagyr, timelagm, sollagm) vary 
in the population of fishers. 
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Table 4.3. Results of the likelihood ratio test for each of the model fits, with d.f. 
representing the degrees of freedom for the constrained and unconstrained model, and 
d.f. Chisq the χ2 value with the degrees of freedom equal to the difference in the 
number of degrees of freedom between the two models. Statistical significance at **, 
5% level, and ***, 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Model 
1997–
1999 
1998–
2000 
1999–
2001 
2000–
2002 
2001–
2003 
d.f.           
  Unconstrained 35 35 35 35 35 
  Constrained 14 14 14 14 14 
log-likelihood           
  Unconstrained –8881 –8063.3 –7307.1 –6481.5 –5766.5 
  Constrained –8916.6 –8093.4 –7337.8 –6537.1 –5822.2 
d.f. Chisq –2169.9 –2160.3 –2161.3 –2111.3 –2111.5 
  *** *** *** *** *** 
      
Model 
2002–
2004 
2003–
2005 
2004–
2006 
2005–
2007 
 d.f. 
       Unconstrained 35 35 35 35 
   Constrained 14 14 14 14 
 log-likelihood         
   Unconstrained –4659.6 –3921.9 –3336.8 –2871.7 
   Constrained –4706.0 –3944.1 –3349.6 –2892.4 
 d.f. Chisq –2192.7 –2144.3 –2125.6 –2141.4 
 
 
*** ** ** ** 
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Table 4.4 Estimated lognormal parameter estimates for each of the models. Parameters were (a) plelagyr: Average vpue of plaice from fishing in 
the same location in the same month in the previous year; (b) sollagyr: Average vpue of sole from fishing in the same location in the same month 
in the previous year; (c) timelagyr: Percentage effort spent in the location in the same month the previous year; (d) plelagm: Average vpue of 
plaice from fishing in the same location the previous month in the actual year of fishing; (e) sollagm: Average vpue of sole from fishing in the 
same location the previous month in the actual year of fishing; (f) timelagm: Percentage effort spent in the location in the previous month in the 
actual year of fishing; and (g) distcost: Average distance to port of landing from the same location the previous month in the actual year of 
fishing weighted by the fuel price. 
 
 
Parameter 
1997–
1999  
1998–
2000  
1999–
2001  
2000–
2002  
2001–
2003  
2002–
2004  
2003–
2005  
2004–
2006  
2005–
2007  
sollagyr_M 0.0405  0.00548  0.0426 . 0.0167  0.0441 . 0.0242  0.0507 . 0.0209  0.0317  
sollagyr_S –0.1256  –0.1484  0.00509  0.0554  0.0737  –0.0498  0.0289  –0.00656  0.00482  
plelagm_M 0.0714  0.0806  0.0304  0.1153 * 0.0745  0.0156  0.0534  0.058  0.0813  
plelagm_S 0.6663 *** 0.0205  0.00497  0.00025  0.00116  –0.0125  –0.00408  0.0179  –0.00267  
sollagm_M 0.0302  0.0926 *** 0.1318 *** 0.1829 *** 0.1799 *** 0.0262  –0.0276  0.0519  0.118 ** 
sollagm_S 0.2156 * –0.285 *** –0.2213 ** –0.2531 *** –0.3071 *** –0.0846  0.0054  –0.00556  0.00268  
timelagm_M 0.5504 *** 0.4914 *** 0.2646 *** 0.3919 *** 0.3469 *** 0.5762 *** 0.5442 *** 0.5951 *** 0.6391 *** 
timelagm_S –0.2174  –0.0174  0.0204  0.1636  0.1585  –0.4889 *** 0.5556 *** 0.5686 *** –0.5554 *** 
plelagyr_M 0.1799 ** 0.1476 *** 0.17 *** 0.1222 * –0.00577  0.2069 *** 0.2064 *** 0.2413 *** 0.0879  
plelagyr_S 0.7301 *** –0.0249  –0.00247  0.00179  –0.00173  0.0144  0.00071  0.00017  –0.0149  
timelagyr_M 0.323 *** 0.3629 *** 0.6843 *** 0.5788 *** 0.5621 *** 0.4618 *** 0.5575 *** 0.5267 *** 0.5222 *** 
timelagyr_S 0.5094 *** 0.00322  –0.4376 *** 0.5267 *** –0.4971 *** –0.4991 *** –0.3758 *** –0.5151 *** –0.499 *** 
distcost_M –0.1382  –0.1512 * –0.106  –0.2511 *** –0.2859 *** 0.1174  0.1558  –0.151  –0.4989 ** 
distcost_S 0.3732  0.0122  0.00987  –0.0122  –0.0016  –0.0326  –0.00415  0.0051  –0.00022  
* Statistical significance at *, 10% level, **, 5% level, and ***, 1% level. 
Parameters marked _M are the lognormal mean coefficients and _S are their between-population standard deviations. 
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Figure 4.3 provides a visual summary of the changing relative influences of different factors 
on fleet decisions, over the nine time-windows (representing short and long term). This 
represents a transition between changing tactics (in the short term) and changing strategies (in 
the long term). The results highlight the noteworthy pattern (shown by the cells shaded 
darker) that past monthly effort in the year of fishing (timelagm) and fishing in the same 
location as the same month the previous year (timelagyr) is common and dominant in every 
model fit, implying a positive tactic by the fishers to choose an area based on past effort. 
Another variable which has a positive influence over almost all nine time-periods fitted is the 
variable for past catch rates of plaice (plelagyr).  
 
Figure 4.3 Heatmap of the transformed mean parameter estimates for each significant 
(p < 0.05) variable, showing the relative importance of the different variables over 
time (See Legend of Table 4.4 for explanation of variable names). 
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Model fits for the period 1997–1999 were more prominent in colour and showed that the 
fishers’ tactics appeared to be based on past expected revenue of plaice. There is also 
substantial variation in the influence of the different variables across the model fits (a lack of 
homogeneity in the shaded cells across columns). This implies that fisher tactics were 
changeable across the different time-windows. For example, for the 1998–2003 fit, the 
expected revenue of sole from fishing in the same location in the same month of the same 
year (sollagm) had a noticeable influence. Conversely, the plaice coefficient was insignificant 
other than in the 2000–2002 fit. This was not consistent throughout all fits, because it was not 
until the fits of 2005–2007 did they reappear as significant, displaying an obvious change in 
tactics. The expected revenue of sole from fishing in the same location in the same month in 
the previous year (sollagyr) is a noticeable absentee from all fits, implying that it was not a 
significant factor in determining location choice. The distance proxy (distcost) displays 
significant negative coefficients in four of the year fits, suggesting that fishers were affected 
by changes in fuel prices. The lack of significance of the distcost coefficients in other years 
possibly suggests that distance travelled to fishing grounds is traded off against the value of 
the catch, such that the costs to reach the best fishing grounds are compensated for by better 
catch rates there. Interestingly, the observations of significance in fuel price, the gap in the 
significance of expected sole and plaice revenue (sollagm, plelagyr), and the different 
strengths of the habitual effort (timelagyr and timelagm), coincide with the change of 
ownership of the fishing vessels from the UK to the Netherlands (see Figure 4.2). Over the 
longer term (1997–2007), past annual and monthly effort (timelagyr, timelagm) were the 
most persistent driving factors influencing fisher choice (Figure 4.3). 
 
Elasticities were calculated for plelagyr (the average vpue of plaice from fishing in the same 
location in the same month in the previous year), and distcost (the average distance to port of 
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landing from the same location the previous month in the actual year of fishing weighted by 
the fuel price), for model fit 2000–2002; this fit was chosen because it yielded the most 
significant contribution of the coefficients. The effect of a 50% increase/decrease in 
value/cost was explored with respect to a change in the probability of location choice relative 
to the model predictions. A 50% decrease (50% increase) in plelagyr had a negligible effect 
on the predicted location choices throughout the time-series except in July 2007, when there 
was an 8% increase (4.8% decrease) towards the probability of fishing in Roundfish area 5 
and <0.02% reductions (0.01% increases) in the probabilities of fishing in other areas. In 
contrast, distcost had a much more persistent and greater effect throughout the predicted 
time-series. A 50% decrease in distcost resulted in a 19% increase in the probability of 
choosing Roundfish area 5, and small reductions of ~0.04% for other areas. A 50% increase 
in distcost resulted in a 10% decrease in the probabilities of choosing Roundfish area 5, with 
small increases (~0.02%) towards selecting Roundfish areas 2, 4, 6 and 7.  
 
4.3.1 Predicting future choice 
The predictions for all model fits through time are presented in Figure 4.4 along with the 
observed percentage of trips in each Roundfish area (black line in the Figure). Predictions 
were computed using the estimated significant parameter estimates and the mean values of 
these variables at a monthly scale [Equation 4.3]. Overall, the models (shown as different 
colours of line) yielded good fits relative to the observed (black line) monthly time-series 
(Figure 4.4). The models predict the effort allocation in Roundfish areas 2 and 6, possibly 
because these are the main fishing grounds for plaice, and have expected good catch rates 
(Figure 4.4). 
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Figure 4.4 Plots of eight of the model predictions based on fits to the data, showing 
the relationship between the percentages of predicted and observed fishing trips, the 
black line representing the “perfect” fit and RFA meaning Roundfish area. 
 
The model fit to data over the period 1998–2000 was used to predict effort reallocation 
during the closure in 2001. As Roundfish area 7 encompassed part of the study area, we 
simulated a closure by forcing all variables in the area to take a value of 0. Using the 
estimated model coefficients, the probabilities of different trip choices were predicted, then 
compared with actual trip choice to assess the degree of effort redistribution (Figure 4.5). The 
percentage of trips to Roundfish area 7 predicted to reallocate effort during the closure to 
Roundfish area 2 for the months March and April 2001 were 23 and 25%, respectively, 
compared with the observed percentages of 23 and 24% of trips (20 and 24% in 2000). 
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Roundfish area 4 showed predicted estimates of 4 and 9% compared with observation 
percentage allocations of effort of 10 and 18%
4
 (5 and 5% in 2000), Roundfish area 5 showed 
predicted estimates of 20 and 24% compared with observations of 23 and 26% for percentage 
reallocation of effort (21 and 23% in 2000), and Roundfish area 6 showed predicted estimates 
of 53 and 42% compared with observations of 45 and 32% for percentage reallocation of 
effort (30 and 39% in 2000). The notable differences were in Roundfish areas 4 and 6 in 
April, for which there were 9 and 10% over- and underestimates of predicted vs. observed, 
respectively. Most of the predictions are, however, reasonable for the choices made during 
the closure period (Figure 4.5).  
 
Figure 4.5 Model predictions from the 2001 closure simulation, based on closing 
Roundfish area (RFA) 7. 
                                                 
4
 The EU flag vessel legislation requires member states to have some economic link with its national fisheries 
communities. During the closure period, the economic link rules applied, so because the western part of the 
North Sea (RFA 4) was open rather than closed, foreign owned vessels having UK quota could land their 
catches in Grimsby.  
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4.4 Discussion  
The work documented here has described a novel method of predicting choice of fishing 
location for the English North Sea beam trawl fleet fishing in the southern North Sea, using a 
mixed model. The model showed good fits relative to the observed monthly time-series 
(Figure 4.3) and predicted the general patterns of spatial change by fishers over time. Model 
variability in prediction is apparent in Roundfish areas 4, 5, and 7 compared with Roundfish 
areas 2 and 6, where the main plaice and sole grounds are respectively located. The model 
was also used to simulate part of the cod closure in 2001 (Figures 4.1a and 4.5), and showed 
good agreement with actual observations on a monthly time-scale.  
 
One of the key findings from this study is that although fishers’ tactics are driven by 
persistent long-term habits, there are also shorter-term subtleties driven by additional issues 
that can vary in their relative importance over time. The utility of fishing in a location (a 
distinct fishing area) depends on previous success measured as good catch rates in terms of 
economic vpue, as well as previous experience, in this case a measure of past fishing practice 
monthly and annually (the effort allocation variable; Hutton et al., 2004). Therefore, the 
results of the RUM analysis here reveal some of the assumptions that could be expected a 
priori for location choice. Essentially, some previous knowledge or experience of a given 
area has the dominant bearing on the decision whether or not to fish there. In addition to past 
experience, we also found that cost (i.e. distance to port of landing and fuel prices) was an 
important driver of choice (see Abernethy et al., 2010). The results of the analyses also 
revealed that fishers made their decisions based on past habitual behaviour/previous 
experience in combination with targeting for plaice (i.e. one-year lagged vpue), fuel price, 
and past monthly catch rates of sole. The heterogeneity in the selection of fishing grounds by 
fishers is attributable to individual variations in decision along with other unexplained 
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factors. The mixed model handles this type of heterogeneity and makes it a useful tool for 
fisher choice modelling approaches.  
 
Past and current failings of fishery management relate partly to uncertainty in the stock 
assessments and the management. These range from different sources of model error, through 
biased input data or process error, to implementation error (Peterman, 2004). Figure 4.4 is an 
example of the temporal and spatial variation or uncertainties of fishing patterns attributable 
to model error. To reduce these uncertainties, there is a need to improve understanding of the 
processes driving location choice, i.e. more-detailed economic (fuel, market prices), social 
(employment), biological (recruitment, spawning-stock biomass) and regulatory (quotas, 
technical measures) influences. Of course, many processes are complex and interrelated, and 
it is difficult to account for all the uncertainty, but each process needs to be understood better 
along with the sources of the uncertainty. This study progresses our understanding of the 
drivers of this fleet significantly in terms of the short-term choice of location both temporally 
and spatially, which appear to be largely driven by habit, but also by other subtle drivers. In 
an environment where change is the norm, fishers develop tactics and strategies to survive 
when faced with rising fuel costs, fluctuating stock levels, regulations, and market conditions 
(some of which can be observed in our study; see also Abernethy et al., 2010). In a 
management context, it is important to understand fisher behaviour in the face of a changing 
environment so as to manage the system better (Hilborn, 1985; Fulton et al., 2011). This is 
especially important when considering closed areas or marine protected areas, MPAs.  
 
4.4.1 Conclusions and future work  
To conclude, the implementation here of a discrete choice mixed model allowed us to explore 
and improve understanding of English and Welsh beam trawl fisher short-term tactical 
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behaviour over a 12-year period. The results confirm the notion that expected revenues from 
target species, experience or habit, and fuel prices are significant factors in determining fisher 
decision-making. Some of the unobserved random components of the model causing 
heterogeneity in the selection of fishing grounds by fishers could be attributable to individual 
variations in decision-making along with other unexplained factors. For example, factors that 
we have not captured could include skipper skill, age, nationality and vessel attribute. 
Compiling data on these factors to investigate the influence fisher attributes would be a 
valuable aim of future work. Nevertheless, even without these, model predictions were 
similar to observed choices during the study period, and the simulated closure we modelled 
resulted in discrepancies of location choice of just 9 and 10%.  
 
Future application of the fleet behaviour model taking account of implementation error within 
a Management Strategy Evaluation (MSE) framework could help evaluate future stock levels 
and the profitability of this fleet (Pilling et al., 2008). The main factor that could contribute to 
this analysis would be the accuracy of predictions of location choice based on knowledge of 
the two main target species, bearing in mind the fact that fisheries have historically been 
managed on a stock-by-stock basis. Although several studies have been published on the 
North Sea sole and plaice fishery (Kell et al., 1999, 2005; Ulrich et al., 2007; Kraak et al., 
2008; Andersen et al., 2010), the work reported here on the spatial dynamics of the fleet may 
complement future research effort, as it has in other MSE spatial studies (Pelletier and 
Mahévas, 2005; Bastardie et al., 2010; Lehuta et al., 2010). Such an analysis could provide 
an insight into mixed fishery management, because in the short term, an approach needs to be 
developed to resolve conflicting management advice for different species in the same fishery.  
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Chapter 5. Effective fishing effort indicators and their application to spatial 
management of mixed demersal fisheries
5
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sole Solea solea (Source: CEFAS). 
  
                                                 
5
 Tidd, A.N., Effective fishing effort trip indicators and their use for efficient spatial management in mixed demersal fisheries. Fisheries 
Management and Ecology, doi: 10.1111/fme.12021. 
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Abstract 
Since Common Fisheries Policy reform in 2002, there have been various proposals for 
designing effective input-management tools in the context of demersal multispecies and 
multimétier fisheries, to augment quota management. The relationship between fishing 
mortality and effort exerted by the English beam trawl fleet is investigated for two stocks of 
North Sea demersal fish, plaice, Pleuronectes platessa L., and sole, Solea solea (L.). 
Catchability was adjusted by accounting for targeting by this gear, seasonal and area effects, 
and individual vessel variation, using results from a generalized linear mixed effects model 
(GLMM) that included random effects (in this case, vessel). Descriptors were standardised in 
relation to distinct submétiers and their impact on both species. Fishing efficiency was 
calculated as the ratio between relative nominal landings per unit effort derived from the 
GLMM and survey indices from a standard survey vessel. Fishing efficiency for sole 
increased (+0.6% annually) and for plaice decreased (−6.2%), probably because of changes in 
targeting, fuel costs and regulations.  
5.1 Introduction 
The management of European mixed fisheries is primarily based on total allowable catches 
(TACs) along with effort restrictions (days-at-sea), technical measures (gear and/or mesh size 
regulations, size restrictions) and seasonal closures. The difficulties in managing fish stocks 
through TACs are widely recognised (Shepherd 2003; Beddington et al., 2007). The main 
issue is that a TAC set to protect one species within a mixed fishery can have an undesired 
effect on another through increased discarding, or indirectly through foodweb interactions. 
Hence, a conservation policy cannot achieve its goal through this single management action. 
For example, a TAC for one species in a fishery may be exhausted earlier in the year than for 
another species taken by the same fleet/fishery (Vinther et al., 2004). The fleet could then 
continue to fish the same grounds until it landed the TAC remaining for each target species, 
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but any catch of a species for which the TACs were exhausted would have to be discarded. 
Discarding species that almost certainly die on return to the sea or the illegal retention of the 
catch leads to socially undesirable results (Copes 1986). Since the Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP) was initially revised in 1992, fishing effort management schemes have had an 
increasing role as tools to control fishing mortality. Effort management differs from TACs in 
that controls on effort manage the input rather than the outputs specified by a TAC, although 
they both aim to limit fishing mortality.  
 
In fisheries science, fishing effort (E) is an essential parameter in the assessment of fish 
stocks and their effective management. It is linked to fishing mortality (F) via the catchability 
(q) at age of a stock, a term that generally means the extent to which the stock is susceptible 
to fishing and that would be captured by one unit of effort. Catchability is therefore as 
important to managers as effort in assessing fish stocks and ultimately in supporting effective 
management. The relationship is assumed to be linear and takes the form F=qE. Fishing 
effort, however, is difficult to quantify because the sizes and types of vessels and gears differ. 
It is usually approximated by a metric of capacity, such as gross tonnage or engine power, 
with a measure of activity (e.g. days-at-sea or hours fished), and is therefore an aggregated 
measure of fisher behaviour in locating the greatest densities of marketable fish (Rijnsdorp et 
al., 2006). Nevertheless, capacity has not always decreased at the same rate as stocks 
(Cunningham and Gréboval 2001), and as resources are depleted, fishers tend to redistribute 
their fishing effort across other fisheries, implement new technologies such as advanced fish-
finding devices (Branch et al., 2006), or participate in illegal, unreported and unregulated 
(IUU) fishing (Agnew et al., 2009). Additionally, vessels and/or gears may be modified to 
circumvent regulations and/or to increase effective fishing power, in an attempt to continue 
harvesting at the most profitable level (Gréboval, 1988).  
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The efficiency of fishing vessels and hence catchability tends to increase over time because 
of factors such as fishing technology improvements. This increase, known generally as 
‘technological creep’, can be quantified in relation to fishing mortality with constant nominal 
effort (En) and intensified effective effort (Ee). These relationships are important to fishery 
managers because they are crucial in reducing fishing mortality through effort control, and 
ignoring them could prove meaningless in limiting fishing mortality (Pauly et al., 2002). 
Shepherd (2003) suggested that for a given amount of effort exerted, and because of 
variations in vessels and their activity, different effects on stocks can be generated. Therefore, 
it would be necessary to set effort limits at the individual level based on area fished and gear 
used. Standardized fishing effort has been interpreted in the literature, however, in different 
ways, and there is some contention within the fisheries scientific community as to what it 
actually means, and also as to how any problem should be addressed. Many authors have 
tackled it using statistical regression models (Maunder and Punt, 2004), where some 
dependent variable, e.g. catch per unit effort (cpue), is modelled as a function of plausible 
explanatory factors such as seasonal, temporal and gear characteristics (Hilborn and Walters 
1992; Weninger and McConnell, 2000; Hinton and Maunder, 2003; Mahévas et al., 2004; 
Piet and Jennings, 2005; Bishop 2006; Marchal, 2008). The parameters from such models are 
then used to estimate the value of the variable in question for any combination of seasonal, 
temporal and technical (e.g. gear) factors. Since the 2002 CFP reform, there have been 
various management and recovery plans, as well as some difficulties in designing relevant, 
efficient and effective management tools in the context of multispecies, multimétier fisheries. 
Hence, there is an increasing role for input management as part of ongoing CFP reform.  
 
The aim of the present study was to evaluate the relationship between fishing mortality and 
nominal effort applied on two North Sea demersal stocks, plaice (Pleuronectes platessa) and 
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sole (Solea solea), caught by the English beam trawl fleet, using an adaptation of the 
commonly used general linear model (GLM; Nelder and Wedderburn, 1972). Effort 
indicators for UK fleet capacity based on vessel capacity units (VCUs
6
) determined by vessel 
size and engine power, and hours fished were used rather than the more traditional metrics 
(e.g. kW and days at sea). Methods of standardising such descriptors in relation to submétiers 
and their impact on both species are suggested, allowing for potential changes and strategies 
in the fishery to be evaluated. The basis for the approach is to resolve potential conflicting 
spatial management advice for different species that can be taken in the same fishery, and 
which could be applied at an individual level, as suggested by Shepherd (2003). Multispecies 
fisheries are difficult to manage, so advice at the fleet or fishery level may be more effective 
than trying to balance and integrate single-species advice for a range of stocks (Vinther et al., 
2004). This means that altering effort controls or spatial regulations for one stock can have 
implications on others and the wider ecosystem.  
5.2 Methods 
English beam trawl vessels in the North Sea have traditionally caught plaice in a directed 
fishery using 120 mm mesh north of 56°N, and in a mixed fishery with sole, using 80 mm 
mesh, in the southern North Sea. In 2005, international landings of North Sea plaice 
amounted to 55 700 t, compared with a peak of 170 000 t in 1989. Reported international 
landings of plaice from the North Sea were dominated by the Netherlands (40%), followed by 
the UK (23%) and Denmark (20%), with Belgium, Germany, France, and other countries 
reporting the remaining 17% (ICES, 2007). In the English fishery, the high value of sole 
makes it one of the most important species targeted by inshore vessels operating trawls and 
fixed nets. The fishery is conducted mainly from March to October, but sole are also taken as 
a target species by offshore beam trawlers, otter trawlers and gillnetters. The English North 
                                                 
6 A VCU is a unit used by the UK as part of fleet capacity management (see UK Fisheries Department 1988). 
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Sea beam trawl fleet until 2003 operated mainly out of east coast English ports, typically 
spending on average 250 d at sea in trips lasting about 6 d (Hutton et al., 2004). Since 
2002/2003 and the transfer of ownership to the Netherlands, however, skippers have 
generally targeted sole because of its greater commercial value and short distance from their 
Dutch home port. 
 
5.2.1 Data 
Individual trip data for the commercial beam trawlers were collated for the years 1997–2007 
and examined by area. These areas were based on International Bottom Trawl Surveys 
(IBTS) and in particular the Netherlands beam trawl survey (BTS), which stratifies its 
sampling of sole and plaice by Roundfish areas (Figure 5.1; ICES, 2009a). Roundfish areas 1 
and 3 were excluded from the study because English beam trawlers generally do not fish 
there. The data collected for each vessel and trip included species landed, hours fished, 
landed weight (kg) per ICES statistical rectangle, month, year, and total value of the catch by 
species. Within the EU, it is a requirement for vessels >10 m long to submit logbooks, but the 
database contained a subset of catch from <10 m vessels that historically reported their 
catches. Fleets were defined to align with those in the data collection regulation (DCR) of the 
European Commission (EC, 2000). A method was developed independently (see EC, 2006a), 
preceding the current data collection framework (DCF; EC, 2008) that defines the beam trawl 
fleet on the basis of its use of a beam trawl for >50% of a fishing trip. The fleet activity, or 
métier, is determined by a fisher’s tactic at a trip level, and is defined on the basis of the mix 
of target species. In other words, métiers are characterized on the basis of the outcome of a 
trip and defined by gear, fishing grounds and composition of landings. The compositions of 
landings were calculated as a proportion of the total value of the catch, thus removing the 
differences in catch rate attributable to vessel capacity. Catch proportions were based on 
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economic value rather than weight, reflecting the notion that fishers are profit maximisers, so 
valuable species received more importance in the analysis. In this study, the beam trawl 
métier that primarily targets crustaceans (brown shrimp) was omitted, and a single demersal 
métier was defined (demersal beam trawl) and used for analysis. The fleet targets the main 
commercial flatfish stocks (plaice and sole) in the North Sea. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Map of the North Sea showing ICES statistical rectangles and roundfish 
areas (1−7), with the plaice box indicated by the heavy dark line (closed to beam 
trawlers of hp >300 for the whole year since 1994).  
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 5.2.2 Exploratory analysis and covariates 
Vessel landings per unit effort (lpue) were calculated from logbook-recorded landings as kg 
per h fished per vessel per trip per area (ICES statistical rectangle; Figure 5.1). Although 
haul-by-haul data are preferred for such analyses, logbook declarations are by day and by 
ICES statistical rectangle per trip. The underlying statistical distribution generating the data 
was also hypothesized to be of the form of a gamma distribution, but after examining the 
data, a lognormal distribution was investigated and normality tested using Q−Q plots. In 
keeping with other studies (e.g. Butterworth, 1996; Ortiz et al., 2000; Ortiz and Arocha, 
2004), zero lpue values were addressed by the addition of a positive constant of 1, because 
the logarithm of 1 is 0 (Ortiz and Arocha, 2004).  
 
Vessel capacity units, i.e. overall length × breadth of vessel (both in m) + engine power (kW) 
× 0.45, was chosen simply because this metric is used in policy and combines characteristics 
recorded in the UK fleet register. Unfortunately, other potentially relevant covariates, such as 
the electronics used (e.g. global positioning systems, GPS, plotter software, fish finding 
equipment, seabed mapping and navigation systems), skipper and crew experience in the 
fishery, and specific technical characteristics of the gear, are not available from logbooks or 
fleet registers. These can be obtained only by face-to-face interviews with the skipper, and 
would also change over time. Year was included as a factor to capture temporal changes in 
technology or fluctuations in stock abundance. Month and area (ICES rectangle) were 
included to account for strategic/tactical effects (e.g. responding to seasonal changes in stock 
abundance). Vessel effect was considered to be an important factor and included, because it 
could be an indication of skipper/crew experience and gear characteristics (Mahévas et al., 
2011). 
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5.2.3 The model 
Generalized linear mixed effects models (GLMMs) are used widely in ecological research 
(Bolker et al., 2009), but less so in fisheries (Venables and Dichmont, 2004a). Nevertheless, 
the applications of GLMMs are beginning to be explored using catch and effort data (Bishop 
et al. 2004; Helser et al., 2004; Baum and Blanchard, 2010; Tascheri et al., 2010). A GLMM 
is a generalization of a GLM (Nelder and Wedderburn, 1972), such that the data are 
permitted to exhibit correlation and non-constant variance (Diggle et al., 2002; Venables and 
Dichmont, 2004b). A GLMM therefore provides the flexibility of modelling not only the 
statistical means of data (as in the standard linear model) but also their variance and 
covariance. The term mixed model refers to the use of both fixed and random effects in the 
same analysis. The model is described formally as:  
 
      
 
           
 
       ,                            (5.1)
         
where       are the fixed effects as descriptors of lpue (   , and        are the random 
effects made up of    , the levels of the random effects, and     is assumed to be distributed 
normally.  
For comparison with the GLMM analyses, a basic GLM with temporal and vessel 
characteristic fixed effects was constructed as follows:  
 
ln(lpue) ~ vcu + year + month + area + month*year + month*area .                        (5.2)
   
Variables were selected initially based on their importance as reported in a pan-European 
study by Mahévas et al. (2011) and their availability from logbooks: final selection was based 
on their statistical significance at a level of α of 0.05, following stepwise backward selection. 
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Two other alternative models with the same fixed effects as (2) but with different random 
effects assumptions were compared using GLMM methodology (1). Alternative regressors of 
fishing power were considered and for these analyses, vessel tonnage was replaced with 
VCU, which is highly correlated with the other technical characteristics of the vessel, and 
‘vessel’ was not considered a fixed effect but rather treated as a random effect. Earlier studies 
explored the use of random effects of vessel and vessel−year interactions when standardizing 
catch and effort data in examining fishing power (Bishop et al., 2004; Helser et al., 2004). 
Based on those studies, the same method was applied in the choice of the variable ‘vessel’ to 
account for between-vessel variation, and ‘vessel and year’ to account for vessel variation 
over time, to capture increase or decrease in fishing power and skipper changes.  
 
The model was developed to capture the variation within vessels and between times, to 
account for potential technical changes in fishing power over the study period. For example, 
older vessels in earlier years should have lower fishing power than vessels that joined the 
fishery later. Residual plots were plotted against predicted values and tested for normality 
using Q−Q plots. The GLMMs were then compared by inspecting the Akaike information 
criteria (AIC; Akaike, 1974). All model analysis was implemented by PROC GLIMMIX 
(SAS Institute Inc. 2006).  
 
5.2.4 Relationship between fishing effort and fishing mortality 
The link between F and nominal E can be characterised by the catchability coefficient q 
(which relates to biomass abundance, and is the fraction of fish caught by a defined unit of 
effort, see above); catchability also links population biomass abundance N to cpue as cpue = 
qN. 
Following Mahévas et al. (2004, 2011), it was assumed that lpue can be represented as 
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lpue = 
        
            
 = aPEN,                  (5.3) 
 
where a represents the accessibility coefficient of the target population, and P the fishing 
power of the vessel targeting population N applying nominal fishing effort E (in this case 
hours fished represented by En). The product of aP is the catchability. The different factors 
characterising fishing effort estimated from the model can be used to calculate effective 
fishing effort Ee by adjusting nominal effort. The relationships between fishing mortality 
were investigated by plotting log-transformed partial ln(F) against log effort, ln(En) and 
ln(Ee) for all trips in the time period, and the r
2
 values compared. Relative nominal and 
adjusted lpue and effort were calculated based on annual totals and averages of the totals for 
the period of the study. Fishing efficiency was calculated based on a method used by Marchal 
et al. (2002) and Engelhard (2008), the ratio of relative nominal lpue and survey stock 
assessment indices from a standard survey vessel that was used consistently throughout the 
time period of study (ICES, 2007) for each species by comparing start and end estimates 
weighted by the number of years to give average weighted increase or decrease. 
 
5.2.5 Estimates of fishing mortality 
Total international landings and estimated values of fishing mortality were obtained from 
ICES annual stock assessments (ICES, 2007) for North Sea sole and plaice. Partial fishing 
mortalities were calculated as 
 
            
       
    
.                               (5.4) 
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The subscripts l, y, s, v, t and a refer to landings, year, stock, vessel, trip and area, so     is 
the total fishing mortality by year and stock (or mean F over selective ages 2−6 (for both 
stocks),      the total international landed weight in kg per year and stock,         the total 
landed weight in kg per year, stock, vessel, trip and area, and        the partial fishing 
mortality by year, stock, vessel, trip and area. 
 
5.2.6 Investigation of submétiers within a fleet using multivariate techniques  
The aim here was to characterize the tactics of a trip based on the effective effort on sole and 
plaice, in order to give an indication of the operational activities of the vessels (i.e. grouping 
the vessels into similar subgroups linked to area, season, capacity and ultimately related to 
approximate fishing mortality) and to use the information as a tool or indicator for managing 
the mixed fishery. For the present study the Ward minimum variance clustering method was 
used, in which the distance between two clusters was the ANOVA sum of squares between 
two clusters added up over all variables (SAS Institute Inc. 1996). This method was preferred 
because it produces tighter clusters (Gauch, 1982). The Wards minimum variance method 
tends to join clusters with few observations, and is strongly biased towards producing clusters 
with roughly the same number of observations. A hierarchical agglomerative clustering 
(HAC) analysis was used to define subfleets. 
5.3 Results 
Results from the GLMM and GLM are presented in Table 5.1. Convergence was achieved for  
all models. The model containing the random effects to account for between-vessel variation 
and vessel variation between years and vessel variation over time had the lowest AIC and 
was considered the best model for both species (Pinheiro and Bates, 2000). The plots of 
residuals against predicted lpue did not show trends and the Q−Q plots followed the reference 
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line, suggesting that the distribution was close to normal and that the correct error models 
were selected.  Furthermore, plots of subject against fitted indicated that all the model outputs 
tracked the data well, with all values of r
2 
>0.56 (Table 5.1). 
 
Using parameter estimates from the descriptors of the GLMM to describe lpue, fishing effort 
was adjusted. Figure 5.2 shows the log of partial F vs. effort relationships (nominal and 
adjusted) for the two stocks. For sole and plaice, the r
2
 values increased from 0.11 to 0.74 and 
0.51 to 0.89, respectively, when effort was adjusted by the parameter estimates of the model. 
The implications of this are that there has been an improvement in the definition and 
modelling of metrics (effort, capacity and others) that defined the relationship between effort 
and capacity and F. 
 
Figure 5.2 Relationships between fishing mortality (F) and [(a) and (c)] nominal 
effort (En) and [(b) and (d)] adjusted effort (Ee) for (left panels) plaice and (right 
panels) sole.  
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Table 5.1 Diagnostic statistics for the best models explaining plaice and sole lpue as a function of vessel and accessibility (year, month, 
area) characteristics. The best GLM model (i.e. without random effects) is shown as the basic model (models 1 and 4). GLMMs 2 and 5 
have fixed effects equivalent to the basic model but also include the random effects of individual vessels. GLMMs 3 and 6 include the 
random effects of vessel*year interactions (interpreted as ‘technological creep’). 
Model 
AIC ΔAIC 
Subject 
against Fitted 
( r
2 
) d.f. 
 Plaice 
  
  
 GLM without random effects, and including main effects 
  
  
1 vcu + year + month + area + month*year + month*area 49 141.28 9 979.48 0.74 20 263 
 GLMM, including random effects 
  
  
2 basic + vessel  42 483.61 3 322.09 0.80 20 124 
3 basic + vessel + vessel*year  39 161.52 0 0.84 19 701 
 Sole 
  
  
 GLM without random effects, and including main effects 
  
  
4 vcu + year + month + area + month*year + month*area 64 029.54 5 510.08 0.57 20 263 
 GLMM, including random effects 
  
  
5 basic + vessel  60 032.64 1 513.18 0.62 20 124 
6 basic + vessel + vessel*year  58 519.46 0 0.66 19 701 
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5.3.1 Fishing efficiency and year effects 
Trends in effort (nominal and adjusted) and lpue (nominal and adjusted) over the study period 
(1997–2007) for the various stock/fleet combinations are displayed on Figure 5.3. For both 
stocks, there was a downward trend over time in both nominal and adjusted effort, but this 
trend appears to have stabilized for the final three years of the analysis. In terms of lpue, there 
was no trend for plaice, but there was an increase for sole over the final 5 years of the study 
period. Analysis of the percentage change in fishing efficiency resulted in an annual 6.2% 
decrease for plaice and a 0.6% increase for sole. These results coincided with the transfer of 
ownership to the Netherlands, where skippers generally target sole because of its greater 
commercial value and availability relatively close to port in the southern North Sea, vessels 
generally operating in Roundfish area 6 (Figure 5.1). 
 
Figure 5.3 Relative [(a) and (c)] landings per unit effort, lpue, and [(b) and (d)] 
relative effort for (top panels) plaice and (bottom panels) sole for the English beam 
trawl fishery in the North Sea (1997–2007), with data for both nominal effort (En) 
(dashed line) and adjusted effort (Ee) (solid line) indicated.  
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5.3.2 Cluster analysis 
The results of the Cluster Analysis pseudo F and cubic clustering criterion (ccc; SAS Institute 
Inc. 1983; not shown) revealed local peaks at three clusters, reinforced by a local low t
2
 and a 
levelling of R
2
 for these clusters, indicating three distinct submétiers (Figure 5.4). 
Exploratory analyses (Figures 5.5−5.7) showed interesting spatial and temporal patterns. 
Clusters 1 and 2, although close spatially (Figure 5.5), were distinguished seasonally (Figure 
5.6) in terms of a decrease in effective effort on sole during the second quarter of the year for 
cluster 1. Cluster 3 was distinct, being mainly a sole fishery just off the English coast fished 
mainly by inshore vessels of smaller capacity (VCU). 
 
Figure 5.4 Dendrogram of the beam trawl fishing trips in the North Sea, based on 
effective effort profiles for sole and plaice.  
 
5.3.3 Application of the analyses 
As a demonstration of utility of the analysis in terms of management indicators, the effects of 
reducing fishing mortality on both stocks for a given reduction in mortality on one stock were 
estimated. Taking into account the relationships between effective effort and fishing mortality  
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Figure 5.5 Total effective effort of (a) plaice and (b) sole by cluster for 2007. 
 
for each submétier/cluster and the trends for each cluster over time, for each gear grouping 
and area, a simple management approach is presented to demonstrate application of the 
approach. Using the values produced from the cluster analysis, Figures 5.6 and 5.7 display 
where the main effort is in terms of trip numbers and effective effort by area and season. For 
example, if a manager wishes to reduce fishing mortality on plaice by 20% in the 1st quarter 
of the year in Roundfish area 6 (or in rectangles in this area) for cluster 2 (Figure 5.7a) and 
vessels with a VCU of 800−1099 (Figure 5.7b), the effective indicators provide a platform to 
control fishing mortality by reducing the hours fished. An example is described below. 
 
Step 1 − Taking the example from above, in 2007 there were ~120 trips (Figure 5.7) exerting 
an average effective effort of 8 (Figure 5.6; plaice effective effort). A fishing efficiency 
decrease of 6.2% is applied in order to estimate the effective effort, which results in a new 
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effective effort of 7.94 (e.g. exp (8) × 93.8%, then back-transformed). 
Step 2 − Applying the effective effort from Step 1 (Figure 5.2b, using the equation from the 
plots) results in a fishing mortality on plaice of −10.641 in total, equating to exp 
(−10.641)*120 trips) and an estimate of F of 0.002869.  
Step 3 − A 20% reduction results in an F value of 0.002295. The average per trip log-
transformed gives an F value of −10.864, which results in an effective effort of 7.71 (Figure 
5.2b) and a nominal effort of 3.46 (Figure 5.2a). The nominal effort back-transformed 
approximates to 32 h per trip, an overall reduction of 6 nominal hours fishing per trip per 
vessel from the original calculated nominal effort of 38 h based on −10.641 fishing mortality 
(Figure 5.2a).  
Step 4 − To provide an indication of the effect on sole for a 20% reduction in plaice, a ratio 
of the start and end estimates of effective effort of plaice as calculated in the steps above 
(7.71/7.94) was applied to the mean effective effort on sole (Figure 5.6; sole effective effort 
5.5, including 0.6% fishing efficiency increase), which was estimated at 5.73 and the 
associated F calculated to be −11.52 (Figure 5.2d). Applying the ratio, the resulting effective 
effort was 5.57 and the revised F −11.69, giving a total reduction of 15.8% in sole mortality 
and a total reduction of 720 h fishing based on a 6 h reduction *120 trips.  
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Figure 5.6 Effective effort indicators. Box and whisker plots of clusters vs. the 
different covariates (roundfish area, VCU and month) for plaice (left panels) and sole 
(right panels) in 2007. The horizontal line represents the mean, the box the 25th−75th 
percentiles, the whiskers the ranges of data, and the solid diamonds outliers, with 
Roundfish areas (rfarea) displayed because they demonstrate the approach more 
clearly than a series of ICES rectangles. (Cluster 1=dark, Cluster 2 =medium dark, 
Cluster 3= light). 
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Figure 5.7 Number of trips by (a) Roundfish area (RFA) and (b) VCU by cluster 
(1−3) and month for 2007. 
 
5.4 Discussion  
The analysis here has provided an understanding of the relationships between some of the 
parameters that allow linkages to be drawn between capacity, effort and fishing mortality and 
of their use as indicators for spatial and temporal management of the North Sea flatfish beam 
trawl fishery. It also takes account of changes in capacity and fishing power. Limiting fishing 
through effort controls via spatial management requires an understanding of likely fisher 
response, and also an ability to predict the choice of fishing area or fishing activity (Vermard 
et al., 2008; Chapter 4). Here, no attempt was made to predict the choice of fishing ground, 
but on the basis of fisheries seasonality, Chapter 4 provided a simplistic ecosystem approach 
(FAO, 2003) to manage a fleet’s activity in a particular area (Daan, 2005), targeting sole and 
plaice. Bycatch species were not included in the model because of the lack of estimates of 
fishing mortality, nor were benthic habitats of conservation interest included.  
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A GLMM that included random effects (in this case, vessel) was applied to lpue as the 
dependent variable in order to explain the variance attributable to targeting by the gear, 
changes in efficiency, capacity, seasonal and area effects. This method was selected over the 
more traditional GLM because of the unbalanced dataset, i.e. not all vessels operated 
throughout the study period. As such, including the vessel as a random effect takes account of 
inter-vessel variation and variation between individual vessels over time; ignoring it could 
produce negatively biased lpue estimates. The model parameter estimates for sole and plaice 
were adjusted with nominal effort and fitted against F. Both adjustments resulted in improved 
relationships relative to F vs. nominal effort. Relative adjusted effort over the study period 
declined initially for both species, but stabilised towards the end of the study period, whereas 
relative adjusted lpue improved slightly for sole and increased the fishing efficiency for this 
species. Cluster analysis of individual trips, based on estimates of effective effort for sole and 
plaice, revealed three main submétiers within the fleet, which then made it possible to 
estimate spatially the effect on one stock of applying an effort or fishing mortality limit 
(including fishing efficiency). 
 
The model relied on estimates of F from ICES working groups. If the F estimate was biased 
there would be variances in the F~Ee relationship. Landings are not always a direct proxy for 
fishing mortality, because of discarding, however, and discarding was not taken into account 
in these analyses because the information was not available for all fleet segments/submétiers. 
The quality of other data sources (e.g. VCUs derived from the fleet register), and the 
collection and databases of logbook information, cannot be assessed. The results from the F-
reduction exercise underscore the difficulties in controlling fishing effort when managing a 
mixed fishery, because the nominal effort vs. mortality relationship for sole had a poor fit 
(Figure 5.2c). The analysis relied heavily on the plaice fit (Figure 5.2a), which provided a 
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better indication of nominal effort exerted at a trip level. The effective effort indicators were 
based on means (Figure 5.6), although they showed the relative uncertainty or spread of the 
data associated with respect to each factor. However, such a spread of data for each factor is 
not uncommon, because fisher behaviour varies and leads to different values of effective 
effort. Managers applying effort limitation need to be aware of the variability in catchability 
by fishers in the same fishery acting on the same stock group. 
 
The seasonal nature of the fishery was evident from the analyses (Figure 5.7). There was 
typically more effort at the start and end of the year in Roundfish area 6 for cluster 2, 
reflecting targeting of plaice then and corresponding to the seasonal migration of the fish 
from the central North Sea (Roundfish area 2) to the southern spawning grounds (Roundfish 
area 6; De Veen, 1978; Rijnsdorp and Pastoors, 1995; Hunter et al., 2003), and greater effort 
in Roundfish area 5 in late spring and summer, possibly reflecting beam trawling for sole on 
their spawning grounds near the English east coast (Cluster 3; De Veen, 1976). Cluster 1 (in 
contrast to Cluster 2) was characterised by more effort farther north in Roundfish area 2 
throughout summer, but this was not as prominent at the start or end of the year. The results 
support the findings of earlier studies of clear seasonal trends in beam trawl effort 
redistribution throughout the study period (Chapter 4). 
 
One of the main assumptions here was that fishing VCU was a proxy for capacity, the 
rationale being that the unit is the basis of vessel-reduction programmes (Multi Annual 
Guidance Programmes; UK Fisheries Department 1988) in the UK. Vessel landing rates, i.e. 
nominal lpue values, were calculated as catch in kg per h fishing per vessel per trip per area. 
The importance of making management decisions on effort measured in hours, in theory, may 
provide a less crude measure that relates closely to actual fishing activity rather than the 
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current days-at-sea restrictions applied to North Sea fleets. However, the current regulations 
are expressed in days-at-sea to simplify the process in terms of enforcement. Irrespective of 
potential changes in fishing tactics to maximise number of hours fished, increases in 
efficiency are evident for one stock (sole), whereas decreases in efficiency for plaice could 
indicate increased targeting of sole (Figure 5.3). More importantly, the slope of the regression 
in each case increased (see Figure 5.2). In practice, this implies that management that 
considers several factors (capacity, seasonal and area effects) that contribute to effective 
effort should be more effective in reducing fishing mortality than management based purely 
on nominal effort. The policy implications are such that adjusting effort such as days at sea 
(or h-at-sea) by capacity (and taking into account month and area effects) should result in 
greater than proportional decreases in fishing mortality. How viable it would be to adjust for 
such an approach through regulation and enforcement requires more study. Changes in 
catchability that arise when applying additional nominal effort or fishing efficiency are 
important to fisheries scientists, to monitor changes in F, and likewise, for a given F, the 
effective effort will be influenced by fishing efficiency and the nominal effort will need to be 
adjusted appropriately.  
 
A key finding from the study was the switch in targeting and the changed fishing efficiency, 
an estimated 6.2% decrease in plaice and an estimated 0.6% increase in sole annually for 
averages calculated over the 11-year study period. The decrease in plaice efficiency is 
interesting because the concept of negative creep is becoming more evident especially as fuel 
prices rise. Increasing fuel costs in beam trawling (Abernethy et al., 2010; Chapter 3) may 
well have influenced the distribution of the fleet in the southern North Sea, with less steaming 
time to ports in the Netherlands reducing operating costs to counteract fuel price increases. 
English beam trawlers generally target both plaice and sole, but in recent years, because of 
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the shrinking fleet size and transfer of ownership to the Netherlands, sole has generally been 
targeted because of its greater commercial value and short distance from port in the southern 
North Sea, also perhaps contributing to the increase in efficiency and the decrease in catches 
of species targeted previously (Marchal et al., 2003; Engelhard, 2008). Measures in 2007 to 
protect juvenile cod as part of the cod recovery plan were imposed on certain beam trawl 
gears; an 8% reduction in effort from 2006 was enforced, and this could have also contributed 
to the fleet fishing closer to port and the switch in target species (EC, 2006b, c).  
 
Limiting and reducing the time a vessel spends fishing is possible in theory, but out of sight 
of regulatory enforcement, it used to be difficult to control. With the application of Vessel 
Monitoring Systems (VMS), however, it has become possible for regulatory authorities to 
monitor the activities and locations of commercial fishing vessels better, although there 
remain problems in identifying activity and there are anyway limitations in VMS data use 
(e.g. the time between satellite pings that monitor the vessels; data being collected only on 
vessels ≥15 m long within the UK; accurate matches with landings data by trip and ICES 
rectangle; and for scientific studies, confidentiality), which is why days-at-sea effort 
restrictions have been preferred in EU waters. 
 
A spatial means of effort control to reduce fishing mortality and discards on cod and to 
encourage compliance introduced by the Scottish Government in 2008 after consultation with 
stakeholders was that of real time closures (RTCs). Fishers were rewarded with extra days at 
sea for avoiding areas where the lpue of cod was high. Currently, the threshold for enforcing 
a RTC is 40 cod per h fished; one catch exceeding this threshold triggers a closure. Early 
studies by Needle and Catarino (2011) using VMS data showed that vessels tended to move 
away from RTCs, but also that vessels returned to these areas shortly after the closure ended. 
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Overall, the conclusion on RTCs was that mortality on cod was reduced, but not sufficiently 
to influence future exploitation patterns. One can argue about the effectiveness of RTCs 
because they do not control effort, but rather displace it, so it is difficult to evaluate their 
effectiveness in the short term. Moreover, any benefits from RTCs may be partly negated by 
the increased days at sea allocated to participating vessels. On the positive side, the measures 
were developed with input from stakeholders, and compliance with respect to RTCs via VMS 
data was encouraging, with vessels moving away from the boundaries of the closed areas. 
With the emergence of electronic logbook data and closed circuit TV (CCTV) for on-board 
surveillance, monitoring of catches may improve and create a more-level playing field across 
sectors of the wider fishing industry. Other recent studies linking catches and effort in mixed 
demersal fisheries in the EU fisheries include Fcube, the Fleet and Fisheries Forecast 
(Maravelias et al., 2011; Ulrich et al., 2011).  This useful application attempts to promote 
fleet and métier management to progress from the traditional single-species approach for 
routine advisory use. Ulrich et al. (2011) concluded that the current single-species 
management for North Sea cod (Gadus morhua) could not be achieved unless TACs and 
effort reduction for other species were applied. However, this study differed from Fcube by 
accounting for changes in fishing power, so can be applied at a finer regional scale. 
 
This study has shown clear applications for input control for mixed fisheries management and 
has also complemented other research initiatives, such as recent catch quota trials (FVM 
2009) undertaken by the UK, Denmark and Germany using remote electronic monitoring 
(REM). The inclusion of REM, personal information on skippers (Kirkley et al., 1998; 
Squires and Kirkley, 1999), information on gear and technological changes (Marchal et al., 
2006) and precise time actually fishing should lead to more detailed estimates of effective 
fishing effort and relationships with fishing mortality at a finer resolution than the ICES 
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rectangle. It will also be important for future studies to take account of other factors, ranging 
from non-target fish and wider ecosystem impacts to the social and economic implications of 
effort controls and their impacts on the different submétiers. The movement away from 
single-species management to the fleet-based management approach applying temporal, 
spatial and gear-specific control measures under the guidance of the DCF (Data Collection 
Framework) and future CFP could be used to evaluate alternative management strategies in 
conjunction with stakeholders, so could facilitate implementation and improve fisheries 
management, including perhaps fairer access to resources.  
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Abstract 
Since 2008, the European Union has had objectives for spatial planning and regulation to deal 
with increasing human activities and pressures at sea. Integrating spatial planning with 
existing fisheries regulations has been difficult because of the spatial scale at which landings 
are reported and the fear among practitioners of conceding space to competing activities. To 
determine the extent that spatial competition influences choice of fishing grounds, a discrete 
choice model was applied to fine spatial resolution data obtained from the Vessel Monitoring 
System (VMS). We analyse the determinants of English and Welsh scallop-dredging fleet 
behaviour, including competing sectors operating in the eastern English Channel. Results 
show that aggregate activity and maritime traffic negatively impact the choice of fishers, and 
conversely that past success, expected revenues and fishing within the 12 nautical mile limit 
have a positive effect on their utility. The model has potential application for Marine Spatial 
Planning (MSP). 
 
6.1 Introduction 
As human pressures increase there is a need to balance competing demands for the natural 
resources that society is challenged to manage and conserve for future generations. 
Experience has shown that once humans have fully exploited a resource on land they look for 
alternatives at sea. The sea, traditionally seen as a common property resource, is confronted 
increasingly with competition for space by competing sectors, e.g. fisheries, oil and gas 
exploitation, aggregate extraction, wind energy, shipping and transport, recreation, dumping 
and the military. The spatial planning and regulation of the increasing human activities and 
pressures at sea are therefore becoming a concern, especially given that some resources are 
limited in space and quantity. If the limited resources are poorly regulated, there may be a 
race to exploit them, a situation commonly known as the “Tragedy of the Commons” 
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(Hardin, 1968). 
 
Since 2008, the European Union has had objectives that place a responsibility on member 
states to achieve common principles. It is called the “Roadmap for spatial planning” (EC, 
2008a) and falls under the Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP; EC, 2007), and is now generally 
referred to as Maritime Spatial Planning (MSP). The objectives of MSP are to manage 
anthropogenic activities in space and time, precluding or minimising conflicts between 
competing sectors without negatively impacting the ecosystem, operating within the Marine 
Strategy Framework Directive (MFSD; EC, 2008b) and covering human activities. MSP is 
therefore an integrated marine management plan to alleviate conflict and balance ecological, 
social and economic demands to achieve Good Environmental Status (GES) in EU waters. 
However, because sectors at sea can change rapidly and the complexities of natural systems 
are linked and inter-reliant, a management decision for one may affect others, and MSP needs 
to be treated as a process of continuous, adaptive management. Uncertainty associated with 
compliance to management measures and thus its effectiveness has been linked to lack of 
knowledge on the motivations associated with people. Traditional fisheries management 
treats fishers as fixed components with no consideration of their behaviour in terms of 
attitudes to fishing (i.e. spatial, temporal, social, ecological and economic) and individual 
aims (Salas and Gaertner, 2004; McKelvey 1983; Smith and McKelvey, 1986).  
 
The EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) recognised the importance of these factors (EC, 
2009a) and is now committed to both an ecosystem approach and more regional approach, 
whereby fleets and fisheries and their interactions are to be managed within smaller regional 
areas rather than the broad ecoregions used in the past. Given the importance of MSP, several 
writers have stressed the relevance of designing fleet-based spatial management in the 
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commercial fisheries sector (Botsford et al., 2007; Kraus et al., 2009; Bastardie et al., 2010), 
accounting for different fleet activities at a scale fine enough to feed into the MFSD. To date, 
integration has been difficult owing to the broad scale (ICES statistical rectangle ~900 
nautical miles
2
) at which some data (e.g. landings) are reported. With the emergence of 
Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS) over the past decade, however, MSP is now potentially 
possible at a finer scale. Issues of data confidentiality between member states have hampered 
the process, though, and there is also a historic reluctance of fishers to provide accurate 
landings information for fear of conceding knowledge of profitable fishing grounds (NSRAC, 
2005). Degnbol and Wilson (2008) suggested that fishers are concerned about data 
confidentiality, especially how the data they provide would be used and by which authority. 
For example, they especially raise concerns regarding how the data would be used against 
them by conservationists, as the data could potentially be used to identify productive fishing 
grounds as suitable for Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) or by fisheries managers to 
implement tighter enforcement constraints. In the light of the limited data availability and 
confidentiality, fisheries managers are looking now for alternative approaches to assist spatial 
planning, which will reduce implementation error i.e. where the effects of management differ 
from that intended (Peterman, 2004). One such approach involves anticipating fisher 
behaviour in response to regulation. Recent studies have applied random utility model 
(RUM) methodology (Vermard et al., 2008; Andersen et al., 2010; Chapter 4) to this issue, 
because such models offer an opportunity to study individual behaviour at a finer scale of 
space and time than previous approaches (Coglan et al., 2004). Fisher behaviour cannot be 
predicted with certainty because of the many factors (see above) which influence where and 
when a fisher will operate. If managers can better anticipate fisher behaviour, then they may 
be able to reduce the unanticipated side-effects of management actions aimed both at the 
fishery sector and at other sectors. 
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The objective of the present study was to analyse and model the key determinants of where 
fishers choose to fish, building on retrospective time-series and including competition 
between a selection of key sectors of activity and understanding their interaction to these 
activities. The focus was the English and Welsh scallop-dredging fleet operating in the 
eastern English Channel (ICES Division VIId). That area also contains one of the busiest 
shipping lanes in the world, the route between the Atlantic Ocean and the North Sea, and 
there is a traffic separation scheme (TSS) in operation with 100 vessels in and 100 vessels out 
per day. It is perceived that such a concentration of vessels would have a negative impact on 
commercial fishers.  
 
There are also several active marine aggregate extraction sites and fishers have expressed 
concerns about the accumulation of marine aggregate sites where licences are permitted and 
the effect of fishing pressure concentrating itself elsewhere for fear of gear damage and the 
sustainability of fish stocks (Cooper, 2005). In terms of fishing restrictions in the eastern 
Channel there is a 12 nautical mile belt of territorial water surrounding the base coastline that 
is sovereign waters, also local bylaws restrict beam trawlers of 300 hp or 70 grt from this area 
and as such restrict competition with the inshore fleet fishing for sole  (Figure 6.1). This 
ruling also prevents fishing by any international fishing vessel, though the area can be used 
for safe passage. Most of the vessels operating in the region are small (<10 m) inshore boats 
that deploy gillnets, trawls, longlines, traps and pots, and target sole (Solea solea), plaice 
(Pleuronectes platessa), cod (Gadus morhua), bass (Dicentrarchus labrax) and some skates 
(Rajidae; Pawson, 1995).   
 
A mixed RUM was developed to analyse the determinants of fisher behaviour at a fine scale 
(a trade-off between ICES rectangle and individual position) using English and Welsh VMS 
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data, highlighting the effect of the key potential competing sectors on fishing behaviour. 
Suggestions are then made as to how the method can be used in integrated MSP in 
anticipation of the potential establishment of Special Areas of Conservation (SACs) in the 
area as part of UK commitments to the EU's Habitats Directive (EC, 1992).   
 
 
Figure 6.1. Competition among sectors within the English Channel. 
 
6.2 Materials and methods 
6.2.1The UK scallop fleet 
The UK scallop (Pecten maximus) industry is one of the UKs most valuable fisheries and was 
valued at >£47 million (£13 million in the eastern English Channel) in 2009, employing 
>13000 people in the catching sector and 17 000 in the processing sector (Defra, 2011). 
Scallops are fished in one of three ways, dredging, trawling and hand-diving. Dredging is the 
most common method and consists of deploying a heavy metal frame with a chain mesh and 
a set of spring-loaded teeth pointed downwards to assist in raking out the scallops into the 
dredge’s chain mesh. These dredges are connected to a beam, which in turn is connected to 
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heavy warps that are towed over the seabed by a fishing vessel.  
 
The UK scallop-dredging fleet is said to be nomadic in nature, moving around the UK coast 
to fish where scallop abundance is best and operating there until those grounds become 
economically non-viable. They then apparently move to other areas and only return to fished-
out areas a few years later when stocks there have recovered (Defra, 2011). The eastern 
English Channel was traditionally a winter fishery because, following spawning in early 
summer, the scallops were in poor condition so unmarketable. In recent years, however, there 
has been an increasing trend in the number of vessels operating in this fishery as fishers in 
other fisheries have had to confront changes in regional management (e.g. more restricted 
fishing opportunities elsewhere, such as Cardigan Bay), market conditions and subsequently 
changed their own tactics and strategies in order simply to survive (Mangi et al., 2011). This 
statement also applies particularly to UK whitefish vessels, for which economic performance 
has been hit by rising fuel costs and hence high running costs (Curtis et al., 2006).  
 
Scallop fishing is less fuel-intensive (in terms of search behaviour of the fleet) because 
fishers are chasing a high-value, stationary stock rather than one that is moving continually. 
There is also the additional pressure for summer fishing grounds for vessels to use, because 
the Irish Sea fishery is closed from June to October. This notwithstanding, there is discussion 
of a summer closed season in the Channel being imposed, as is the case in France. A further 
pressure over the past six or so years has been changes in Scottish fisheries which led to their 
largest scallopers (14 per side) being banned from Scottish waters, meaning that they can now 
work only south of the Scottish border (Howell et al. 2006).   
 
Defra (2011) suggest that there has been a noticeable increase in fishing effort in the eastern 
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English Channel from 2008 to 2010 and this is predominantly from the larger ≥15 m long 
more powerful vessels due to the increase in scallop abundance resulting from heavy 
recruitment.  The variability in landings resulting from fluctuations in recruitment, market 
demand, regulations and more recently fuel price are common features of scallop fisheries.  
Historically the consequences of which include variability in the number of vessels 
participating in the fishery due to there being no restrictions on licences or total scallop 
catches.  In 1999 the number of vessels was at a high so regulatory authorities attempted to 
cap licences on vessels (≥10 m) (Brand, 2006).  However it has been suggested that it had 
little impact on the fishing effort as there were more licences granted than there were boats 
fishing in the fishery (Brand, 2006).  Nevertheless there are periods of temporal inactivity 
when stock abundance is low and the fleet move to other fishing grounds (Beukers-Stewart 
and Beukers-Stewart, 2009).  Generally current management of scallop fisheries are 
controlled through minimum landing sizes and the numbers of dredges regulated by local sea 
fisheries committees as there are no catch limitations. 
 
6.2.2 Data 
The UK’s Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) database for 
fishing activity and the fleet register were used to select commercial landing and vessel data 
from the English and Welsh fleet (excluding Scottish and Northern Irish due to 
confidentiality issues). Individual trip data for commercial scallopers were collated for the 
years 2005–2010. The data collected for each vessel included species landed, hours fished, 
landed weight per ICES statistical rectangle (kg), month of fishing, year of fishing and total 
value of the catch by species, vessel and trip. Within the EU, it is currently only a 
requirement for vessels >10 m long to submit logbooks, but the database also contains a 
subset of catch from <10 m vessels that historically reported their catches by means of 
logbooks. 
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Methodology for the definition of fleets was based on the European Commission’s Data 
Collection Regulation (DCR; EC, 2000). A method was developed independently (see EC, 
2006a), preceding the present Data Collection Framework (DCF; EC, 2008c), which defines 
the scallop-dredging fleet on the basis of its use of a scallop dredge for >50% of a fishing 
trip. It is assumed that dredge catches consist mainly of molluscs and that their tactics/métiers 
can be defined based on the proportional composition of mollusc value to the total value of 
landings, so removing the differences in catch rates attributable to vessel capacity. 
 
VMS monitoring in the European Union (EC, 2003, 2009b) has been in place since 2000, 
initially for fishing vessels of ≥24 m long, post-2005 for vessels ≥15 m long, and in 2012 ≥12 
m long. The data are designed to help regulatory authorities determine whether a vessel is 
rule-breaking by receiving a ping every 2 h giving position, course and speed. However it is 
not totally clear from VMS data whether the vessel is in port, steaming to and from fishing 
grounds, hauling, shooting or fishing. Over the past few years, authors such as Mills et al. 
(2007), Lee et al. (2010) and Hintzen et al. (2012) have described methods to determine 
fishing or steaming activities from unprocessed VMS data, methods that include removal of 
erroneous data, e.g. positions on land, unusually high speeds, positions close to port and 
duplicate records. No individual method in the scientific literature has been adopted as the 
definitive process or preferable to another, however, but for ease and accessibility, the data 
for the years 2005–2010 were processed in the manner described by Lee et al. (2010). 
Logbook data and VMS fishing records were selected, combined by vessel and ICES 
rectangle between departure and arrival dates, forming a detailed dataset of fishing activity. 
The ICES rectangle was further formatted into 200 (3' × 3')-pixel squares coded from 000 to 
199, starting from top left and moving to bottom right, placing all the coordinates from the 
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VMS data into the pixels.  
 
Marine diesel prices, excluding value-added tax (VAT) and duty, were obtained from the 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC). Aggregate-extraction intensity data by 
month for the years 2005–2010 were obtained from the UK’s Royal Haskoning and the 
French l’Institut Français de Recherche pour l'Exploitation de la Mer, Ifremer. In terms of 
shipping/transport, however, such data were not available at the time of the analysis, so 
marine traffic-separation zone data, obtained courtesy of Ifremer, and were used as a 
surrogate. Finally, UK and French 12-mile limits were added to the maritime activities 
dataset because it was considered that competition for space with the local inshore fleet 
would be an influencing factor. Having populated the dataset with all covariates, the dataset 
could be used in a mixed RUM to determine the key determinants of fisher behaviour in 
relation to the key competing sectors of activity as well as fishing specific covariates. It is 
likely that key competing sectors of activity as well as costs (i.e. fuel price) will negatively 
impact fishing specific operations (Figure 6.2), in contrast to expected revenues and past 
effort (knowledge or habit) largely influencing fishing operations. The scale of the analysis 
and variables selected are descried below. 
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Figure 6.2. The eastern English Channel displaying scallop dredging effort in hours 
fished represented by green circles. (See Figure 6.1 for other activities). 
 
 
6.2.3 The model 
In keeping with the work of Chapter 4 describing the dynamics and drivers of fisher location 
choice, a mixed logit choice RUM was implemented because it relaxes the non-IIA 
(Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) assumptions associated with preference 
heterogeneity among fishers. This approach is efficient in dealing with panel data for 
repeated individual choices, as is the case within this study. For a detailed explanation of 
mixed logit, see Hensher and Greene (2003) and Train (2003). Succinctly, the total utility 
      of fisher   for site   in trip   is 
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                              .        (6.1) 
 
where        represents the observed utility and        the unobserved utility due to 
heterogeneity, and       is the error distribution that is part-correlated and part independently 
and identically distributed (iid) over alternatives and individuals (McFadden, 1981; Maddala, 
1983). The mean    plus its standard deviation    are used to represent the preference 
distribution in the population of fishers (Train, 1998). All covariates met the normality 
assumption following log-transformation. Within the mixed logit framework,    was 
assumed to follow a normal distribution, and for a given value of   (for simplicity 
disregarding t), the conditional probability of choice j across all other choices k = 1 to J is 
estimated by drawing random values   by simulation using 
 
       
          
           
 
   
  ,       (6.2) 
 
where   is a vector of coefficients that varies across individuals, and     is a vector of the 
attributes of each of the choices made. Cost data enter the model with a negative sign and 
revenues with a positive sign, as suggested in the economic literature (Train, 1998; Ran et al., 
2011). The analysis was carried out in the SAS package PROC MDC (SAS, 1999 Not in 
References) using quasi-Newton optimisation and 100 Halton draws.  
 
6.2.4 The definition of choice set 
When designing RUMs, fisheries scientists are confronted with the problem of creating a 
choice set, which covers the individual sites to which a fisher travels to fish. If sites are too 
small (individual latitude/longitude positions), there may not be sufficient site-specific 
information, but if they are too large, important site-specific information can be lost when 
aggregating, losing information valuable to policy-makers. Handling many variables with 
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zero data in the choice set may cause problems of maximum likelihood estimation and result 
in model non-convergence.  
 
Fishers have prior knowledge of resource distribution and habitat (Hilborn and Ledbetter, 
1979; Gillis et al., 1993; Pet-Soede et al., 2001), and scallops are relatively static molluscs, 
suggesting that in future years, any choice set will be subject to relatively little or no change. 
On the basis of this assumption, the predetermined area making up the choice set for this 
study was based on the 2005–2010 effort distribution of scallop dredgers plotted from the 
VMS records (Figure 6.2). The investigative plots displayed effort coverage over a large area 
within the small number of ICES statistical rectangles (as previously ICES rectangles were 
considered too large for spatial planning purposes with pixels too finite). Therefore a trade-
off was necessary and the pixels were grouped (25 pixels) into 8 subrectangles based on area 
(the 15' × 15' rectangles also used by Ifremer’s Channel Groundfish Survey, CGFS). These 
areas were georeferenced into 45 subrectangles, so determining the choice set (Figure 6.3).  
 
6.2.5 Variable selection 
As with other economic/fisher behaviour studies, data on the costs of fishing trips are not 
always available because of the time and cost taken to collect such information, and the 
information is also likely to be confidential. Researchers therefore use a proxy of value per 
unit effort (vpue) rather than cost, which relates to the utility/net benefit of variations in stock 
density (Marchal et al., 2007; Vermard et al., 2008). Value per choice was calculated as a 
proportion of the total value (revenues from landings) per ICES rectangle based on effort 
derived from the VMS, and vpue was then computable. The average vpue by year and month 
and location choice was calculated for the fleet and lagged in two ways: lagged vpue for a 
particular month in year t = –m; lagged annual vpue in year t–1 = mt-1, i.e. taking account of 
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strong or weak temporal and spatial fluctuations. Habit, knowledge and experience of fishing 
locations influence fisher behaviour (Begossi, 2001). The past percentage of a particular 
vessel's scallop trips to a fishing location as a percentage of the fleet total elsewhere was used 
as the habit/experience variable and to track the seasonal nature of the fishery, as in Holland 
and Sutinen (1999). These variables were lagged in the same method as explained above.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.3. The eastern English Channel with ICES rectangles overlaid and the 
choice set represented by the hatching geo-referenced by ICES rectangle and the eight 
sub-rectangles within. 
 
 
Fishers are assumed to maximise their returns (Robinson and Pascoe, 1997), so depending on 
weather and other factors, they trade off travel costs against the quality of the fishing 
grounds. An increase in distance linearly relates to an increase in fuel costs and hence time 
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and energy, so removes the potential for participating in other activities, e.g. fishing closer to 
shore or non-fishing activities (Daw, 2008). Therefore, in terms of accounting for the 
expected travel costs and the landing behaviour of the fleet, a proxy for cost was calculated 
based on the average fleet distance to landing port from VMS fishing locations, calculated 
using the Haversine formula (Sinnott, 1984), weighted by mean average fuel price, lagged by 
a month in each year of fishing as a measure of perceived costs. Landing port was used 
because of the nomadic behaviour of this fleet; it was assumed that the fishers would have 
prior knowledge of seasonal market prices in the proximity of fishing locations. 
 
Aggregate activity enters the model as the average percentage coverage per choice by year 
and month, but because of inconsistencies between French commercial aggregate data 
expressed at a daily scale and English intensities at a monthly scale, daily scale records could 
not be used. The traffic separation zone data and the 12-mile limit (as a proxy for the inshore 
fleet and internationally restricted zone) were treated as a spatial constraint (as above). One 
might assume that the greater the percentage coverage of a restriction, the greater the 
negative impact on site choice and that site preference would then be elsewhere due to 
activities that would be a nuisance to fishing. The variable selection set described above was 
merged with individual scallop trip data by year, month and choice, such that for every trip, 
the decision-maker had a choice of the specified 45-subrectangles. If the choice was made, 
the values took a value of 1 if selected or 0 otherwise. The definitions of the variables are 
listed in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1. Definition of variables used in the RUM to model fisher location choice 
for the 45 ICES sub-rectangles in the eastern English Channel as defined in Figure 
6.3. 
 
Variable Definition 
effyr  
 
 
Percentage of trips to the location in the same month the previous year 
(taking account of trips by the scallop fleet fishing in other areas outside of 
the eastern English channel 
vpueyr 
 
Average vpue of scallop from fishing in the same location in the same 
month in the previous year. 
vpuem 
 
Average vpue of scallop from fishing in the same location the previous 
month in the actual year of fishing. 
effm 
 
Percentage of trips to the location in the previous month in actual year of 
fishing. (taking account of trips by the scallop fleet fishing in other areas 
outside of the eastern English channel). 
cost Average distance to port of landing from the same location the previous 
month in the actual year of fishing multiplied by the fuel price. 
aggregate  Average % coverage of area occupied by aggregate activity. 
traffic Average % coverage of area occupied by marine traffic lanes.  
limit Average % coverage of area occupied by 12 mile limit. 
 
6.3 Results 
The results from the mixed model showed a McFadden’s pseudo-R2 of 0.21, suggesting an 
excellent fit (McFadden, 1979). Theoretically, the range for McFadden’s pseudo-R2 is 
between 0 and 1, but the general rule of thumb is that any value from 0.2 to 0.4 suggests an 
excellent fit as shown in an earlier study by Domenich and Mcfadden (1975) in which they 
compared ordinary least squares (OLS) R
2 
of 0.7–0.9 with the above pseudo-R2 range. 
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Pseudo-R
2 
method differs from a traditional R
2
 where the parameter estimates were not 
calculated to minimise variance via (OLS) goodness of fit process, instead they are calculated 
via maximum likelihood iterative process and the low values between 0.2–0.4 are considered 
to be acceptable (McFadden, 1979). The goodness of fit determined by the likelihood ratio 
test was also conducted on the constrained model (log-likelihood under the null hypothesis) 
fits against an unconstrained model, the resulting p-value of <0.05 and likelihood ratio of 
4833.5 demonstrating that the mixed model was better in terms of likelihood compared to the 
conditional model.  
 
Observations from the parameter estimates showed some key features, in terms of 
significance and direction of the signs. Holland and Sutinen (1999) suggested that the 
direction of the sign of the coefficient in terms of profit or revenue is an indicator of average 
risk preference in terms of variability, suggesting as an example that if fish aggregations are 
not present at certain times of the year, fishers would not go to an area; as such there would 
be an increase in variability in profit or revenue and the coefficient would be negative. 
Conversely one may view a positive sign and a small coefficient of variation as showing that 
fishers are risk-averse and fish in locations of past success or experience. 
 
The estimated coefficients from the mixed model on the 3019 observations available are 
presented in Table 6.2. All coefficients were statistically significant (p < 0.01) except the 
coefficient for percentage of trips to the location in the same month the previous year 
(effyr_M, p > 0.1) and the average distance to port of landing from the same location the 
previous month in the actual year of fishing weighted by the fuel price which was marginally 
significant (cost_M, p < 0.1). The estimated standard deviations of the estimates were not 
significantly different from the mean indicating that the parameters do not vary in the 
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population of fishers  for past expected revenues (vpueyr_S, vpuem_S), percentage of trips to 
the location in the same month the previous year (effyr_S), average distance to port of 
landing from the same location the previous month in the actual year of fishing weighted by 
the fuel price (cost_S) and average percentage coverage of area occupied by marine traffic 
(traffic_S). Conversely, the percentage of trips to the location in the previous month in the 
actual year of fishing (effm_S), the average percentage coverage of area occupied by 
aggregate activity (aggregate_S) and the average percentage coverage of area occupied by 
marine protected area or 12-mile limit (limit_S) did not vary, perhaps related to variations in 
characteristics of the fishers not captured in the model. The signs of the standard deviations in 
some instances are negative, but for estimation purposes they are free to take any sign, 
because the normal distribution is symmetrical around its mean, and the absolute value can be 
taken to estimate the variance. 
 
The effort distribution maps in Figure 6.2 show the interactions of the scallop dredges with 
the traffic separation scheme (TSS) and the aggregates and fisheries within the 12-mile limit. 
Coupled with the model outputs, these results display some notable features. In general the 
mean coefficients show the signs one would expect (Table 6.2). The positive sign on the 
coefficient for the 12 mile limit (limit_M) shows that fishers benefit from fishing within this 
zone as there are several hotspots with high scallop catch rates (Figure 6.2). Conversely the 
negative signs on the mean coefficients for aggregates (aggregate_M) and the TSS 
(traffic_M) imply that these sectors impede fishing operations. However, in every year of the 
study there was a large amount of fishing effort in these areas, even more so in 2010 within 
the TSS. Perhaps that result is a trade-off in terms of larger expected revenues in these areas. 
Expected revenues (vpueyr_M and vpuem_M) show positive signs which clearly demonstrate 
that revenue has a significant influence on the tactics of fishers in contrast to the cost proxy 
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(cost_M) which was negative as expected.  Past effort variables (effm_M and effyr_M), 
which were included to depict habit or knowledge of past success of fishing grounds, have 
positive coefficients, suggesting they are important drivers in determining fisher location 
choice. 
Table 6.2. Estimated lognormal parameter estimates, the dependent variable took a 
value of 1 if a choice was made or 0 otherwise. 
        Standard   
Parameter   d.f Estimate Error   
vpueyr_M   1 0.0467 0.0114 *** 
vpueyr_S   1 –0.0006 0.2878   
vpuem_M    1 0.098 0.0222 *** 
vpuem_S   1 0.00384 0.2737   
effyr_M   1 0.0535 0.0301 * 
effyr_S   1 0.0184 0.6357   
cost_M   1 –0.0294 0.0161 * 
cost_S   1 0.00397 0.1623   
effm_M   1 0.7134 0.0309 *** 
effm_S   1 –0.2527 0.0884 *** 
aggregate_M   1 –0.0957 0.013 *** 
aggregate_S   1 0.2023 0.0528 *** 
limit_M   1 0.7528 0.1184 *** 
limit_S   1 –0.7213 0.1031 *** 
traffic_M   1 –0.1405 0.0465 *** 
traffic_S   1 0.00126 0.5333   
 
* Statistical significance at *, 10% level, **, 5% level, and ***, 1% level. 
Parameters marked _M are the lognormal mean coefficients and _S are their between-population standard deviations. 
 
 
To test the sensitivity to different variables the mean choice probabilities were calculated 
from the model output and then compared with mean choice probabilities after re-running the 
model under alternative scenarios where each variable was doubled/halved one at a time. The 
differences in probability of location choice, under each of these scenarios, show that the 
magnitude of the effect on location choice (Figures 6.3–6.5) and how sensitive the variables 
are to changes i.e. how the variables that penalise fishing operations (e.g. aggregate 
extraction, marine traffic, and fuel costs) affect fishers, in contrast to expected revenue which 
should encourage fishing operations.   
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In terms of aggregate extraction, fishers responded to a decrease (halving the coefficient, i.e. 
half the level from –0.0957 to –0.04785) in % area covered which resulted in a difference in 
probability of +0.019, +0.012, and +0.011 in the areas associated with aggregate extraction, 
30E9G, 29F0C, and 30E9F, respectively (Figures 6.4–6.5). Doubling the effect, increasing 
the size of the site resulted in fishers moving out of the areas of aggregate extraction, notably 
to 30E9G, 30E9F and 29F0C with a change of probability of –0.019, –0.012 and –0.012 
respectively.  There was a small increase in probability into 29F0D, the adjacent sub-
rectangle to 29F0C.  Most of the main scallop grounds are in marine traffic areas and 
therefore one would expect that with a decrease in area occupied by traffic lanes there would 
be less competition for space and fishers would move into these areas.  
 
Maritime traffic, however, surprisingly showed little effect, apart from in 30E9G (an area that 
contains aggregate sites and a small section of traffic lane).   In this sub-rectangle, doubling 
the coefficient of maritime traffic resulted in fishing effort being displaced out of the area 
(probability reduction of –0.015), whereas halving the coefficient led to an increase in 
predicted effort in 30E9G (+0.006). An explanation could be the risk adverse nature of this 
fleet, as 30E9G is an inshore sub-rectangle (steady amount of fishing effort throughout the 
time series, Figure 6.2) and despite being relatively close to land (i.e. less distance to travel to 
land their catch and hence less fuel consumption), vessels may seek to reduce spatial 
competion with increased disruption from maritime traffic. However, expected fuel cost did 
not show large significant differences in probabilities of site choice when increased or 
decreased.  Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5 suggest that with a halving of the fuel price, fishers 
move to areas where the concentration of fishers and expected revenue is at its highest (areas 
29F0A, 29F0B, 29F0C and 29F0D), resulting in a trade-off with expected costs and expected 
revenue (net benefits). 
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Figure 6.4.  The difference in mean choice (sub-rectangles) probabilities from the benchmark 
model and one under alternative conditions (twice the level (doubled) and half the level 
(halved), for a selection of the variables) 
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Figure 6.4 (continued). The difference in mean choice (sub-rectangles) probabilities 
from the benchmark model and one under alternative conditions (twice the level 
(doubled) and half the level (halved), for a selection of the variables). 
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Figure 6.5 Changes in probabilities when halving or doubling the effects of each 
variable in contrast to the benchmark model. 
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6.4 Discussion 
It is widely recognised that decision-makers and managers now require an ecosystem-based 
approach to address current interlinked problems for social well-being (FAO, 2003b). Since 
the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 there have been pressures from environmental 
organisations, increased public and political interest and a concurrent implementation of 
directives and policies to improve management of human activities on a regional basis by 
different stakeholders. MSP requires the balancing of multiple objectives, e.g. fisheries 
managers need to understand the implications of effort displacement from closing an area and 
the unforeseen consequences of their management actions (e.g. effects on other marine life, 
economic implications and effects on other maritime sectors). 
 
Several authors have stressed the importance of anticipating fisher behaviour in response to 
management regulation, in order to reduce implementation error (Dugan and Davis, 1993; 
Allison et al., 1998; Fulton et al., 2011). Here, a mixed RUM was applied at fine-scale 
resolution to assess the key determinants of scallop fisher behaviour in the eastern English 
Channel, so that if a regulation or new activity, emerging pressures as well as potential 
hazards were present, fishing effort re-allocation could potentially be predicted.  
A key finding was that past success in a location within the previous month was a predictor 
of continued fishing in that location. I interpret this as a proxy for habit, knowledge or 
experience as in other studies (Holland and Sutinen, 1999; Salas and Gaertner, 2004; 
Andersen and Christensen, 2006). Similarly, the expected utility of visiting one fishing site 
rather than another in terms of marginal revenue, expressed as vpue, was significant as 
expected (Ran et al., 2011). This is more apparent for the vpue in the previous month, rather 
than in the same month the year before, potentially capturing either seasonality or relatively 
short term temporal correlations in stock abundance (see Table 6.2). Surprisingly, perceived 
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fuel costs were not a major driver in choice of fishing grounds, possibly because of the 
proximity of grounds to landing ports in the eastern English Channel. The location being 
inside the 12-mile limits was strongly positively correlated with it being chosen, possibly 
because grounds within these limits are close to landing ports. This may also perhaps explain 
the weak significance of the fuel-cost coefficient. 
 
Competition for space with other <15 m vessels does not seem to affect this fleet (the 12-mile 
limit as a proxy for the inshore fleet which protects the inshore fleet from large beam trawls 
and international fishers), and the scallop fleet does benefit from the exclusion of an 
international fleet that is banned from operating within the 12-mile limits and as such have 
less competition. Nevertheless competition from the national fleet could become an issue if 
the fleet was squeezed into a small enough space, for example by spatial closures. Of policy 
importance are the effects of the commercial marine environment and associated maritime 
activities on the behaviour of the scallop fleet; if these are better understood then the 
additions of other sectors or addition of other potential aggregate site plans and their 
implications to this fleet can be assessed in terms of potential effort re-allocation. The areas 
occupied by aggregate extraction sites are less chosen than expected from their other 
attributes, confirming the assumption that the aggregate industry does impact scallop fishing, 
which takes place in large areas where aggregate licences have been granted since 2005 
(Vanstaen et al., 2007). This is contrary to Desprez and Lafite's (2012) findings for sole, 
which suggests that aggregate extraction can have a positive effect on the catchability of sole 
by beam trawlers and hence on profitability. Perhaps, increased turbidity increases sole 
catchability (by reducing visual cues for escape and/or fish being disturbed from the seabed) 
or the dispersal of food into the water column encourages sole to move away from the bottom 
to feed.  
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The existence of the TSS in one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world is a management 
attempt to alleviate maritime accidents which can also impede fishing. The output from the 
model suggests that the presence of a TSS significantly reduces the probability of a fisher 
choosing a location, suggesting that the policy is having the desired effect of separating 
fishing from other activities, though at the cost of reduced ability to choose areas of potential 
high profitability. Nowadays, policy makers require information on predictions of potential 
shares of each alternative chosen by the fishers, and the analysis shows that changing a 
particular preference parameter it is possible to calculate choice probabilities under 
alternative policies. For example, an increase in aggregate activity and the likely choices of 
fishers in response to this, or a levy on fuel price and the likely effects of effort displacement 
would have a high chance of displacing effort to local inshore waters (Figure 6.4).  The 
results from the sensitivity analysis (Figure 6.4) show that the fleet trades off lower fuel cost 
by going further off shore with the expectation of the reward of higher returns, and when 
costs are higher they fish more inshore.   
 
The fleet is also affected by maritime traffic, fishing further inshore under increased traffic 
and surprisingly moving into one specific area out of the way of any potential dangers. This 
may be because the majority of the traffic lanes are home to the main scallop fishing grounds 
and the specific location they relocate to inshore has the next best expected catch rates and 
lower costs. This is also apparent for the competition with the aggregate sites, which are 
located in the heart of scallop fishing grounds. Any reduction of the space taken up by 
aggregate extraction, especially inshore, shows an increase in effort allocation to those 
locations. An important point from Figure 6.5 is that if one of the parameters that 
disadvantages fishers (e.g. increasing the traffic lanes – doubling the effect) is altered, then 
effectively the competition for space increases and the fishery spreads out, and as such fishers 
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‘fish for space’. This could mean that a reduction in the total space occupied by the vessels 
could be interpreted as a direct measure of competition within the fleet as well as a response 
to other sectors. Further investigation would be necessary to prove or disprove this theory, 
along with the inclusion of international fishing fleets. Overall, the model describes the 
nomadic behaviour of the fleet, i.e. in-year behaviour with respect to habit, expected revenue, 
proximity to landing ports and competition from other maritime sectors. 
 
6.5 Conclusions and future work 
The Eastern English Channel is a shared resource and there is increasing competition for 
space and new challenges for novel management approaches by understanding all or some of 
the interactions between sectors. In parallel to this work progress is being made on several 
dynamic processes (e.g. larvae distribution, consequences of aggregate extraction on benthic 
communities and fishing interactions) that will be implemented into a bio – economic mixed 
fishery model and a complex ecosystem holistic model using the ATLANTIS 
(http://www.csiro.au/en/Organisation-Structure/Divisions/Marine--Atmospheric-
Research/Atlantis-ecosystem-model.aspx) framework as part of EU VECTORS project 
(http://www.marine-vectors.eu/).  Different management strategies can be performed and 
their outcomes assessed. 
 
To my knowledge, no other study has used a mixed RUM at fine resolution to assess key 
determinants of human behaviour in relation to different maritime sectors and as a possible 
tool for MSP. The results are promising and lay the foundations for future work which could 
include including Marine Conservation Zones (MCZs) and using information on the 
movement of shipping traffic from Automatic Identification System (AIS) data which include 
vessel position and movement. Final decisions on where MCZs will be enforced in the 
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English Channel are still work in progress, so it was not appropriate here to incorporate 
simulated closure and effort displacement evaluated using Equation (6.2). Nevertheless, the 
principle outlined and the approach taken could already be applied to other fleets, as RUMs 
offer the capacity to model individual behaviour at fine spatial and temporal scales, which is 
needed for policy decisions (Smith, 2002). Further work could include evaluating trade-offs 
with both socio-economic and conservation objectives using efficient and effective spatial 
planning tools such as Marxan and MinPatch, as performed in a study by Wallace (2012) 
whereby cost layers were introduced in order to evaluate trade-offs. However Wallace (2012) 
did not incorporate fisher behaviour and the author stresses the importance to include this in 
any future analysis. Nevertheless, before such use for policy, the predictive ability of these 
models does need to be evaluated using a form of cross-validation (see Chapter 4). 
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Chapter 7. Discussion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sunset at sea (Source: Jim Ellis) 
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7.1 Introduction 
A primary aim of fishery management is to balance the fishing opportunities for all sectors of 
a wider fishing community (so ensuring the cultural and economic viability of coastal 
communities, maintaining fisher knowledge and providing fish products for wider society) 
with the need to maintain fish stocks in a healthy state and, of increasing concern to 
managers, the need to reduce fishing impacts on the ecosystem while also considering  the 
needs of various other maritime industries (e.g. offshore renewable energy, transport, leisure, 
recreational fishing, aggregate supply).  
 
Although some regulations (e.g. mesh size) are relatively easy to enforce and are applied 
across the relevant fleets (a key issue, as most fishers want a “level playing field”), others 
may not be particularly effective. For example, fisheries management within the European 
Union has been based mainly on setting TACs (and allocating quota nationally) as a means of 
ensuring appropriate levels of fishing mortality on the main commercial species (based on 
what are traditionally single-species stock assessments). Such an approach is of course best 
suited to highly selective fisheries exploiting a discrete stock, whereas in reality most 
fisheries exploit a range of stocks over varying spatial scales. Hence, issues such as 
misreporting, illegal fishing and discarding have compromised the quota system, especially in 
mixed fisheries. 
 
Management of fisheries in the past has treated the fishers as fixed components with no 
consideration of their individual behaviour and goals when fishing. However, to paraphrase 
Newton’s third law of physics, “for every fishery management action, there is an equal and 
opposite fisher reaction”. The omission of fleet behaviour parameters from management 
systems that rely solely on biological assessments can lead to overconfidence in the likely 
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effectiveness of proposed management actions. For instance, early models of Marine 
Protected Areas (MPAs) assumed that fishing effort would be displaced uniformly to other 
areas or simply dissipate (Wilen et al., 2002). However, Dinmore et al. (2003) showed that 
the North Sea cod closure of 2001, which was developed without considering the behaviour 
of the fleet, simply resulted in effort displacement along the boundaries of the MPA, causing 
negative impacts on the ecosystem (including the benthic communities). Moreover, Yew and 
Heaps (1996) showed the benefits of incorporating a model of fleet behaviour into the 
management process by scenario-testing the outcomes of the current policy of limited licence 
entry to reduce fishing effort. The conclusion of that study was that the intended policy would 
not achieve its desired effect because fishers could potentially circumvent the regulation by 
fishing for more days. Other studies have shown that using models to assess a fleet’s 
responses to management measures can provide essential information on fleet dynamics that 
can be used then to inform the management decision-making process (Pelletier and Mahévas, 
2005; Bastardie et al., 2010; Lehuta et al., 2010).  
 
The long-term motivation behind this thesis is that ignoring fleet and fisher behaviour in 
fishery management decision-making will undermine the overall value and likely success of 
fishery management, so the study was designed to provide new tools to assist the 
incorporation of behaviour into management-relevant modelling. The overarching research 
objective covered in the various chapters was to investigate the various factors that affect 
fishing mortality, and how more detailed information on fleet structure and dynamics 
(including effort and capacity) can improve our knowledge of the relative contributions of 
different components of a fleet to fishing mortality of the main target species.  
7.2 Scientific contribution of the thesis 
This thesis has resulted in three original peer-reviewed publications to date, and was intended 
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to describe and quantify the links between fishing capacity, fishing mortality and fishing 
effort by considering various spatial, temporal, social, ecological and economic factors. I 
have demonstrated in all of the chapters that understanding the behaviour and dynamics of 
fishers and their fleets is hugely important for managing fisheries. Specifically, I have 
contributed scientifically to understanding of (a) how fishers invest/disinvest in capacity by 
implementing a multinomial logit model (Chapter 3); (b) how fishers utilise and allocate 
effort by using a mixed discrete choice model with partial cross validation techniques 
(Chapter 4); (c) how to link capacity and fishing effort to mortality in mixed fisheries using a 
combination of multivariate approaches (Chapter 5); and (d) how the key determinants of 
fisher behaviour, including competition for space from other important maritime sectors, can 
be modelled using a mixed discrete choice model to determine its utility as a tool for marine 
spatial planning (Chapter 6). 
 
In terms of linkages across the work, Chapter 4 gave a good indication of the drivers 
determining how effort is allocated; these same drivers were then applied in Chapter 6 at a 
finer scale and produced similar results. Further, predicting location choice in multispecies 
fisheries and linking capacity to the resources, Chapter 5 builds on the findings of Chapter 4. 
For example, external factors or management regulations (input or output) that affected plaice 
could result in a changed catchability for sole. A similar approach might be applied in the 
methodology described in Chapter 6, and the implications of introducing a Marine 
Conservation Zone could then be assessed in terms of effort displacement and mortality 
induced on the resource assessed. Although that was not done within the framework of the 
present work, the results from the study are promising and lay the foundations for future 
work. Finally, in Chapter 3, I showed that there was no single significant variable driving 
investment in the study fleet; several economic variables can affect investment. Each of the 
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sections below considers the main contributions of each chapter in the wider context of the 
research, limitations and future directions. 
 
7.3 Exit and entry of fishing vessels: an evaluation of factors affecting 
investment decisions in the North Sea English beam trawl fleet 
In Chapter 3, the strategic decision-making behaviour of fishers when investing (or dis-
investing) in the English North Sea beam trawl fishery was examined using a discrete choice 
modelling approach. It was assumed that the decision to enter into, remain in or exit from a 
fishery depended on anticipated future profit. Decommissioning grants have been offered by 
the European Commission as a voluntary incentive to reduce the capacity of member states’ 
fishing fleets, so are additional strategic choices available to fishers. By integrating available 
cost data, decommission grants and other factors that were likely to influence future 
anticipated benefits or losses, it was possible to predict whether operators chose to enter, 
remain, exit or decommission. Important factors considered in the analysis included future 
revenues and operating costs (e.g. potential fuel price increases), stock status of the main 
target species and the impact of management measures (e.g. total allowable catches, TACs), 
and total fleet size (i.e. congestion/overcapacity). The model provided a strategic planning 
tool that can be used to help develop management plans to align fleet capacity with fishing 
opportunities. 
 
The results indicated, as expected, that older vessels were more likely to leave than newer 
ones. This is to be expected as older vessels are generally subject to replacement by newer 
ones, resulting in a gradually increasing efficiency of the fleet. The results also indicated that 
the larger the fleet, the more vessels entered, and the smaller the fleet, the fewer the number 
of vessels that exited, reflecting an historic trend in the sense that when a fleet experiences 
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increased fishing opportunities (large catches of plaice and large revenues) more vessels 
enter. The number of active vessels has reduced gradually to very low levels in the past few 
years, with just a few larger, new vessels remaining, and fewer vessels are now exiting from 
the small fleet (specifically because they have acquired the quota of others who have left).  
 
The stock status of sole was also an important factor determining investment, with a reduced 
sole spawning-stock biomass (SSB) yielding a greater probability of exit (and an increasing 
plaice revenue giving a greater probability of entry). The impacts on the long-term 
management of the fishery are such that in the medium to long term, unsustainable 
management of the stocks of sole and plaice (with consequent declines in stock biomass) will 
provide less opportunities and the fleet would then either decline in size or diversify (in terms 
of fishing areas and/or species).  
 
The results for revenue unsurprisingly indicated that vessels with lower revenues had a 
greater probability of exiting the fleet. The implication of vessels with low revenues (or low 
value per unit effort) departing the fisheries must surely have an impact on overall fleet 
efficiency. Decommissioning programmes during the period of the study did not entice beam 
trawlers to decommission at a fast rate, and just 32 vessels out of more than 700 vessels in the 
whole UK fleet were persuaded to withdraw (Nautilus, 1997). This result was possibly 
attributable to quota and licence restrictions. Surprisingly, fuel price had a very small effect, 
perhaps partly because prices in the 1990s were relatively stable and that it was only from 
2000 that there were large hikes in the price, up to £0.60 per litre in 2008. The model could 
have adjusted for this and rendered the effect small.  It was assumed that the performance of a 
vessel in its first year of entry to the fishery achieves the expectation surrounding the entry 
decision. It was also assumed that the decision to exit, remain or decommission was based on 
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the most recent year’s performance, and that a decommissioning programme was based on 
scrapping a vessel with a 100% grant. 
 
Misreporting practices or any other falsification of technical data used in the analyses will 
potentially bias the results and the predictive power of models applied for policy. As a 
suggested way of improving future models, data on pre-entry and post-exit performance 
related to revenues in other fisheries would be useful, along with background information on 
the origin of the vessel or its future location and use (Quillérou and Guyader, 2012; Van 
Putten et al., 2012).  As an example, as vessels are decommissioned or exit a particular 
fishery, what actually exits and what are the implications for the previously targeted stock(s)? 
Vessels may have been involved in many fishing activities, for example a vessel may engage 
in pot fisheries for crustaceans or whelks for part of the year, but be involved in  fishing for 
demersal stocks (with otter trawl, longline or gillnet) for most of the year.  Furthermore, there 
may be impacts on other stocks, for example the spatial distribution of fishing effort may 
change as some vessels exit a particular fishery and impact other stocks. This will result in 
fishing mortality changes on different ages of the new target stock and by-catch, and the 
subsequent discard levels.  As some of the fleet exit others do not, it still results in the most 
profitable remaining with money from buybacks or government grants used for more 
investment (Chapter 3), i.e. new powerful engines, technological advancements (see Chapter 
5) resulting in greater impacts on different stocks.  Social changes also happen, as those that 
do not exit the fleet can be bought up by other national or international fishers, which is what 
happened to a large portion of the beam trawler fleet transferring to the Netherlands (Chapter 
3).  This can have implications in terms of changes in targeting (fishers like to fish nearer 
their homeports) and hence fishing mortality.  
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7.4 Dynamic prediction of effort re-allocation in mixed fisheries 
In Chapter 4, a discrete choice model was developed to determine how fishing effort was 
allocated spatially by the English North Sea Beam trawl fleet. Individual vessels could fish in 
five distinct areas. The utility of fishing in an area depended on previous success, measured 
in this case as high catch rates (here, revenue-based i.e. value per unit effort, vpue), and 
experience, measured as past fishing effort allocation, and perceived costs based on fuel 
prices weighted by distances to landing port. Both lagged vpue and lagged effort were 
included as explanatory factors. The models were evaluated using iterative partial cross-
validation by fitting the model over a series of separate time-periods (nine in total) to show 
changes in the drivers over time, because there were changes in both ownership and spatial 
management. The model can be used to predict potential changes in effort allocation under 
various management strategies for spatial control. 
 
The utility of fishing in a location (the distinct fishing area) depended on previous success 
measured as high catch rates (in terms of economic vpue) as well as previous experience, in 
this case a measure of past fishing practice (effort allocation), as well as perceived costs 
(measured as distance to landing port weighted by fuel price). Therefore, the results of the 
RUM (random utility model) analysis showed some of the assumptions that could be made a 
priori for location choice. 
 
Essentially, previous knowledge or experience of a given fishing rectangle had a bearing on 
the decision to fish there. The RUM analysis included only choice-specific variables (i.e. 
factors that varied for alternative decisions), but this was adequate because the beam trawl 
fleet is relatively homogenous in terms of size of vessel and the target species and their 
habitat. The model can be used to predict potential changes in effort allocation under various 
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effort and catch control management strategies. The predictions may also help policy-makers 
understand fleet dynamics and the impact that regulations may be having on the fleet.  
 
The methodology for the definition of fleets was based upon the Data Collection Regulation 
(DCR) of the European Commission (EC, 2006a), which defined the beam trawl fleet based 
on its use of a beam trawl for >50% of the time during a fishing trip. The fleet activity or 
métier is then defined as the fisher’s tactic at a trip level, expressed as the group of targeted 
species. In this study the beam trawl métier that targeted primarily crustaceans (i.e. shrimps) 
was omitted, and only the demersal métier was used in the analysis. Métiers are characterised 
as an outcome of a trip based on the landing composition, which itself is calculated as a 
fraction of the total monetary catch. This removed the differences in catch rate attributable to 
vessel capacity. Moreover, the fractions of the catches were based on economic value rather 
than weight, reflecting the view that fishers are profit maximisers and that less-common high-
value species being targeted have more weight in the analysis. It was assumed that stock 
abundance was relatively constant over each time-step (month), so stock effects were 
excluded. 
 
For the purpose of this application, because the set of areas from which choices for beam 
trawlers targeting flatfish grounds, which can be defined by depth and sediment and seasonal 
availability (De Veen, 1976, 1978; Rijnsdorp and Pastoors, 1995; Hunter et al., 2003) are 
quite specific, one may expect relative stability of selection for some years hence. One of the 
main issues in this analysis was the aggregated spatial scale of the choices, but this chapter 
focused on detailed temporal dynamics because it is more difficult to present fine-scale 
spatial and temporal dynamics. A management strategy evaluation, MSE, model and 
framework (a model is currently being developed to analyse the behavioural response of 
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fishers to adjustments of TACs and effort levels to achieve a set of fishery management 
objectives) and also to investigate the implications on other species taken as by-catch in the 
same fishery (Romero et al., 2013; Pascoe et al., 2013).  Future work could usefully involve 
research into how much stock assessment and associated projections better account for 
changes in fleet dynamics.  What is the utility of routine stock assessments versus an 
occasional full MSE?  Stock assessments aren’t always spatial, yet there is a clear need to 
appreciate fleet dynamics in the formulation of management advice and in gauging the 
efficacy of potential management measures. Given the recent upsurge in spatial management, 
work to investigate how fleets may respond to different types of spatial closure in space and 
time, and the implications of the closure on the target species, bycatch species and wider 
marine ecosystem is required. For example, what are the likely impacts on catches, discarding 
levels, population structure and habitats, and what are the socio-economic impacts? 
 
7.5 Effective fishing effort trip indicators and their use for efficient spatial 
management in mixed demersal fisheries  
In Chapter 5, specific fleet landing profiles attributable to alternative fishing strategies of 
beam trawlers were analysed to define distinct fleet activity. The relationship between fishing 
mortality and effort exerted by the English beam trawl fleet was investigated for two stocks 
of North Sea demersal fish, plaice and sole. Catchability was adjusted by accounting for 
specific targeting of the gear, changes in efficiency, seasonal and area effects and individual 
vessel variation. This was undertaken on the basis of results from a GLMM, a mixed effects 
general linear model (GLM) that included random effects (in this case, vessel).  
 
A mixed linear model is a generalization of the standard linear model used in a GLM, the 
generalization being that the data are permitted to exhibit correlation and non-constant 
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variability. The GLMM therefore provided the flexibility of modelling not only the means of 
the data (as in the standard linear model), but also their variances and covariances. The 
method can be applied in cases where fishing fleet surveys are not collated and detailed 
vessel/skipper specific information is not available for a sample (or the whole population). It 
was possible to distinguish between effort measures such as days-at-sea and hours fished (this 
model) and to refit the relationship between fishing mortality and nominal effort (h). Changes 
in fishing efficiency were calculated, and descriptors standardised in relation to distinct 
submétiers and their impact on both target species. 
 
The implications of setting management decisions on effort measured in hours are discussed 
in the context of recent regulations (days-at-sea restrictions) that are having an impact on 
North Sea fleets. Irrespective of potential changes in fishing tactics maximising the number 
of hours fished, increases in efficiency were evident for one stock (sole), whereas decreases 
in efficiency for plaice could indicate increased targeting of sole. More importantly, the slope 
of the regression in each case increased. In practice, this implies that management that 
considers several factors (capacity, seasonal and area effects) that contribute to effective 
effort should be more effective in reducing fishing mortality than management actions based 
purely on nominal effort. The policy implications are such that adjusting effort such as days-
at-sea (or h at sea) by capacity (and taking into account month and area effects) should result 
in greater than proportional decreases in fishing mortality. 
 
The reliability of the relationship between fishing mortality and fishing effort depends on the 
precision of both the measurement of the effort and the estimate of the mortality. In both 
cases, adjusting fishing effort (by taking into account significant explanatory factors) led to a 
substantial gain in the precision of the relationship between fishing mortality and fishing 
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effort. How viable it is to adjust for these by regulation (and the implementation thereof) 
requires further assessment. A key finding of the study was the switch in targeting and the 
changed fishing efficiency, an estimated 6.2% decrease in plaice and an estimated 0.6% 
increase in sole annually for averages calculated over the 11-year study period, probably 
because of changes in targeting, fuel costs and regulations. 
 
In the study, one of the main assumptions is that a fishing vessel capacity unit (VCU) is a 
proxy for capacity. The rationale for this is that up to now, VCUs have been the basis of 
vessel reduction programmes in the UK. Landing rates, i.e. nominal landings per unit effort 
(lpue) was calculated as catch in kg per hours fished per vessel per trip per area. The results 
suggest that a VCU may provide a reasonable approximation of fishing capacity for the beam 
trawl fleet. 
 
The models for this study were heavily reliant on estimates of fishing mortality (F) drawn 
from ICES working groups. If the estimate is biased, however, there will be variances in the 
F~fishing effort relationship. There are issues relating to how lpue models deal with zero 
catches when effort is recorded as non-zero, so adjustments have to be made to account for 
this by including a small catch (the method commonly used). Traditionally, the method has 
been applied by scientists to yield the most normal distribution of residuals when using a log-
transformed dependent variable and a normal error model, but there may be other reasonable 
approaches to the problem.  
 
Physical characteristics that inform on VCU may have been misreported to or not updated in 
the fleet register, in which case raising implications not obvious in the model results. Another 
issue that would bear further investigation in future is to determine whether sales slip data, 
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which contain nominal landings and effort associated with logbook landings, have been input 
correctly at port offices or misreported originally by fishers.  
 
The study has shown clear applications for input control for mixed fisheries management and 
has also complemented other research initiatives such as recent catch quota trials (FVM, 
2009) undertaken by the UK, Denmark and Germany using remote electronic monitoring 
(REM). Future work may need to account for other factors, ranging from non-target fish and 
wider ecosystem impacts to the social and economic implications of effort controls (Cheilari 
et al., 2013) and their impacts on different sub-métiers (ICES, 2009b). 
 
7.6 Fishing for space  
Based on the methods described in Chapter 4, a method was developed using fine spatial 
resolution using Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) data and a discrete choice model to 
analyse the determinants of English and Welsh scallop-dredging fleet behaviour, including 
those of competing sectors operating in the eastern English Channel.  
 
Results showed significantly that aggregate activity and maritime traffic have a negative 
impact on the utility of fishers, and that past success, expected revenue and fishing within the 
12-mile limit have a positive effect on their utility. Based on the results, the model showed 
promising application for Marine Spatial Planning (MSP). One of the main assumptions was 
the way in which value per choice is calculated, as the proportion of the total value per ICES 
rectangle based on effort derived from VMS. The definition of a vessel’s activity derived 
from VMS was formulated from another study (Lee et al., 2010). One of the issues raised in 
this study was not having access to raw/unprocessed maritime traffic data, so a proxy had to 
be used in the form of percentage coverage of maritime traffic lanes. Further, the vessels used 
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were >15 m which, by law have to supply position and activity information. Regrettably, 
fishing data for scallopers <15 m or for international fishing vessel are not readily available 
yet, so future work may well benefit from following up on these components of the scallop 
fleet. The results from the study are nevertheless promising and lay the foundations for 
innovative future work that could include real Marine Conservation Zones (MCZs) and the 
economic implications fishers potentially face from their introduction (Van de Geer et al., 
2013), shipping traffic from Automatic Identification System (AIS) data, including vessel 
position and movement.  It would also be potentially possible to identify fishing vessels at a 
finer temporal and spatial resolution and as such would validate the effort estimates obtained 
from VMS data and give an accurate indication of compliance.  This approach could the be 
applied to the log book effort estimates at a broader scale to give an indication of effort mis-
reporting across management units which is in turn vital for the successful management of 
fish stocks. 
 
7.7 Overall conclusions and future directions 
7.7.1 Model validation 
The overarching objective of this study was to use RUM to explain and predict fisher 
behaviour (e.g. Chapters 3, 4 and 6). This requires variables that can be used to explain the 
observed historic patterns in fisher behaviour and then predict future responses. If future 
conditions have not been seen in the historic observations then future predictions will be 
based on extrapolations.  For example fuel prices have continued to increase and current 
management is aiming to recover stocks to levels that will support MSY (a level which has 
not been seen in the past). Therefore future costs and catch rates will be greater than those 
used to fit the RUM. In Chapter 3 for example, the model fitted the observations well 
showing the main factors that contribute to fisher decision-making; however the r
2
 used to 
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determine its predictive performance was low (0.22); nevertheless r
2
 is not necessary a good 
guide to how well a model predicts as there is a possibility to over fit data by adding too 
many degrees of freedom and increase r
2
.  
 
If a model is to be used to inform the management process and support policy decisions, 
model validation is essential in checking that the model addresses the problems posed and 
describes the system being modelled accurately. Scientific advice provided to managers 
based on exploring the potential outcomes of alternative management strategies, without 
model validation, may result in erroneous decision-making down the line. A model may 
provide the best fit (describing how well the model fits the observations) but it may have poor 
predictive power, i.e. it could be unable to predict future events based on system changes in 
the past not captured in the fit, so a fleet’s response cannot be predicted with certainty. It 
should be noted that models only form part of the inputs of a manager’s decision-making 
toolbox (Grant, 1986; Pitelka and Pitelka 1993). Limits to the range of the data may limit a 
models’ ability to predict because of observations not seen in the fit, and predictions will then 
need to be based on extrapolation. Further, correlations in the data may mean that different 
models fit the data equally well but have poor predictive power. For instance, if fuel prices 
increase while plaice catches decline, there may be a linear relationship (collinearity) 
between the two variables. Choice of variables may depend on whether they can be used as 
control variables by managers to influence costs or catch rates, e.g taxes or TACs and area or 
seasonal closures. However some variables such as stock abundance are not directly 
controllable as they are the result of complex ecological processes. Collinearity means that 
changing one of the variables results in a change in another, and that it is no longer possible 
to predict the effect of a single variable such as fuel price when analysing the marginal effects 
of the explanatory variables. An additional issue currently is that goodness of fit diagnostics 
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for a collinear model can appear to be a highly significant. However, the problems with 
collinearity are not with the model fit but with the parameters. Collinearity can lead to 
erroneous parameter estimation in statistical models (Weisberg, 1985). If predictions are 
performed within the range of the data this may not be a problem, but extrapolating outside 
the range of the data for a collinear model may be risky. Alternative models may equally be 
supported by the data, in which case selecting multiple models and comparing their 
predictions may be beneficial.  
 
Model choice is not necessarily about selecting the best model, because the recognition that 
there may be several equally good explanatory models is important in developing a better 
understanding of system dynamics. Also, simple models will help in generalisation, i.e. they 
will work in scenarios different from those in which the model was developed and tested. 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) can help alleviate the problems of multi-collinearity in 
the dataset by converting correlated variables into uncorrelated components. It performs this 
by identifying directions in the data and places them in components with the greatest 
variation and uses linear combinations of the variables to describe the component. These 
linear projections provide a platform on which to base outputs from correlation matrices in 
supporting variable selection for the model(s).  
 
Future work will be to evaluate whether fisher behaviour can be predicted based on past 
behaviour and whether these models can be used to model changes in fishing effort in 
response to management, economics and changes in stocks and to evaluate whether it is 
actually possible based on the data availability, i.e. what I currently have and what is needed.   
One option for future work to better assess the performance of a model when there are 
sufficient data, and one that is widely adopted by other researchers to assess the true error of 
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a model, is a statistical process called cross-validation (Kohavi, 1995). Cross validation is 
becoming a more widely used technique adopted by ecologists (although it seems to be less 
well used in fisheries science) used to provide defensible hypothesis about processes and 
conclusions (e.g. Boyce et al., 2002). The basic theory behind cross-validation is to split the 
data by removing a portion to build a model (the training set), then using the remainder of the 
data (the test set) to test the performance of the training set model by computing the mean 
square error. The procedure is repeated k times by randomly partitioning different portions of 
the data in turn and predicting the test set k−1. Each model is then assessed on the different 
subsets of the data it predicts and an average proportion predicted is compared with the 
observed data from each test set. A confusion matrix can then be created to assess model 
performance, including a statistical test of index of agreement called a weighted kappa score 
between classifications of observed vs. predicted for each model. The weighted kappa takes 
account of data anomalies such as class skew (specificity and sensitivity). The model with the 
highest score for kappa would be considered the best predictor. Sensitivity and specificity 
confidence interval score can be assessed, confidence intervals calculated and the trade-offs 
observed through plotting receiver operator curves (ROCs).  
 
In terms of my analyses, I evaluated my choice predictions using iterative partial cross 
validation by fitting the model over a series of separate time-periods and comparing with the 
observed choices (Chapter 4), although this can be a time consuming process. Indeed, 
Apostalaki et al. (2008) emphasized this common problem faced by scientists and stated that 
validation testing imposed delays on the inclusion of new knowledge, and the reluctance to 
include new knowledge due to time constraints.  Nevertheless on-going research will factor in 
more time for cross validation and quality control checks and the possible implementation of 
new knowledge as it arises. 
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7.7.2 Qualitative survey 
Several authors have stressed the importance of including fisher knowledge in management 
decision-making (McGoodwin, 2006; Menzies and Butler, 2006). Fisher knowledge was 
absent from this study because there was no time or resource to conduct a qualitative survey, 
so assumptions had to be made in the models constructed. Most fisher behaviour analyses 
based on decision theory has been constructed via theoretical economic theory and/or 
knowledge that’s been published (Abernethy et al., 2007). However, there are often issues of 
trust with respect to data confidentiality and how the data may be used by governing 
authorities (Degnbol and Wilson, 2008). Surveys also have to be conducted in a particular 
way, because respondents can influence the direction of the interview. An interview should 
not guide the interviewee, but for a thorough overview, an interview is best conducted using a 
semi-structured process (Bernard, 1994). A qualitative study would give a better 
understanding of fisher knowledge and the external factors influencing fisher behaviour, and 
it would also give the opportunity to potentially validate many of the assumptions made in 
this thesis.  More importantly having this knowledge would increase the success of proposed 
management strategies in terms of willingness to comply and respect (Dimech et al., 2009). 
 
7.7.3 Management strategy evaluation (MSE)  
Improved understanding of the key sources of uncertainty is required for fishery management 
to be effective. One method to determine the effectiveness of management plans is to use a 
simulation approach known as management strategy evaluation (MSE; Kirkwood, 1997; 
Butterworth and Punt, 1999; Sainsbury et al., 2000; Kell et al., 2007, Butterworth et al., 
2010). New tools are currently being developed to evaluate methods for providing scientific 
advice to fishery managers, including MSE, in collaboration with stakeholders (e.g. the EU-
funded project JAKFISH: https://www.surfgroepen.nl/sites/jakfish/default.aspx). The process 
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is known as participatory modelling, and scientists and stakeholders develop flexible, 
transparent models to enhance common understanding of biological and fishery management 
issues, so reducing the risks and consequences of implementing different management plans 
and also involving fishers more in the management process. Early MSE focused on target 
species (Kell et al., 2007), but recent MSE have focussed on the broader impacts of fishing, 
e.g. ecosystem-based fisheries management, with management strategies being evaluated 
based on a set of environmental indicators (e.g. Pikitch et al., 2004, on the EU-funded project 
IMAGE, http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp6/ssp/image_en.htm). Ecosystems are complex, 
dynamic and poorly understood, so predicting the results of any management plan at an 
ecosystem level is highly uncertain. MSE methods rely on simulation testing to assess the 
consequences of a range of management options and to evaluate each performance measure 
across a range of objectives, requiring the use of an operating model (OM; see Figure 7.1) to 
simulate the actual system to be managed and to evaluate the performance of alternative 
candidate management procedures (MPs) to be applied in practice.  
 
Testing an MP should essentially be a blind experiment where information about the system 
is limited to the data available to the stock assessment. Performance statistics based on the 
OM (e.g. yield, probability of stock collapse) are then used to evaluate the performance of 
management against its objectives. MSE allows for testing the robustness of different 
management strategies to a lack of knowledge and/or data, both being major problems in 
providing advice under current advisory frameworks. Under the MSE approach, the objective 
is no longer to come up with the single answer, but to evaluate the consequences of different 
management strategies under alternative assumptions about overall system dynamics, i.e. its 
robustness to uncertainty. An important aspect of MSE is that the management outcomes 
from the harvest control rule (HCR) are fed back into the operating model so that their 
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influence on the simulated stock, and hence on future simulated fisheries data, is propagated 
through the stock’s dynamics. Traditional stock assessment has mainly considered just 
uncertainty in the observation process (e.g. recruitment). Uncertainty about the actual 
dynamics (i.e. model uncertainty) can have an even greater impact on whether management 
objectives are achieved (Punt, 2008). However, the effects of a HCR can be quite different 
from those intended because of the response of fishers to economic incentives and, as such, 
HCRs are generally poorly equipped to represent human welfare and MSEs tend not to 
represent implementation error well (Milner-Gulland, 2011).  
 
A current challenge is to characterise and communicate uncertainty involving a range of 
stakeholders and to integrate ecosystem and economic models more fully into MSEs. 
Incorporating fleet behaviour into an MSE framework would reveal the benefits of fleet 
behaviour models, and this would be a necessary step forward in the use of MSE as an 
advisory tool (Venables et al., 2009).  
 
In future there would be value in attempting to incorporate the behavioural model developed 
in this thesis into a MSE, to evaluate retrospectively the observed behavioural response of a 
fleet to management measures implemented against model prediction, then to use the results 
to quantify the uncertainty in the predicted response to reveal the magnitude of the 
implementation error associated with model prediction. However, the bigger question is 
likely to be what should be in an MSE? For instance, what or how many assumptions about 
the fleet need to be made in terms of what is realistic to include, given the data and history of 
technical changes, and of course what is the cost of collecting more data if that is deemed 
necessary. Also, what is practical to manage, and can we manage at the level of a métier?  
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Figure 7.1 Conceptual framework of the MSE (see text above) that includes (i) an 
operating model that represents alternative plausible hypotheses about stock and 
fishery dynamics; (ii) an observation error model that describes how simulated fishery 
data are sampled from the operating model and (iii) a management procedure or 
management strategy that estimates stock status from the pseudo-data and generates 
management outcomes. Note that in this case implementation error is represented in 
the implementation of management options box. 
 
Fisheries management has progressed over the course of the 20
th
 century, but given the large 
proportion of stocks that are depleted or over exploited (FAO, 2010), the threat to many 
coastal communities, and the increasing number of marine species that have been lost or 
listed as endangered (Dulvy et al., 2003), there is a clear need for improved management. As 
the European Community and other nation states move towards EBFM, in order to balance 
food production and security with wider ecosystem concerns, the types of model developed 
here will be of increasing importance in developing robust management plans which properly 
account for fisher and fleet behaviour. 
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